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3Abstract
Debt management is of high importance for ﬁnancial professionals and is a complex man-
agerial decision, since the uncertainty of business cashﬂows may undermine the availability of
ﬁnancing, stress business operations and diminish future growth prospects. Whilst the manage-
ment of corporate debt has sparked much interest and been widely discussed in the academic
literature, none of the existing theories address this problem comprehensively.
This thesis considers debt management decisions in non-ﬁnancial corporations; it tests em-
pirically various existing theories, establishes several stylised facts regarding funding decisions
and contributes to the current research by exploring the inﬂuence of industry speciﬁc factors,
ﬁnancial intermediates and market conditions on debt management. Using U.S. data at the
company level, the ﬁrst study explores the variation of debt maturity across industry. Also,
using both European bond and loan aggregate data, the second and third studies are the ﬁrst
ones, which highlight the impact of ﬁnancial intermediates on both debt issuance and debt
maturity timing strategies. The present work therefore oﬀers both a cross-sectional overview
of debt management and an analysis of its dynamics over time.
The results indicate that (i) in addition to ﬁrm's characteristics, the cross-sectional variation
of debt maturity can be explained by industry speciﬁc factors, which are not captured in
the existing literature, (ii) that the agency cost hypothesis appears to be irrelevant for large
cap ﬁrms, therefore giving more weight to the maturity-matching principle and the signaling
hypothesis in explaining debt maturity structure, (iii) that managers tend to time their credit
borrowing spread when they issue bonds and switch to the loan market during high interest
rate periods, therefore contradicting earlier claims that interest rate timing explains time-series
variations of debt issuance and (iv) that while corporates debt maturity mirror government
debt maturity when directly placed debt is considered, ﬁnancial intermediates act as a barrier
to corporate debt maturity timing strategy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Capital structure is at the heart of ﬁnancial management decisions and is a top priority
for corporate ﬁnancial oﬃcers (CFOs). Ensuring optimal ﬁnancing to support business perfor-
mance is a key management skill that shareholders seek in order to support growth and prevent
the destruction of value. In this context, careful debt management is of high importance for
ﬁnancial professionals and is a complex managerial decision, given that the uncertainty of
business cashﬂows may undermine the availability of ﬁnancing, stress business operations and
diminish future growth prospects. Whilst debt management has sparked much interest and
led to much discussion in the academic literature over the past several decades, none of the
existing theories address this problem comprehensively.
This thesis considers debt management decisions of non-ﬁnancial corporations, speciﬁcally
choices concerning debt maturity, their dynamics and decisions on the scheduling of debt
issuance. It tests empirically several existing theories and broadens current research by ex-
ploring the inﬂuence of industry speciﬁcity, ﬁnancial intermediaries and market conditions on
debt management. As such, this study oﬀers a cross-sectional overview of debt management
and an analysis of the variations of debt maturity and debt issuance over time.
Chapter 2 consists of an empirical analysis of debt maturity decisions across diﬀerent in-
dustries using U.S. data. It tests several theories which address the problem of debt maturity
choice and contributes to the existing research by paying particular attention to the particu-
larities of industry and their eﬀects on debt maturity. In keeping with previous studies, the
results show that ﬁrms attempt to match the maturity of their liabilities with the maturity
13
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of their assets. In addition, high-quality ﬁrms are found to have shorter debt maturity than
low-quality ﬁrms. In contrast to the existing literature, the growth opportunity eﬀect is found
to be irrelevant for large cap ﬁrms, showing, however, that the management of debt maturity
structure is, in part, industry speciﬁc. This study explores why this industry speciﬁcity might
make sense.
Indeed, whilst ﬁrms' characteristics explain ﬁrms' debt maturity reasonably well, segregat-
ing the data into sectors reveals further important information: industries such as materials,
telecommunication services and utilities are found to have a debt structure with longer matu-
rities than theories predict. This ﬁnding is presumably the result of their natural monopoly
structure, the fact that they have long-lived collateral and regulatory constraints. In contrast,
under-performing sectors or sectors subject to the bursting of speculative bubbles are found
to face severe credit rationing through an 'over' shortening of their debt maturity. The latter,
in turn, not only reﬂects the inﬂuence of the state on the wider economy of debt maturity but
also gives weight to industry-speciﬁc economic factors.
Chapter 3 is an empirical study of the market timing of debt issuance in the eurozone. The
study, in keeping with previous literature, explores managers' market timing ability, i.e. their
ability to issue new debt when market conditions are favourable, in particular when interest
rates are low compared with past rates. The novelty of the analysis lays in (i) the study of the
inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediaries or banks on the market timing of funding decisions and
(ii) the attention paid to short-horizon timing strategy.
In contrast to previous analyses, this study uses eurozone data. The ﬁnancing structure
of corporations in the eurozone has changed signiﬁcantly in recent years but, nonetheless,
remains primarily bank-orientated. The use of eurozone data thus allows one to assess whether
earlier ﬁndings derived from U.S. data carry over to a diﬀerent ﬁnancial market. It also oﬀers
the possibility of focusing more clearly on the inﬂuence of banks on debt issuance timing
strategy. In addition, and again in contrast to the existing literature, this study speciﬁcally
considers short-term timing strategies. Using monthly aggregate data on corporate loan and
bond issuance, it asks whether debt issuance is more likely to happen when the cost of borrowing
is low compared with costs in the recent past.
The results contribute to the existing knowledge since, contrary to earlier studies, they show
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little evidence that corporates issue debt in an attempt to time the interest rate market. This
is most evident when ﬁnancing is done through ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks. The
results suggest, instead, that: (i) managers switch between bond and loan issuance depending
on interest rate conditions, speciﬁcally showing themselves more likely to undertake bank loans
in high interest rate environments; and, (ii) managers tend to time their credit spreads when
scheduling their bond issuance since they appear to issue more bonds when their credit spread
is low compared to recent levels; a ﬁnding not observed in the loan market highlighting the
inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediates on credit spread timing attempts. In addition, the results
show only mixed evidence that managers issue more debt when they expect economic conditions
to worsen in the near future.
Chapter 4 to some extent combines the topics covered in Chapters 2 and 3 since it, too,
considers the market timing of debt maturity decisions. This chapter empirically explores,
more speciﬁcally, the variation over time in the maturity structure of the eurozone debt capital
market and tests four empirical predictions of the recent 'gap-ﬁlling' theory. This theory claims
to explain why time series variation in debt maturity is observed by arguing that corporate
debt maturity choices are inﬂuenced by government debt maturity.
Whilst similar in spirit to the existing literature, the analysis contributes to current research
by: (i) concentrating on eurozone debt markets, considering not only bond data but also
data on bank loans which, again, gives the opportunity to observe the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial
intermediaries; (ii) using a more detailed set of data compared with previous papers, with
monthly gross, net and outstanding debt volumes used for each type of debt; and, (iii) using
a vector auto regression model in addition to ordinary least squares regressions to illustrate
the eﬀects of shocks in government debt maturity on corporate debt maturity, examining how
quickly corporates adjust their debt maturity in light of changes in government debt maturity.
The results show that, in aggregate, corporates aim to react to government debt maturity.
In particular, they do so when government debt is large and market liquidity is high, as well as
during turbulent credit market conditions as seen during the recent credit crisis. The results
are found to be of greater relevance for the corporate bond market than for the corporate loan
market: a ﬁnding not observed in Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) since they concentrated
their study on the bond market only. The present results therefore contribute to the existing
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knowledge since they suggest that ﬁnancial intermediaries may attenuate gap-ﬁlling strategies.
In contrast, the results show only mixed evidence with regards to the predictive power of
government bond maturity on excess bond returns.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and discusses opportunities for further research in non-ﬁnancial
corporate debt management.
Chapter 2
Industry Speciﬁcity of Debt Maturity
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2.1 Introduction
The decision concerning debt maturity is one of several ﬁnancing choices that a ﬁrm must
take when determining how to ﬁnance itself. If a ﬁrm opts for issuing debt rather than equity,
it must also decide upon the maturity of that debt, its seniority, whether to issue public or
private debt, as well as other contractual provisions including call and convertibility features
and restrictive covenants. The aim of the present study is to investigate the determinants
of corporations' funding decisions, in particular the choices made concerning the maturity
of corporate debt. The study elaborates stylized facts about funding decisions in diﬀerent
industries and examines the validity of diﬀerent theoretical explanations of maturity choice.
Survey evidence has suggested that ﬁrms are concerned with ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and credit
ratings when issuing debt. This observation, however, is not consistent with corporate ﬁnance
theory, which suggests that, under certain conditions, policy about ﬁnancing is irrelevant.
Most recent theories have attempted to explain why ﬁnancial policy matters by relaxing some
of these assumptions; in doing so, they have tended to predict that the use of short-term debt
is preferred. Empirical studies such as those of Bowen, Lane and Huber (1982)1have shown
that debt ratios diﬀer systematically in diﬀerent industries. Their study, however, does not
provide much in the way of insights into the maturity structure of corporate debt claims.
The aim of the present study is to test the diﬀerent hypotheses developed in the literature
by examining the variation of the structure of debt maturity in diﬀerent industries. Existing
empirical analyses about debt maturity decisions, which are presented later in this Chapter,
have looked either at the US corporate sector as a whole - Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and
Mauer (1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003), Datta, Iskandar-
Datta and Raman (2005), Harford, Li and Zhao (2008) or have more narrowly examined
the variation of the structure of debt maturity in diﬀerent countries - Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999), Fan, Titman and Twite (2005). Thus far, no study has set out to examine
the structure of debt maturity within an industry-speciﬁc framework. The present work bridges
that gap. In addition, this study speciﬁcally adresses debt maturity choice decisions for large
1In particular, Bowen, Lane and Huber (1982) found evidence for DeAngelo-Masulis's (1980) proposition, which asserted
that the reliance on the use of tax shelters plays a signiﬁcant role in determining the optimal use of debt for the capital
structure of non-regulated ﬁrms at the industry level.
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cap ﬁrms. This, in turn, aﬀects the results compared to previous literature since it highlights
the eﬀect of ﬁrm's size on the diﬀerent hypotheses tested.
Using ﬁrm-level data for diﬀerent cross-sections between 1998 and 2010, this study begins
by providing a descriptive analysis of the variation of debt maturity in diﬀerent industries.
Then, several theories of corporate ﬁnance that address the choice of debt maturity are tested
in diﬀerent industries by use of cross-sectional OLS regressions. In particular, the eﬀect on
industry of the choice of debt maturity is made clear by the introduction of dummy variables
representing each of the sectors and, then, the choices are investigated in more detail by means
of industry-speciﬁc OLS regressions.
This study contributes to the existing knowledge in the following ways. The results obtained
strongly support both the maturity-matching principle and the signalling hypothesis. This
study, however, ﬁnds little support for agency-theory explanations of maturity choice, though
Diamond's liquidity risk hypothesis cannot be rejected. Since this study focuses exclusively
on large cap ﬁrms, the results demonstrate that the growth opportunity eﬀect, commonly
supported in the existing literature - Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996),
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005), Harford, Li and Zhao (2008), appear to be of lesser
importance for large cap ﬁrms. This, in turn, gives more weight to the validity of the maturity-
matching and signalling hypotheses for large cap ﬁrms. This is a new stylised fact since, as far
as I am aware, no prior study demonstrated the agency cost hypothesis has almost no eﬀect
on the management of the maturity of debt in large cap ﬁrms.
In addition, segregating the data into sectors leads to additional signiﬁcant ﬁndings: in-
dustries such as materials, telecommunication services and utilities are found to have a longer
maturity debt structure than theories would suggest. I suggest that these observations are
likely due to the longevity of their collateral, their natural monopoly structure and regulatory
constraints, which all create high barriers to entry. These observations, coupled with the inﬂu-
ence of merger and acquisition activities on debt maturity seen in the energy sector highlight
the possible eﬀects of market structure on debt maturity; a possibility, which, as far as I aware,
has never been put forward in the existing literature.
Furthermore, the results demonstrate that the state of the economy plays an important role
in inﬂuencing debt maturity choices: under-performing sectors or sectors subject to collapse
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in a speculative bubble (such as information technology in the early 2000s) face severe credit
rationing leading to an 'over-shortening' of their debt maturity. It is clearly evident, as well,
that the 2008 credit crisis aﬀected all sectors, emphasising the fact that economic conditions
have an eﬀect on the choice of debt maturity.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a review of existing funding policies,
Section 2.3 is an overview of the research approach and methodology of the present study,
Section 2.4 describes the key results, and Section 2.5 is a conclusion.
2.2 Literature review
This section summarises current theories of corporate structures of debt maturity proposed
by the classic corporate framework and discusses some of the empirical ﬁndings of previous
studies.
2.2.1 Theory of debt maturity structure
The maturity of debt is a topic that has been much discussed. Modigliani and Miller (1958)
showed that in competitive, frictionless markets, and in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs
and asymmetries of information, corporate ﬁnancial policy is irrelevant. Three immediate
corollaries arise, namely the irrelevance of ﬁnancing decisions, the independence of a ﬁrm's
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) from its capital structure and a positive association
between the cost of equity and the debt-equity ratio.2
Stiglitz (1969, 1974) further demonstrated Modigliani and Miller's theorem within a frame-
work of general equilibrium and showed that individual investors are indiﬀerent to ﬁrms' ﬁ-
nancial policies, particularly as it concerns the maturity of debt: investors can counteract, at
a personal level, any of the ﬁrm's decisions.
Subsequent theoretical literature on the role of the structure debt maturity on ﬁrms' values
has relaxed the hypotheses made by Modigliani and Miller and Stiglitz. Barclay and Smith
(1995) suggested that the classic literature on corporate ﬁnance, which addresses the choice
of debt maturity, can be categorized into three main groups: contracting-cost hypotheses,
2That is, the value of a ﬁrm is independent of its capital structure and its WACC depends on the future stream of cash
ﬂows.
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signalling hypotheses, and tax hypotheses. These core theories and their empirical predictions
are presented below.
2.2.1.1 The contracting-cost hypothesis and the underinvestment problem
Contract theory provides insights into corporate debt-maturity choice and demonstrates
that a ﬁrm's opportunities for growth and its size are important factors.
Myers (1977) introduced the underinvestment problem, whereby leveraged ﬁrms pass up
projects with a positive net present value that would be taken by all equity-ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
Indeed, he has argued that the issuance of debt for the purpose of ﬁnancing current investment
can impair investment incentives as the beneﬁts would accrue to debt-holders. According to his
study, only debt maturing after an investment option is exercised induces suboptimal decisions.
Therefore, a simple way to avoid problems of underinvestment is to shorten the maturity of
debt by issuing and rolling over short-term debt. While this roll-over strategy cannot be
followed continuouslysince the same problem will occur with long-term debt rolling-over
short-term debt oﬀers the ﬂexibility for 'shareholders to shift back at any time to all equity
ﬁnancing'. It therefore prevents problems with underinvestment.3
Another implication of contract theory is an eﬀect of ﬁrm size. Mauer and Stohs (1996) and
Antonios, Guney and Paudyal (2002) have argued that ﬁrms with relatively large numbers of
future investment opportunities tend to be smaller. The intuition is that small ﬁrms are likely
to face more severe agency conﬂicts than large ones, and they may, as a result, use short-term
debt to mitigate these conﬂicts. Empirically, a ﬁrm's debt maturity should be negatively and
positively correlated to the ﬁrm's opportunities for growth and its size, respectively.
2.2.1.2 Asymmetry of information
Another theory that seeks to explain debt-maturity choice is based on an asymmetry of in-
formation between insiders and outsiders of a ﬁrm. In particular, the agency problem associated
with informational asymmetry and the signalling hypothesis may lead to speciﬁc debt-maturity
3It is obvious that costs related to the maintenance of such ﬂexibility should be considered. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet
(1980) have shown that Myer's type of problem with suboptimal future-investment decisions can be solved either by the
issuance of debt with call provision or by rolling over claims to short-maturity debt . See also Hart and Moore (1995), who
have extended Myer's model by assuming that managers have empire-building tendencies.
CHAPTER 2. INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY OF DEBT MATURITY 22
characteristics. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) have argued that, in the absence of sig-
nalling, entrepreneurs suﬀering from an undervaluation of their investment opportunities can
recapture part of their loss through the issuance of callable debt or by shortening the maturity
of their debt claims.4 Debt should, indeed, be called immediately after the revelation of the
ﬁrm's true nature to avoid the beneﬁts accruing to the bondholders. Shortening the maturity
of debt claims is analogous to attaching a call provision to the bond issue.5 Consequently,
call provisions and the roll-over of short-term debt are optimal strategies that can be used to
prevent a ﬁrm's undervaluation as a result of informational asymmetry.
Flannery (1986) has since shown that, in the presence of the signalling hypothesis but in
the absence of ﬁnancial transaction costs, the debt market will have a pooling equilibrium,
with every ﬁrm borrowing at the same rate. As such, outsiders will not be able to distinguish
a high-quality ﬁrm from a low-quality ﬁrm. High-quality ﬁrms will pay a positive premium
when the market treats them as average, while low-quality ﬁrms will pay a negative premium.
In contrast, when debt issuance is costly and ﬁrms are better informed than the outside world
about their expected future performance, they will issue the types of securities that the market
values the most. Intuitively, low-quality ﬁrms will be willing to lengthen their debt maturity in
order to avoid expected increases in costs in rolling over short-term debt, whilst high-quality
ﬁrms will tend to shorten their debt maturity in order to beneﬁt from decreases in interest costs
resulting from announcements of strong performance. 6 As a consequence, Flannery's (1986)
signalling hypothesis predicts that ﬁrms shorten their outstanding debt's average maturity to
4More speciﬁcally, if an entrepreneur has an investment opportunity A while the market thinks that he has an investment
opportunity B, if the truth were revealed the market would have valued investment A more. As a consequence, given an
asymmetry of information, project A, as well as the ﬁrm, are undervalued. Part of the loss for the entrepreneur could
be recaptured if he were to add a call provision on top of the new debt such that the value of the call compensated him
for his loss. The loss for the entrepreneur can be measured by the diﬀerence between the market value of debt related to
investment A and the market value of debt related to investment B (VD(A)− VD(B)). The amount of callable debt that the
entrepreneur should issue is (VC(A)− VC(B)), where VC(A) and VC(B) are the value of the call option related to project A
and B, respectively. In other words, the entrepreneur knows that project A is worth more, so as soon as the true nature of
the ﬁrm is revealed, it is in his interest to call his debt as soon as possible to avoid the beneﬁts to accrue to the bondholders
if the maturity of the debt is after the date of the revelation.
5Shortening the maturity of the debt to within the period before the revelation of the ﬁrm's true nature is of no value.
6Suppose, for example, a model with two time periods where low-quality ﬁrms issue short-term debt at the beginning of
the ﬁrst period. When the true nature of the project or, equally, of the ﬁrm is revealed at the end of the ﬁrst period, low-
quality ﬁrms are likely to face high reﬁnancing costs for the remainder of the period as they will have to pay the transaction
costs related to the reﬁnancing of its old debt. It is also relatively highly probable that they will also have to pay a high
rate in the second period, since lenders will require compensation for bearing the risk of ﬁnancing a high-risk project. In
contrast, high-quality ﬁrms face a lower probability of a high default premium in the second period and, thus, are willing to
bear the transaction costs to obtain the lower rate on short-term debt in the ﬁrst period.
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signal their credit quality. Empirically, a linear relationship between a ﬁrm's credit quality and
its debt maturity is therefore predicted.
In a similar framework, Diamond (1991, 1993) has examined the eﬀect of liquidity risk,
in essence extending Flannery's model to include liquidity-risk constraints. Thus, Diamond
analysed debt-maturity choice as a trade-oﬀ between the borrower's preference for short-term
debt due to private information about the ﬁrm's future credit rating7 and the borrower's will-
ingness to assume liquidity risk. Liquidity risk from short-term debt arises when the borrower
is unable to obtain reﬁnancing. Since borrowers are adverse to bearing this risk, more highly
rated ﬁrms prefer short-term debt as a type of 'bridge ﬁnancing that allows them to choose to
reﬁnance when good news arrives, while lower rated borrowers prefer long-term debt'. What
is more, credit rationing favours short-term debt lending. Some very low-rated borrowers may
have no choice but to use short-term debt as the amount that is pledged to lenders may be
less than the value they receive from liquidation.
Diamond (1991, 1993) has suggested that highly levered ﬁrms would choose longer-term
debt as they are more likely to be unable to repay debt than a less levered ﬁrm. As a con-
sequence, borrowing long-term debt allows them to avoid reﬁnancing risk. Thus Diamond
(1991, 1993) has identiﬁed two categories of short-term borrowers: low-rated ﬁrms who have
no choice, and high-rated ﬁrms who use short-term debt to coordinate their borrowing to lower
their cost of funding by taking advantage of the arrival of good news. Borrowers with ratings
in between these or with high levels of debt rely more heavily on long-term debt. A non-
monotonic relation between debt maturity and credit rating is therefore expected according to
Diamond's theory.
2.2.1.3 Tax beneﬁt of debt and bankruptcy costs
The last area of corporate ﬁnance that attempts to explain corporate debt-maturity choice
considers frictional costs such as taxes, bankruptcy and transaction costs. Brennan and
Schwartz (1978) have shown that in the presence of tax and bankruptcy costs, the optimal
leverage ratio decreases with maturity. They have also argued that in the absence of trans-
action costs, it is optimal to issue and redeem short-term debt continuously as 'bankruptcy
7Flannery's model is not as speciﬁc as Diamond's as it attaches importance to the ﬁrm's quality in general. Diamond
has speciﬁcally deﬁned the ﬁrm's quality by its credit rating.
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costs may be avoided while the tax saving is still enjoyed.' Boyce and Kalotay (1979) have
established tax conditions under which long-term debt and short-term leverage are optimal.
They have shown that, under certain conditions, the maturity of debt can aﬀect the after-tax
cost of debt. In particular, they have found that a rising-term structure of interest rates implies
that long-term debt is optimal.
Brick and Ravid (1985) have extended the models of Boyce and Kalotay (1979) and Bren-
nan and Schwartz (1978) by allowing for default, possible agency costs, and a non-ﬂat term
structure of interest rates. Intuitively, borrowers seek to accelerate interest payments in order
to maximise the present value of interest tax shields, while lenders seek to slow down interest
payments to minimise the present value of their tax liabilities. In the presence of non-stochastic
interest rates, long-term debt will increase the present value of debt tax beneﬁts if the term
structure of interest rates is increasing. Indeed, if the yield curve is upward sloping, inter-
est expenses are more heavily discounted in later years than in the near future, accelerating
the present value of the interest expense in the near future. Issuing long-term debt, then,
maximises the amount of leverage that the ﬁrm may employ for a given probability of default
and thus increases the ﬁrm's current market value.8 For the same reason, a decreasing term
structure, on the other hand, calls for short-term debt.
Finally, it is usually prescribed that matching debt maturity to asset life is a form of
corporate hedging that reduces the expected costs of ﬁnancial distress. Indeed, if debt has a
shorter maturity than assets, there may not be enough cash on hand to repay the principal
when it is due. The reverse is also true: if debt has a longer maturity, then cash ﬂows from
assets may cease while debt payments remain due.9
Interestingly, Morris (1976) has analysed the implications of debt-maturity policies on the
variance of net income, the cost of capital and the systematic risk of the ﬁrm's equity in
the context of the classic 'capital asset pricing model'. He has argued that, under certain
circumstances, a policy of rolling short-term debt over can decrease the variance of net income
8Brick and Ravid (1991) have extended this tax-based debt-maturity model to the case where interest rates are stochastic.
They concluded that in addition to the acceleration of tax beneﬁts, uncertainty introduces a capacity factor that always
favours long-term debt.
9Diamond (1991) has argued that liquidity risk arises from debt that is of a shorter maturity than assets. One way to
circumvent this is to deﬁne debt maturity by coordinating its timing with cash ﬂows generated by assets in place. Brick
and Ravid's (1991) model allowing for uncertainty about interest rates has shown consistency with the maturity-matching
principle used by investment bankers.
CHAPTER 2. INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY OF DEBT MATURITY 25
compared with a policy hedging maturity in which the maturity of the loan equals the life of
the asset. In periods of prosperity (recession), net operating income and interest rates may
tend to increase (decrease) together, so much so that the increase (decrease) in net income
is limited. His ﬁnding complements Diamond's (1991, 1993) theory since it oﬀers managers
some ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. However, as Diamond (1991, 1993) has argued, rolling debt over time
might be costly.
The main ﬁnancial theories which have addressed the choice of debt maturity presented in
detail in this section demonstrate that the choice of debt maturity is a complex managerial
decision. The next section summarises the empirical predictions which result from the theories
presented above and discusses empirical ﬁndings of the existing literature.
2.2.2 Previous empirical analysis: an overview
2.2.2.1 Empirical predictions
Current theories imply that choices of debt maturity are subject to multiple inﬂuences.
These inﬂuences may be summarised as follows.
1. The agency-cost hypothesis emphasises that a ﬁrm's debt maturity decreases:
a) the larger the proportion of growth opportunities in its investment opportunity set.
b) the smaller its size.
2. The signalling theory predicts that high-quality ﬁrms use shorter-term debt as opposed to low-quality
ﬁrms, which use long-term debt.
3. The liquidity risk argument implies that
a) ﬁrms with high or very low credit ratings use shorter-term debt, while other ﬁrms use longer-
term debt.
b) highly leveraged ﬁrms use long-term debt.
4. The tax hypothesis predicts that debt maturity increases
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a) as a ﬁrm's eﬀective tax rate decreases.10
b) as the volatility of a ﬁrm's value decreases.11
c) as the slope of the term structure increases.
5. The matching hypothesis predicts that debt maturity is positively related to asset maturity.
The various theories of debt-maturity structure provide a mixture of cross-sectional and
time-series predictions.12 Whilst agency cost, signalling, liquidity-risk and maturity-matching
predictions are primarily cross-sectional, tax hypothesis and term-structure slope predictions
are time-series in nature. As the approach of the present study involves concentrating on
cross-sectional evidence, the tax hypothesis is not tested below.
2.2.2.2 Empirical results from the literature
Empirical results reported in the literature are mixed concerning the implications of ﬁnance
theory for the maturity structure of debt. For example, Barclay and Smith (1995)13 and
Harford et al. (2008) have found strong empirical support for the under-investment problem
since their results provided evidence that ﬁrms with fewer opportunities for growth have more
long-term debt in their capital structures. Using two-stage least-squares regressions, Barclay,
Marx and Smith (2003) demonstrated the endogeneity of debt maturity and leverage and
further evidenced that the larger growth options in the investment opportunity set, the lower
the ﬁrm's leverage and its proportion of long-term debt. As such, they claimed that `leverage
and maturity are substitutes in addressing the under- and over-investment problems.' Their
results contradict those of both Graham and Harvey (2001) and Stohs and Mauer (1996),
who found little evidence that ﬁrms use short-term debt to mitigate the underinvestment
10See Stohs and Mauer (1996).
11See Stohs and Mauer (1996).
12See also Guedes and Opler (1996), Table 1, p. 1816
13Barclay and Smith (1995) performed an empirical analysis to test the contracting-cost hypothesis, signalling hypothesis
and tax hypothesis. They regressed the percentage of debt that matures in more than three years on the ﬁrm's market-to-
book ratio, the ﬁrm's value, the ﬁrm's abnormal earnings and the risk-free term structure. Their results, in line with Stohs
and Mauer (1996), did not support Brick and Ravid's (1985, 1991) tax hypothesis since the term structure did not appear
to aﬀect the debt-maturity choice. Guedes and Opler (1996) found no signiﬁcant results with regards to the tax hypothesis;
they do not, however, reject it.
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problem14. However, Stohs and Mauer (1996) have found that larger ﬁrms have longer debt-
maturity structures, in turn providing some evidence in favour of the agency-cost hypothesis
since it can be argued that small ﬁrms are more likely to face agency conﬂicts. Barclay et al.
(2003) results also contradict the ones from Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005), who
interested by the inﬂuence of managerial stock ownership on debt maturity, found evidence
that managers with high proportion of ﬁrm's stock are incentivised to choose a signiﬁcantly
greater proportion of short maturity debt than their counterparts with low equity ownership,
even when their set of growth opportunities is low.
Moreover, Barclay and Smith (1995) have found little evidence that ﬁrms use the maturity
of debt to signal information to the market. Instead, they claimed that ﬁrms with larger
information asymmetries issue more short-term debt. This is in contrast to Berger, et al.
(2005), who found evidence consistent with Flannery's model that debt maturity is an upward-
sloping function of a ﬁrm's risk and to Harford et al. (2008) or Datta et al. (2005), who found
that ﬁrms with strong boards, or managers with high stock ownership respectively, will make
greater use of short term debt thereby committing to more frequent monitoring. It is worth
noting that Berger, et al. (2005) did not ﬁnd that highly risky ﬁrms rely on short-term debt
as predicted by Diamond's model, a ﬁnding very much in line with Datta et al. (2005), who
argued that managers with low stock ownership use longer maturity debt even when liquidation
risk is low. On the other hand, Stohs and Mauer (1996) found strong support for the liquidity
hypothesis as captured by the non-monotonic relationship between the debt-maturity structure
and bond rating.
Finally Graham and Harvey (2001), in line with Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Ozkan (2000),
found strong support for the matching hypothesis. In addition to manager's concerns about
the volatility of ﬁnancial income, reﬁnancing risk and credit rating, Graham and Harvey (2001)
found strong evidence that managers pay particular attention to the maturity of their assets
when choosing between short- and long-term debt.
It is worth noting that both Barclay and Smith's (1995) and Stohs and Mauer's (1996)
analyses examined debt maturity based on a ﬁrm's outstanding debt. As Barclay and Smith
14Stohs and Mauer's deﬁnition of long-term debt was diﬀerent to that of Barclay and Smith. In addition, Barclay and
Smith did not control for leverage in their regressions, deﬁned in Stohs and Mauer as the ratio of total debt (the sum of
long-term debt, long-term debt due within one year and short-term debt) to the estimate of the market value of the ﬁrm.
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(1995) suggested, it might be more powerful to examine new debt issuance so as better to
understand how ﬁrms choose claims on the maturity of debt at the time they decide on their
funding. In addition, the vast majority of empirical studies have looked at either non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms15 as a whole or at country-speciﬁc determinants.16 They have not examined the variation
of the debt-maturity structure in diﬀerent industries within the corporate sector. The present
work ﬁlls this gap.
The detailed analysis of the existing literature on debt-maturity decisions presented above
has shown that the choice of debt maturity is inﬂuenced by several factors. Previous empirical
results on the implications of ﬁnance theory for debt's maturity structure are mixed, very much
reﬂecting the complexity of debt-management decisions.
2.3 Research methodology
This section presents a statement of the null hypothesis tested in the present study, as well
as a description of the data used. It also describes any measurements involved and develops
testable propositions for each variable included in the analysis.
2.3.1 Null hypothesis and testing strategy
Corporate ﬁnance theories provide some insights in ﬁrms' funding policies. However, they
do not speciﬁcally demonstrate that the choice of the maturity of debt may vary in diﬀerent
industries. Therefore, one can postulate that these theories and their empirical predictions
should be equally relevant to every industries. Thus, the null hypothesis can be stated as
follows:
Hφ: The inﬂuences that debt-maturity choices are subject to are the same across industries.
Below we ﬁrst provide a descriptive analysis, and graphical analyses in diﬀerent industries
are discussed. Second, the empirical test of the theories is based on OLS cross-sectional estima-
tions. The main characteristics of a ﬁrm are proxied by a set of variables, which are described
later in this section. Cross-sectional regressions are used in this analysis as the tested theories
15See Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Barclay and Smith (1995), Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003),
Datta et al. (2005), Harford et al. (2008).
16See Antonios, Guney and Paudyal (2002), Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Fan, Titman and Twite (2005).
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are cross-sectionals in nature. Thus, they do not require a consideration of the time dimension.
Cross-sectional regressions are also simple and robustly capture any potential variations across
industries of the relationship between debt maturity and a particular ﬁrm's characteristics.
The alternative of a full-panel data analysis would require the speciﬁcation of a structure on
error terms, the results of which would likely be sensitive.17
To summarise, a pooled set of results is obtained and shows that debt-maturity choices are
subject to multiple inﬂuences. The industry speciﬁcity of debt-maturity choice is ﬁrst captured
by the introduction of dummy variables representing each of the sectors and then shown in
more detail through industry-based OLS regressions.
2.3.2 Data
The data employed in this study are extracted from the COMPUSTAT database and pro-
vide a comprehensive overview of the composition of debt in diﬀerent industries from 1998 to
2010. The database employed focuses on ﬁrms whose market value exceeds $3 billion. This
choice is motivated by the focus on large-cap ﬁrms. The ﬁrst reason for this focus is that
those ﬁrms are more likely to be more regular debt issuers than mid- and small-cap ﬁrms.
The second reason is that data, as public information, is more readily available for mid- and
large-cap ﬁrms than for small-cap ﬁrms. Firms with missing data are excluded, as well as ﬁrms
belonging to the ﬁnancial sector as the study focuses on non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms only. This leads
to 5,170 observations.
Data are derived from ﬁrms' annual reporting from 1998 to 2010.18 This choice is motivated
by the high contrast in the economic environment witnessed in the US. During the second half
of the 1990s, the US experienced a fast economic expansion19 characterized by well-publicized
17Panel-data models such as the random coeﬃcient model could have been used in this analysis as the slope coeﬃcients
are treated as random. That model, however, requires making speciﬁc assumptions concerning error terms. Among other
assumptions, the random coeﬃcient model assumes that the covariance between error terms is nil between individuals and
over time which, in practice, may be too restrictive.
18The large majority of ﬁrms reports their ﬁnancial results on 31 December each year, but some report on a diﬀerent date.
Including ﬁrms which report their annual results at a diﬀerent time obviously may introduce a time bias into the analysis.
Be that as it may, they represent less than a quarter of the total. This potential bias is, thus, kept to a minimum and, as
such, the study beneﬁts from a larger and more representative sample.
19Waller (1998) studied the main macroeconomic indicators used in assessing the performance of an economy and argued
that they were outperforming in the late 1990s compared with previous years. The real growth in the gross domestic product
(GDP), which measures the value of all domestic goods and services, was above the long-term average observed since the
early 1970s. The national unemployment rate reached its lowest level since the late 1960s and the producer price index (PPI)
evinced a steady downward trend over the last year. Last but not least, 1998 was the ﬁrst year since 1969 that the US federal
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initial public oﬀerings of high-tech and 'dot-com' companies. By 2000, however, it was evident
that a bubble in stock valuations had occurred and the stock market dropped signiﬁcantly,
leading the economy to worsen until the beginning of 2004. From 2001 to 2007, the sub-prime
housing market in the United States fueled a false sense of security regarding the strength of
the US economy and resulted, in early 2008, in a major ﬁnancial crisis. As a result, the United
States to faced one of the most serious recessions in its recent history.20
Finally, as the aim of this analysis is to identify the determinants of debt-maturity structure
across industries, the economy is segregated into diﬀerent sectors according to the ﬁrst two
digits of the global industry classiﬁcation system codes (GICS) available in COMPUSTAT.
GICS is a corporate classiﬁcation system developed by Standard & Poor's and Morgan Stanley
Capital International. It is composed of eight-digit codes that correspond to various business or
industrial activities. It is based upon a classiﬁcation of economic sectors, which can be further
subdivided into a hierarchy of industry groups, industries and sub-industries.21 The detail of
GICS classiﬁcation is given for reference in Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6. Each sector is reasonably
well represented as the number of observations tends to be similar in each sector, with the
exception of the consumer discretionary sector. This sector comprises more observations, while
the telecommunication services sector is the least well-represented sector. It is worthwhile
noting that this sample contains enough observations and provides suﬃcient information for
each sector convincingly to perform cross-sectional OLS regressions.
2.3.3 Deﬁnition of variables
2.3.3.1 Measuring debt maturity
Whilst practitioners generally deﬁne short-term debt as debt22 payable within a year or less,
academic studies vary in their deﬁnitions. Barclay and Smith (1995) have deﬁned long-term
debt as debt maturing after three years while Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1997)23 deﬁned
government was running a surplus, nearly $70 billion.
20According to Brunnermeier (2009), 2008 showed signs of recession as consumer spending and GDP began falling whilst
the unemployment rate rose signiﬁcantly. Proposals for stimulus packages and other bailout plans provided some relief but
they also led the US's deﬁcit to hit an unprecedented record high.
21In total, there are 10 economic sectors, 23 industry groups, 59 industries and 123 sub-industries categories. The system
is similar to ICB (industry classiﬁcation benchmark), a classiﬁcation structure maintained by Dow Jones Indexes and the
FTSE Group.
22For simplicity, debt is deﬁned as the book value of the ﬁrm's total debt.
23Cited in Antonios, Guney and Paudyal (2002)
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long-term debt as debt maturing after ﬁve years. In line with Antonios, Guney and Paudyal
(2002) and normal accounting standards, such as US GAAP and IFRS, short-term debt is
deﬁned in this study as debt maturing within one year and long-term debt as debt maturing
after one year from the company's balance-sheet date.
Moreover, prior studies have used various measures of debt maturity. For instance, Barclay
and Smith (1995) measured debt maturity as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt, Guedes
and Opler (1996) used the maturity of new issues and a duration measure, and Stohs and
Mauer (1996) used the weighted average maturity of liabilities. In this study, debt maturity
is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt as it is most representative of the
mix of short-term and long-term debt used. This is readily accessible in COMPUSTAT. The
corresponding formula is DLTT+DD1DLTT+LCT , where (LCT) denotes current liabilities, or liabilities
due within one year including the current portion of long-term debt (DD1). (DLTT) is the
amount of long-term debt, which represents debt obligations due more than one year from
the company's balance-sheet date according to US and Canadian GAAP deﬁnitions. The
numerator (DLTT) is adjusted by (DD1) in order to represent best the amount of long-term
debt outstanding. As in Stohs and Mauer (1996), the use of short-term liabilities (LCT) to
proxy short-term borrowing is appropriate as (i) it represents obligations that a ﬁrm must meet
and so is similar to short-term debt, and (ii) is of major importance for the maturity-matching
hypothesis since, in that case, ﬁrms may be expected to match their entire liabilities structure
with assets.
Despite the simplicity of these deﬁnitions, a problem arises when considering hybrid debt,
especially when debt is combined with an American call or put option or other non-vanilla
options. Indeed Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) have shown that shortening the maturity
of debt or issuing long-term debt with a call provision are equivalent in eliminating agency
problems associated with informational asymmetry, risk incentives, and future investment op-
portunities. Given the large set of possible call features and the fact that hybrid markets do not
represent a suﬃciently large and liquid market, hybrid debt is not considered in this analysis.
Also, Diamond (1991) has suggested that it might be worthwhile using short-term bank debt
as a proxy for the low-rated borrowers who must choose short-term debt and using commercial
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paper (CP)24 as the proxy for the high-rated borrowers who choose short-term debt as an
alternative of long-term debt. Such a distinction is not feasible in the present analysis since
the data produced from COMPUSTAT include all types of debt.
2.3.3.2 Deﬁnition of regressors
Agency-cost hypothesis
Growth options can be proxied by many diﬀerent variables. The most common one is
the market-to-book (MTOB) ratio, which has been used in most previous empirical studies.
One may also consider, however, the price earnings (PE) ratio or the ratio of research and
development spending to sales.25 Because the PE ratio measures how much an investor is
willing to pay per (dollar) of current earnings, higher PE ratios are often taken to mean the ﬁrm
has signiﬁcant prospects for future growth. However, the PE ratio can be a highly questionable
measure of company performance since earnings result from accruals-based accounting and are
thus subject to managerial decisions. In addition, since the present study considers a large
number of of ﬁrms, it is not feasible to pay particular attention to the way earnings have
been computed for each company. Therefore, PE ratio is not used as a proxy for growth
opportunities in this study.
The MTOB ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of the market value of assets26 to the book value
of assets. As mentioned by Stohs and Mauer (1996), Smith and Watts (1992) argued that the
more options for growth in the ﬁrm's investment set, the larger the ﬁrm's MTOB ratio.27 This
measure is the most commonly used as a proxy for growth opportunities in the literature. It
is, however, important to note that the MTOB ratio represents the market's expectation of
a ﬁrm's opportunities for growth. As a consequence, if one assumes that the set of growth
opportunities which markets expect is indeed the true set of the ﬁrm's growth opportunities,
24Professionals argue that short-term debt programs such as the CP program are risky for investors, and only ﬁrms with
strong balance sheets and solid credit reputations are invited into this type of market. This is because CP is generally issued
as an unsecured instrument with no attached collateral or covenants by the issuer, and no accepting or endorsing party can
enhance the credit of the note. See Certiﬁcate in Financial Mathematics and Modeling, chapter 2 page 14, The Association
of Corporate Treasurers.
25Kester (1984) and Brealey and Myers (1981) developed a model for measuring growth opportunities. Their model,
known as the KBM model, was severely critiqued by Danbolt, Hirst and Jones (2002) and, therefore, is not used in this
study.
26The market value of assets is deﬁned as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value
of equity.
27Barclay and Smith (1995) also used the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth options.
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then one also needs to appreciate that there is a limited information asymmetry between ﬁrm
managers and market participants.
Another common proxy found in the literature is the ratio of research and development
(R&D) spending to sales. Guedes and Opler (1996) used the R&D spending to sales ratio to
argue that the ﬁrms with higher R&D spending are more likely to grow by introducing new
products in the future.28 In an unreported table, a strong correlation was found between the
MTOB ratio and the R&D ratio. Thus, in an attempt to avoid collinearity issues in the OLS
regression, only the MTOB ratio is used here as it appears to capture most of the relevant
information.
The size of the ﬁrm is measured by the book value of the ﬁrm's total assets. This is diﬀerent
to both Barclay and Smith (1995), who used the market value of equity plus the book value
of liabilities as a proxy for the size of the ﬁrm, and Antonios, Guney and Paudyal (2002) who
considered the logarithm of total sales and total assets. A common measure of a ﬁrm's size,
as suggested by Stohs and Mauer (1996), is the market value of the ﬁrm. In a non-tabulated
table a strong correlation was found between the MTOB ratio of a ﬁrm and its market value.
Therefore, in an attempt to minimise potential collinearity issues in the regressions, the variable
of the ﬁrm's total assets is used as proxy of ﬁrm size. Also, since the study focuses on large cap
ﬁrms only, in turn making the range of the size variable narrower than if small and medium
cap ﬁrms were included in the sample, the use of logarithm in the regression does not appear
to be necessary.
Signalling and liquidity risk hypothesis
The ﬁrm's credit quality is proxied by the following measures. The ﬁrst variable is the
Standard & Poor's (S&P) credit rating of the ﬁrm's long-term debt (SPLTIRCM). This is
the most widely used measured in the ﬁnancial markets. The detail of this rating may be
found on the S&P web page, www.standardandpoors.com. It is worth noting that this proxy
28One could also argue that the marketing spending to sales ratio can be a good proxy for growth opportunities as
advertising expenditure aims to increase sales and, consequently, might increase the value of a ﬁrm. R&D spending to sales
ratio is probably not applicable for every company, so the use of marketing spending to sales as a proxy of growth options
for brand-based companies might be more appropriate.
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is consistent with Stohs and Mauer's (1996) since, in addition to abnormal earnings, they use
the credit rating of the ﬁrm better to reﬂect Diamond's theory.29
A measure of long-term solvency is also introduced in this analysis through the cash interest
coverage ratio, EBIT+DPXINT deﬁned as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus depreciation
(DP) over interest expenses (XINT).30 This measure is more suitable than the interest coverage
ratio as depreciation, a non-cash expense, is deducted from the numerator. Finally, leverage is
deﬁned as the total debt ratio LTAT , where (LT) is total liabilities excluding minority interests
(MIB) and (AT) is total assets.31
Matching-maturity hypothesis
For consistency with the debt-maturity measurement, asset maturity is deﬁned as the ﬁxed
asset to total asset ratio AT−ACTAT , where (AT) is total assets and (ACT) is current assets.
32
Debt duration is not computed in the present analysis because of the lack of information on
debt maturing after the ﬁfth year from the balance-sheet reporting date. For the same reason,
asset duration, another common measure in the empirical literature, is not considered.
The second variable is the interval measure. This is deﬁned as the ratio of current assets
(ACT) to average daily operating costs deﬁned as costs of goods sold divided by 365 days:
ACT
COGS · 365 . This measure aims to reﬂect a ﬁrm's current asset maturity and measures how
long the company can operate until it needs ﬁnancing. A positive relationship is expected
between debt maturity and the two aforementioned variables.
The research approach adopted in this analysis has been explained in this section, as were
a careful selection of any measurements involved and testable propositions for each variable
included in the analysis.
29There is another common proxy to measure a ﬁrm's quality, the abnormal earnings of a ﬁrm. Abnormal earnings are
estimated as the diﬀerence between the earnings per share in years (t+1) and (t) divided by share price in years (t). Barclay
and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996) and Antonios, Guney and Paudyal (2002) measured a ﬁrm's quality by its
abnormal future earnings: high-quality (low-quality) ﬁrms have a positive (negative) future abnormal earnings. Despite
its wide use in most of the empirical analyses, this measure is not being used in the present analysis as it requires a time
dimension which does not exist in a cross-sectional analysis.
30The cash ratio and the net working capital ratio are not used in this analysis as these are endogenous to the debt-maturity
measure.
31AT = LT +MIB +SEQ, where (LT) is total liabilities, (MIB) is minority interests and (SEQ) is shareholder's equity.
32Antonios, Guney and Paudyal (2002) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) provided a measure of asset maturity by calculating
the duration of the ﬁrm's ﬁxed assets deﬁned as the ratio of total assets minus current assets divided by the annual depreciation
expense.
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2.4 Results
The results of the study are presented in two parts. First, several stylised facts about the
maturity structure of debt across diﬀerent sectors are established by describing the sample.
Second, the results obtained from OLS regressions, designed to test existing theories of debt
maturity, are described and discussed.
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
2.4.1.1 Description of the sample
Tables 2.1 provide summary statistics for each of the explanatory variables employed in
the analysis. The table is subdivided so that averages across time periods and industries are
shown in the bottom line and right-most column, respectively. There are two main comments
to be made based on these results.
First, each variable ranges widely across industries and well reﬂects the large diversity of
the sample considered. Indeed, variables used to test the agency problem oﬀer a wide range
of values. For example, the MTOB ranges from 0.46 to 2.34 on average across all periods
considered and the total asset variable ranges from 11.65 to 49.85. The same holds for variables
used to test the signalling hypothesis and the liquidity risk theory since the credit score ranges
from 6.96 to 9.64, the cash coverage ratio ranges from 4.46 to 92.23, and the leverage measure
is between 0.50 and 0.72. Equally, the ﬁxed- to total-asset ratio used to test the maturity-
matching principle ranges from 0.48 to 0.85, and the interval measure varies from 5.06 to 18.71.
Hence, the sample considered oﬀers a large enough set of data to be able to focus on sectors'
speciﬁcities.
Second, the results show substantial diﬀerence in sector characteristics. Sectors, such as
the energy, materials, telecommunication, and utilities sectors, have on average fewer growth
opportunities than other sectors. They tend to be larger and have a larger proportion of ﬁxed
asset. In addition, they have on average a lower credit rating and a lower cash coverage ratio.
This ﬁnding is particularly relevant when sectors are regulated.33
33Capital-intensive industries which are currently regulated in the United States do, in large part, belong to the energy,
materials, industrial and utilities sectors. Further details of the following unexhaustive list can be found on the U.S.
government's website, www.business.gov: aviation; ﬁrearms, ammunition and explosives; maritime transportation; mining
and drilling; nuclear energy; radio and television broadcasting; and, transportation and logistics.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables
This table provides summary statistics for the data employed in the analysis. The ﬁgures are the average values over each
period considered and for each sector following GICS code classiﬁcation. Averages across time are displayed in the bottom
line whilst averages across sector are shown in the right most column. The variables are: Market to Book ratio (Market
Capital/Book Value of Assets), Total Assets (Book Value of Assets), Interval Measure (Currents Assets/Costs of Goods
Sold/365), Cash Coverage Ratio ((EBIT+Depreciation)/Interest Expenses) ), Fixed Assets to Total Assets Ratio ((Total
Assets-Current Assets)/Total Assets) and a proxy for leverage measured as Total Liabilities to Total Assets Ratio, where
Total Liabilities is made of Current Liabilities, Long Term Liabilities, Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit and other
Liabilities. For each rating, a score is attributed: AAA = 1, AA+ = 2 and so on. Non-rated ﬁrms are excluded. Then the
average rating within each sector and over each period is calculated as a simple average.
Energy Materials Industrial Cons. D. Cons. C. H. Care. Info. Tech. Telecom Utilities Total
dltt+dd1
lct+dltt
1998-1999 0.63 0.59 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.42 0.34 0.72 0.71 0.54
2000-2002 0.64 0.61 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.39 0.73 0.66 0.55
2003-2007 0.58 0.57 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.34 0.77 0.74 0.53
2008 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.35 0.77 0.71 0.54
2009-2010 0.62 0.62 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.42 0.87 0.77 0.56
1998-2010 0.61 0.59 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.37 0.77 0.72 0.54
Market to Book ratio
1998-1999 0.99 1.02 1.28 2.10 2.51 3.78 3.85 2.23 0.56 2.08
2000-2002 1.04 0.90 1.09 1.47 2.03 3.28 2.70 0.86 0.43 1.64
2003-2007 1.28 1.23 1.25 1.47 1.68 2.06 1.65 0.92 0.50 1.40
2008 0.75 1.12 0.88 0.92 1.21 1.41 1.16 0.66 0.38 0.95
2009-2010 1.08 1.24 1.08 1.27 1.45 1.19 1.37 0.75 0.44 1.17
1998-2010 1.03 1.10 1.12 1.45 1.77 2.34 2.14 1.08 0.46 1.45
Size - Total assets (in billions of dollars)
1998-1999 15.34 8.88 12.73 12.22 10.65 9.43 11.91 20.69 15.08 12.70
2000-2002 15.86 11.96 15.13 14.61 15.29 10.43 13.19 41.52 22.13 15.95
2003-2007 18.63 10.21 14.25 15.41 18.23 14.06 15.61 35.41 20.53 16.47
2008 29.65 14.21 18.02 21.78 23.46 20.92 21.80 45.45 23.25 22.99
2009-2010 20.14 13.00 15.96 18.08 19.74 19.70 19.48 106.19 23.76 20.00
1998-2010 19.93 11.65 15.22 16.42 17.47 14.91 16.40 49.85 20.95 17.62
Credit Rating
1998-1999 6.76 7.69 7.02 7.98 5.87 6.32 8.81 9.44 7.19 7.54
2000-2002 7.37 7.64 7.03 8.31 6.28 7.86 9.68 8.57 7.83 7.92
2003-2007 8.73 8.97 8.04 9.37 7.32 8.29 10.10 9.61 8.83 8.80
2008 8.19 8.25 7.78 9.02 7.38 7.29 8.40 10.53 8.70 8.25
2009-2010 9.15 9.02 8.03 9.38 7.95 8.10 9.02 10.04 8.66 8.71
1998-2010 8.04 8.31 7.58 8.81 6.96 7.57 9.20 9.64 8.24 8.24
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Energy Materials Industrial Cons. D. Cons. C. H. Care. Info. Tech. Telecom Utilities Total
Leverage
1998-1999 0.60 0.57 0.64 0.60 0.70 0.57 0.50 0.64 0.70 0.61
2000-2002 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.53 0.47 0.62 0.75 0.60
2003-2007 0.55 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.52 0.52 0.66 0.72 0.60
2008 0.54 0.63 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.53 0.53 0.70 0.72 0.62
2009-2010 0.52 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.54 0.50 0.64 0.71 0.59
1998-2010 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.54 0.50 0.65 0.72 0.60
Cash Coverage ratio
1998-1999 7.68 10.57 12.73 16.00 21.38 23.69 81.97 5.56 4.66 21.74
2000-2002 11.80 7.41 11.14 16.85 17.97 29.12 31.83 6.72 3.84 16.67
2003-2007 18.42 13.01 17.29 15.20 22.25 26.75 186.58 6.29 4.24 33.73
2008 38.96 13.60 16.33 18.76 14.66 20.51 109.09 7.12 4.62 28.01
2009-2010 20.92 11.14 15.96 16.74 15.43 17.31 51.70 7.04 4.95 20.05
1998-2010 19.56 11.15 14.69 16.71 18.34 23.48 92.23 6.55 4.46 24.04
Interval Measure
1998-1999 204.86 196.69 185.43 265.56 199.48 792.21 631.37 1,325.50 176.45 405.15
2000-2002 255.90 205.49 184.56 185.23 228.45 1,230.10 1,137.93 416.91 197.74 458.71
2003-2007 398.12 241.38 205.27 237.04 200.66 974.34 820.03 314.67 201.69 399.41
2008 275.25 207.29 198.44 206.14 190.47 877.44 648.00 273.51 184.76 331.51
2009-2010 307.78 274.93 243.52 246.90 222.28 818.96 839.76 355.85 187.27 386.31
1998-2010 288.38 225.16 203.44 228.17 208.27 938.61 815.42 537.29 189.58 396.22
Fixed to Total Asset ratio
1998-1999 0.81 0.74 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.55 0.46 0.77 0.86 0.68
2000-2002 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.53 0.46 0.85 0.82 0.68
2003-2007 0.78 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.59 0.48 0.86 0.84 0.67
2008 0.79 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.50 0.87 0.84 0.69
2009-2010 0.78 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.49 0.88 0.86 0.66
1998-2010 0.79 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.58 0.48 0.84 0.85 0.67
Number of observations
1998-1999 57 64 86 150 71 60 83 58 70 699
2000-2002 132 81 121 228 112 125 138 60 99 1096
2003-2007 316 223 316 479 238 269 238 93 205 2377
2008 51 28 55 54 42 38 40 15 40 363
2009-2010 86 68 92 103 78 61 75 17 55 635
1998-2010 642 464 670 1014 541 553 574 243 469 5170
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Indeed, the average MTOB ratio from 1998 to 2010 is found to be lower in those sectors -
energy (1.03), materials (1.10), telecommunication services (1.08) and utilities (0.46) - than in
the rest of the economy (1.45). In addition, it is worth noting the large variance in MTOB ratio
in the consumer discretionary, health care and information technology sectors over the period
from 1998 to 2010, as shown by the 1.61, 1.91 and 2.34 standard deviation, compared with
1.47 for the entire economy. These results emphasise these sectors' vulnerability to economic
variations seen during the time period under consideration. Lastly, it is worth observing
the 44% decrease in the MTOB ratio between 1998-1999 and 2009-2010, both reﬂecting the
bursting of the 'dot com' bubble and the worldwide credit crunch, respectively. Similarly, a
ﬁrm's size, represented by the ﬁrm's total assets in billions of dollars, is generally found to be
larger in heavy industries compared with the rest of the economy.34 The largest sector is the
telecommunication services sector, with an average ﬁrm's size of $49.85bn between 1998 and
2010.
With regards to the variables related to a ﬁrm's credit quality, the telecommunication ser-
vices sector is found to have the worst credit rating, although the variance across industries
is low. The past ten years have, however, witnessed a general deterioration of credit (one
notch, on average) across all sectors. In contrast, the cash-coverage ratio depicts major diﬀer-
ences in terms of cash management between diﬀerent industries. The information technology
and utilities sectors are good examples, with average cash-coverage ratios of 92.23 and 4.46,
respectively. In addition, the leverage variable is found to be higher in sectors less sensitive
to economic cycles, sectors such as consumer staples, telecommunication and utilities sectors.
This is found consistently to be the case over time. It is worthwhile noting that leverage re-
mains almost identical over time, which presumes that ﬁrms do not deviate from their speciﬁc
debtequity mix target.
Finally, whilst variables designed to represent ﬁrms' asset maturity do not materially diﬀer
over time, they do appear to be substantially diﬀerent across sectors. Indeed, the interval mea-
sure ranges on average from 189 days in the telecommunication sector to 939 days in the health
sector, while the ﬁxed asset to total asset ratio ranges from 0.48 to 0.85, respectively, with a
total average across all sectors of 0.67. This shows that ﬁrms tend to have a large majority of
assets maturing at least after one year from their annual reporting date. Unsurprisingly, the
34An exception is the material sector, with an average total of $11.65bn compared with $17.62bn overall.
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energy, materials, telecommunication services and utility sectors all have a large part of their
balance sheets made up of ﬁxed assets, due to the nature of their activities requiring large
investments in plant, equipment and other ﬁxed assets.
To summarise, the characteristics of ﬁrms observed in this sample diﬀer substantially across
sectors. As such, ﬁnancial theories imply that this observation should also be reﬂected in the
variation of debt maturity across sectors.
2.4.1.2 Short-term versus long-term debt across sectors
Figure 2.1 shows average debt maturity as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt across
the diﬀerent sectors of the economy for diﬀerent periods from 1998 to 2010.35
There are two points to be observed from this chart. First, the ratio of long-term debt
to total debt varies signiﬁcantly on average from one sector to another. This observation
is found independently of the time period. Again, and in line with previous results, the
diﬀerent sectors can be broadly classiﬁed into two main groups: (i) the energy, materials,
telecom and utilities sectors, which all have longer debt maturity than the rest of the economy,
and (ii) other industries such as consumer staples, consumer discretionary, health care and
information technology, which consistently demonstrate lower debt maturity. These results
are also supported by the positive (negative) correlation found between (non) capital-intensive
sector dummy variables and debt maturity as in Table A.7.36 In conjunction with earlier
results, sectors' characteristics are well reﬂected in their debt-maturity choice and are in line
with empirical predictions. Tables A.7 conﬁrm this point since the correlation coeﬃcients
between debt maturity and the various explanatory variables are generally consistent with
empirical predictions.
Second, Figure 2.1 depicts a net increase in debt maturity across all sectors in 2009-2010
compared with earlier periods. This is particularly noticeable in sectors such as the materials,
health care, information technology and telecommunication services sectors. In line with the
theories of Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991, 1993), one might expect that ﬁrms tend to have
more long-term debt during turbulent economic conditions in order to avoid any reﬁnancing
35The underlying statistics can also be found in Table 2.1.
36The industrial dummy variable is found to be negatively correlated with debt maturity, although its coeﬃcient is close
to zero.
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Figure 2.1: The ratio of Long Term Debt to Total Debt
Figure 2.1 shows the average of the debt maturity proﬁle for each sector. The corresponding formula with COMPUSTAT
code is LongTermDebtratio = DLTT+DD1
DLTT+LCT
, where LCT denotes Current Liabilities, which represents liabilities due within
one year including the current portion of long-term debt DD1 . DLTT is the amount of Long Term debt, which represents
debt obligations due more than one year from the company's balance sheet date according to U.S. and Canadian GAAP
Deﬁnition. The numerator DLTT is adjusted by DD1
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risk, in turn signalling deteriorations in credit quality. Given the low interest rates in 2009 and
2010, ﬁrms may also have taken advantage of low interest to lengthen their debt maturity. This
being the case, ﬁrms may undertake market-timing strategies as suggested by Barry, Mann,
Mihov, and Rodriguez (2008, 2009).
In order to deepen the understanding of this last observation, Figures 2.2 (a) and (b) display
the distribution of ﬁrms' long-term debt across sectors for the years 1999 and 2009, respectively.
The average debt maturing between the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth year from the balance-sheet date37 is
shown in these graphs. However, it is worth noting that the details of debt maturing after ﬁve
years from the balance-sheet date is not provided. In addition, movements in debt distribution
37The underlying statistics can be found in Table A.8 in the appendix.
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between 1999 and 2009 are captured in Table 2.2.
One may observe from Figure 2.2(a) that in 1999, whilst the amount of debt maturing
from year one to year ﬁve is relatively well spread, the amount of debt maturing after year
ﬁve is distinctly higher across all sectors. Indeed, the amount of long debt maturing each
year does not, on average, exceed 11% of the total long-term debt outstanding, as opposed
to the percentage of debt maturing after ﬁve years, on average around 52%. Details on the
composition of debt maturing after year ﬁve from the annual reporting date is not available in
COMPUSTAT.
In contrast, as shown in Figure 2.2(b) and in conjunction with Table 2.2, the average
debt maturity in 200938 is longer than in 1999. Indeed, the percentage of debt maturing
from year two to year ﬁve increased by 0.3%, 4.4%, 1.5% and 1.7%, respectively, whilst the
percentage of debt maturing within the ﬁrst year or after the ﬁfth year decreased by 2.7% and
6.0%, respectively. Thus, whilst the aggregate amount of long-term debt certainly increased
from 1999 to 2009, access to the long end of the yield curve was limited. Firms generally
accessed, at best, the medium-term market. Hence, even though ﬁrms have a majority of
debt maturing after ﬁve years, this proposition slightly decreased compared with 1999. It is
also worthwhile noting that the consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care and
information technology sectors drastically decreased the amount of debt maturing in the near
future, which may be linked to the deterioration of their credit worthiness as shown in Table
2.1. Intuitively, these results seem plausible and are in line with both Flannery's (1986)
and Diamond's (1991, 1993) predictions, since these sectors are more exposed in economic
downturns.
This descriptive analysis thus leads to two main stylised facts. First, debt maturity diﬀers
signiﬁcantly on average from one sector to another. This ﬁnding is in line with empirical
predictions set out by the main ﬁnancial theories considered above. Second, ﬁrms are likely
to choose to structure their debt with longer maturity when they experience turbulent market
382008 saw some major turbulences in the debt capital market due to the underlying liquidity crisis. Overall credit spreads
over treasuries across all ratings were unusually high compared with previous years. In addition, the risk premium, usually
deﬁned as the spread diﬀerence between the long end and the short end of the treasury yield curve, was particularly high
as the short-term rates were very low on the back of the Federal Reserve Bank's decision to cut the Fed funds' interest rate
seven times during 2008, from 3.5% in January 2008 to 0% in December 2008. Despite short-term rates being very low, ﬁrms
shifted their maturity structure on the long end of the curve, which presumes that ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between the cost of
funding and (re)ﬁnancing risks.
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Figure 2.2: Outstanding Long Term Debt distribution across sectors in 1999 and 2009
This table shows the outstanding long term debt distribution across sector and is based on ﬁgures as in 1998. Average 1 is
the average ratio of the debt maturing during the ﬁrst year over the total debt maturing from the ﬁrst year to the ﬁfth year
dd1
dltt
. Averages 2 to 5 are calculated in the same way using debt maturing from the second year from the balance sheet date
and so on. This ratio does not include debt maturing after the ﬁfth year from the balance sheet date as this information is
not available in COMPUSTAT. Thus it provides a sense of the debt distribution for the next ﬁve years only, but does not
provide information regarding the distribution of the total debt of the ﬁrms.
(a) 1999







	




    ! "# $ %&# %& '
(% #
(% )#
(% )#
(% )#
(% )#
(% )#
(b) 2009







	




    ! "# $ %&# %& '
(% #
(% )#
(% )#
(% )#
(% )#
(% )#
CHAPTER 2. INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY OF DEBT MATURITY 43
Table 2.2: Movement in debt distribution across sectors
This table shows movement of the outstanding long tern debt distribution for each sector between 1999 and 2009. ∆ DD1
DLTT
is the movement of long term debt maturing within the ﬁrst year from the annual reporting date between 1999 and 2009.
∆ DD2
DLTT
is the movement of debt maturing between year 1 and year 2 and is calculated in the same way, etc. 41−
∑5
i=1
DDi
DLTT
is the movement of long term debt maturing after years 5. This however, does not provide the exact composition of debt
maturing after the ﬁfth year from the balance sheet date as this information is not available in COMPUSTAT.
Movement in Debt distribution between 1999 and 2009 across sectors
Sector GICS
code
∆ DD1
DLTT
∆ DD2
DLTT
∆ DD3
DLTT
∆ DD4
DLTT
∆ DD5
DLTT
41−
∑5
i=1
DDi
DLTT
ENERGY 10 1.3% -0.7% 8.0% 4.3% -4.0% -7.4%
MATERIALS 15 -2.0% -2.2% 1.9% -0.5% 5.3% -3.5%
INDUSTRIAL 20 8.3% -0.2% 6.3% 1.1% 1.0% -18.4%
CONSUMER D. 25 -1.7% 2.8% 3.7% -0.9% 2.8% -8.3%
CONSUMER S. 30 -4.6% -0.1% 1.9% 6.9% -0.3% -4.7%
HEALTH CARE 35 -15.4% -4.1% 2.0% -2.3% 7.6% 6.6%
INFO TECH. 45 -11.1% -1.6% 8.4% 4.1% 3.4% 0.5%
TELECOM. SER. 50 0.8% 4.2% 4.4% 1.0% 3.2% -14.7%
UTILITIES 55 -2.9% 0.6% 0.8% -0.3% -0.2% 0.3%
All Sectors -2.7% 0.3% 4.4% 1.5% 1.7% -6.0%
conditions in order to avoid any (re)ﬁnancing risks in the near future. The increase in the
long-term to total debt ratio is nevertheless seen over the past ten years to translate into
an increase in medium-term debt. This eﬀect does not, however, appear to be of the same
magnitude in each sector; this observation applies more clearly to the sectors most subject to
economic variations. Therefore, these ﬁndings presume that debt maturity results from ﬁrms'
characteristics, the speciﬁcs of industry and the economic environment. This clearly calls for
a quantitative analysis. The next section tests each of the empirical propositions developed in
Section 2.2 across industries.
2.4.2 Hypotheses testing
This section presents the key results. The industry speciﬁcity of debt-maturity choice is
ﬁrst captured by the introduction of dummy variables representing each of the sectors and
is then shown in more detail through industry-based OLS regressions. The results strongly
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support the maturity-matching principle and the signalling hypothesis and are best seen when
data is segregated into sectors. Little support is found with regards to the agency problem,
although Diamond's liquidity risk hypothesis cannot be rejected.
2.4.2.1 Sectors as dummy variables
Table 2.3 summarises the results obtained when OLS regressions are run over the entire
sample from 1998 to 2010. The coeﬃcients of determination (R2adj) for these regressions ranges
from 50.3% to 67.1%, meaning that more than half of the sample variability in debt maturity
is explained by the chosen variables. Also, Fisher's combined probability test and related
p-values show that both regressions are highly statistically signiﬁcant.39
Mixed results are found with regards to the agency-cost hypothesis. Indeed, a ﬁrm's growth
opportunities represented by the variable of the MTOB ratio is not consistently statistically
signiﬁcant over time. In the period 19982010 the MTOB ratio is found statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10% level but is found to have a wrong sign. Furthermore, the same variable is not
found to be statistically signiﬁcant when the dataset is divided into diﬀerent periods of time.
In addition, the size variable, which should have been positive according to the agency-cost
hypothesis is found to be consistently negative over the diﬀerent periods of time considered.
Hence, these ﬁndings show strong evidence against the agency-cost hypothesis.
The results contradict Mauer and Stohs (1996), Antonios, Guney and Paudyal (2002), who
argued that small ﬁrms are likely to face more severe agency conﬂicts than large ﬁrms and may
use short-term debt to mitigate these conﬂicts. They also contradict Barclay and Smith's (1995)
ﬁnding that the liabilities of larger ﬁrms have longer term to maturity and to Barclay, Marx
and Smith (2003), who argue that 'the more growth options in the investment opportunity
set cause the ﬁrm to reduce leverage and reduce its fraction of long-term debt` but are in
line with Datta et al. (2005), who did not ﬁnd a statistical signiﬁcant relationship between
market-to-book ratio and debt maturity. Since this study examines large-cap ﬁrms, it may be
the case that the present sample is too restrictive to capture ﬁrms' growth opportunities. Also,
given that the sign of the size variable is found to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant, the
agency-cost hypothesis does not appear to have explanatory power for large cap ﬁrms. The
39The Fisher statistic is used to test the hypothesis that all parameters (excluding intercept) are zero. Hence, the statistical
signiﬁcance of the results suggests that at least one of the variables in the regression is diﬀerent to zero.
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results are, thus, in line with Graham and Harvey (2001), who did not ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms
alleviate agency conﬂicts by shortening the maturity of their debt. They are also in line with
Guedes and Opler (1996), who argued that larger ﬁrms are less likely to default and have
shorter maturity as a result, according to both the signalling and the liquidity risk hypotheses.
In contrast, strong support is found for the signalling hypothesis. Indeed, the credit rat-
ing, the cash-coverage ratio and leverage variables are found to be consistently statistically
signiﬁcant and with the expected sign across all the datasets considered. An interesting obser-
vation is found when comparing the coeﬃcients slope of these variables in period of economic
downturn with those found during economic prosperity. Indeed, during 2008 and 20092010,
the credit-score variable was of lesser importance compared with previous years. Similarly,
leverage levels in 20002002 and in 2008 were certainly important in explaining debt maturity,
albeit to a lesser degree than during economic prosperity. In contrast, the cash-coverage ratio
is found to be of greater importance in 20002002 and in 2008, though not in 20092010.
One explanation may be as follows. During economic prosperity, investors might be better
able to base their judgments on credit rating and leverage to distinguish high- and low-quality
ﬁrms. As a result, it is reasonable to observe a strong relationship between a ﬁrm's credit
quality and debt maturity. In contrast, in periods of economic weakness, such as 2008, it
is more diﬃcult for investors to make such a distinction ex ante, because: (i) credit ratings
may not be as trustworthy as in prosperous economic times as a result of potential delays
between credit-rating movements and the true state of the ﬁrm's credit-worthiness; and (ii),
high-quality ﬁrms borrow at longer maturities in order to avoid liquidity risk, which in turn
creates a pooling equilibrium with medium- and low-quality borrowers. When high-quality
ﬁrms slightly increase their debt maturity in order to cope with potential reﬁnancing risks, it
creates a pooling equilibrium in the long end of the debt market with lower-quality ﬁrms. As
a consequence, low-quality ﬁrms may beneﬁt by maintaining or increasing their debt-maturity
proﬁle at a lower cost. This may lead ex post to an overall upward shift in debt maturity across
all credit ratings. Hence the lower impact of credit rating on debt maturity during turbulent
economic conditions.
In addition, ﬁrms may use hybrid debt, which is treated in most cases as equity but which
behaves as debt securities. Hence, leverage may not be a transparent and eﬀective measure of
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Table 2.3: Pooled OLS regressions based on data from 1999 to 2010
This table shows the regressions output for diﬀerent periods of time. The dependent variable is the long term to total
debt ratio DLTT+DD1
DLTT+LCT
, where LCT denotes Current Liabilities, which represents liabilities due within one year including the
current portion of long-term debt DD1. DLTT is the amount of Long Term debt, which represents debt obligations due
more than one year from the company's reporting date. Dummy variables are also included in the regressions to proxy the
industry speciﬁcity of debt maturity. Note that the Industrial sector is taken as the reference.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1998-2010 1998-2010 1998-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2000-2002 2003-2007 2003-2007 2008 2008 2009-2010 2009-2010
MTOB 0.019∗ 0.019∗ -0.017 -0.012 0.017 0.038 0.000 0.008 -0.028 -0.043 -0.002 0.006
(0.075) (0.075) (0.487) (0.629) (0.508) (0.151) (0.997) (0.603) (0.492) (0.321) (0.940) (0.841)
size -0.046∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.063∗ -0.065∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.043) (0.025) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.092) (0.002) (0.005)
creditscore 0.280∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cashcoverageratio -0.048∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.046∗ -0.045∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.083) (0.088)
interval 0.013 0.013 0.154∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.019 0.020 0.104∗∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.153) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.180) (0.142) (0.004) (0.050) (0.000) (0.002)
ﬁxedassetratio 0.635∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
leverage 0.143∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Energy 0.010 0.069∗∗ 0.065∗∗ -0.011 -0.041 -0.027
(0.411) (0.013) (0.026) (0.568) (0.361) (0.442)
Materials 0.066∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.027 0.099∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.020) (0.095) (0.000) (0.497) (0.002)
ConsumerS 0.018 0.029 -0.004 0.026 0.021 0.002
(0.137) (0.318) (0.882) (0.133) (0.619) (0.947)
ConsumerD 0.023∗ 0.063∗ 0.022 0.038∗ 0.002 -0.033
(0.084) (0.054) (0.504) (0.055) (0.957) (0.350)
Health_Care 0.059∗∗∗ 0.050∗ -0.013 0.069∗∗∗ 0.063 0.038
(0.000) (0.084) (0.670) (0.000) (0.168) (0.251)
Info_Tech -0.035∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.086∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.021 0.006
(0.008) (0.584) (0.011) (0.002) (0.644) (0.878)
Telecom 0.085∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.036 0.051∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.046) (0.000) (0.357) (0.081)
Utilities 0.084∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.026 0.110∗∗∗ 0.025 0.056∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.345) (0.000) (0.560) (0.095)
Observations 5104 5104 684 684 1078 1078 2365 2365 360 360 617 617
Adjusted R2 0.534 0.549 0.663 0.671 0.503 0.512 0.538 0.562 0.610 0.609 0.581 0.594
AIC -4688.1 -4840.9 -813.5 -821.3 -897.9 -909.2 -2189.9 -2307.6 -397.6 -388.4 -673.7 -684.9
BIC -4635.8 -4736.3 -777.3 -748.9 -858.1 -829.5 -2143.7 -2215.3 -366.5 -326.2 -638.3 -614.1
F 837.2 414.6 193.2 93.82 156.6 76.19 394.4 203.2 81.25 38.21 122.9 60.97
p 0 0 1.19e-156 4.35e-153 5.09e-159 1.40e-156 0 0 1.22e-69 5.71e-64 4.14e-112 5.42e-110
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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a ﬁrm's ability to pay back its debt. In contrast, the cash-coverage ratio appears to be a key
metric used by investors when assessing a ﬁrm's liquidity during strong economic turbulence.
This is because the measure is based on actual cashﬂows and shows a ﬁrm's ability to repay
its debt. As mentioned previously, this is not found to be the case in 2009-2010. This anomaly
can be explained by the manager's strong focus on boosting cashﬂow in 2008 through active
de-stocking and tight management of working capital, which led to a high level of cash balances
at the end of the year.40
Diamond's (1991, 1993) theory emphasised a non-linear relationship between debt maturity
and credit rating. Table 2.4 summarises another set of regressions, including a quadratic
function of the credit-rating variable. Mixed results are found with regards to this variable
since, despite being statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, this variable does not have the
expected sign. The results show that low-quality ﬁrms have an even higher proportion of long-
term debt than what a linear trend would predict. It is worth noting that introducing a square
variable for the credit-rating variable does not have a major eﬀect on the other regressors or on
dummy variables. One may explain this ﬁnding by the fact that credit rationing is probably
more likely to be applicable to small-cap ﬁrms as opposed to large-cap ﬁrms that constitute
this sample.
Figure 2.3 depicts the average maturity of debt across credit ratings between 1998 and 2010.
The ﬁgure shows that debt maturity tends to be almost linear with respect to the credit-rating
variable up to a B- rating and then falls for companies with lower ratings. Despite the apparent
fall in debt maturity for very risky companies, the sample contains only seven observations (out
of 5,170) of ﬁrms with a credit rating lower than B-. Hence, the sample is not suﬃcient to
investigate whether debt maturity is lower for poor-quality ﬁrms. For these reasons, Flannery's
(1986) model for explaining debt-maturity choice is accepted whereas Diamond's theory cannot
be rejected.
Moreover, strong evidence is found in favor of the maturity-matching principle. Indeed, the
ﬁxed-to-total asset ratio is found to be robustly statistically signiﬁcant and has the strongest
slope coeﬃcient among the diﬀerent samples considered. Hence, there is strong evidence that
40Refer to Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2009) for a comprehensive study of non-ﬁnancial corporates'
ﬁnancial management strategy during the recent credit crisis.
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Table 2.4: Pooled OLS regressions based on data from 1999 to 2010 with polynomial credit rating variable
This table replicates Table 2.3 but includes a polynomial function f : x→ x2 for the credit rating variable. The dependent
variable is the long term to total debt ratio DLTT+DD1
DLTT+LCT
, where LCT denotes Current Liabilities, DLTT is the amount of
Long Term debt and DD1 is the current portion of long-term debt. Dummy variables are also included in the regressions to
proxy the industry speciﬁcity of debt maturity. Note that the Industrial sector is taken as the reference.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1998-2010 1998-2010 1998-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2000-2002 2003-2007 2003-2007 2008 2008 2009-2010 2009-2010
MTOB -0.000 0.000 -0.044∗ -0.038 -0.006 0.015 -0.017 -0.010 -0.040 -0.056 -0.007 0.001
(0.963) (0.972) (0.079) (0.146) (0.818) (0.566) (0.271) (0.549) (0.312) (0.189) (0.815) (0.963)
size -0.064∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.083∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.027) (0.000) (0.001)
creditscore2 0.265∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
cashcoverageratio -0.048∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.046∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.079)
interval 0.012 0.012 0.132∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.018 0.019 0.096∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.193) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.190) (0.156) (0.007) (0.074) (0.000) (0.003)
ﬁxedassetratio 0.640∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
leverage 0.141∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Energy 0.014 0.069∗∗ 0.071∗∗ -0.005 -0.039 -0.025
(0.270) (0.013) (0.016) (0.772) (0.386) (0.468)
Materials 0.070∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.049∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.030 0.103∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.017) (0.069) (0.000) (0.447) (0.002)
ConsumerS 0.018 0.027 -0.002 0.027 0.023 0.002
(0.129) (0.349) (0.955) (0.119) (0.582) (0.962)
ConsumerD 0.031∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.034 0.046∗∗ 0.007 -0.028
(0.021) (0.032) (0.298) (0.019) (0.868) (0.418)
Health_Care 0.058∗∗∗ 0.045 -0.013 0.072∗∗∗ 0.063 0.037
(0.000) (0.119) (0.689) (0.000) (0.167) (0.256)
Info_Tech -0.031∗∗ -0.016 -0.078∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ 0.028 0.006
(0.021) (0.627) (0.022) (0.005) (0.536) (0.861)
Telecom 0.083∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.039 0.052∗
(0.000) (0.015) (0.062) (0.000) (0.324) (0.077)
Utilities 0.088∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.031 0.114∗∗∗ 0.025 0.058∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.560) (0.082)
Observations 5104 5104 684 684 1078 1078 2365 2365 360 360 617 617
Adjusted R2 0.529 0.543 0.658 0.665 0.497 0.506 0.533 0.557 0.608 0.607 0.579 0.592
AIC -4632.0 -4778.0 -803.7 -810.1 -886.3 -896.6 -2166.3 -2283.2 -395.8 -386.6 -671.6 -683.0
BIC -4579.7 -4673.4 -767.5 -737.7 -846.5 -816.8 -2120.2 -2190.9 -364.7 -324.4 -636.2 -612.2
F 820.1 405.4 189.1 91.57 153.3 74.48 387.1 199.5 80.60 37.90 122.2 60.66
p 0 0 1.50e-154 9.93e-151 1.56e-156 6.50e-154 0 0 2.88e-69 1.33e-63 1.19e-111 1.35e-109
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.3: Average Debt Maturity across Credit Rating between 1998 and 2010







	



                   


the maturity-matching principle is one of the main factors which drives ﬁrms in their choice of
debt maturity. In addition, the interval measure is found to be statistically signiﬁcant and with
the expected sign for several timelines. However, it is not found to be statistically signiﬁcant
over all periods considered, in particular for the period 20032007. The reason is likely to be
that ﬁrms manage their working capital more tightly during economic turbulence in order to
lower their ﬁnancing needs and to delay debt issuance. In contrast, during economic prosperity
ﬁrms may have greater access to the debt capital market and so do not pay as much attention
to working capital management. This, then, is reﬂected in the lack of statistical signiﬁcance
of the interval measure during 20032007.
Finally, for each period considered, dummy variables proxying sectors are included in the
OLS regressions. They appear to have a positive eﬀect on the overall statistical signiﬁcance
of the regressions and a negative impact on the slope coeﬃcients of the dependent variables.
These results contradict Barclay and Smith (1995), who found evidence that the industry
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dummies, which they included in their regressions, are certainly jointly diﬀerent from zero but
have no inﬂuence on the other variable slope coeﬃcients. The main diﬀerence between this
study and the one from Barclay and Smith (1995) is our focus on large cap ﬁrms. This might
be the reason why we observe a stronger inﬂuence of the industry eﬀect on debt maturity than
Barclay and Smith (1995) do. Once again, it could be interesting to investigate further the
inﬂuence of market structure on the management of corporate debt maturity as we suspect
that this could be the underlying driver of the signiﬁcance of our industry dummies.
Based on the statistical signiﬁcance criteria only, the results suggest that ﬁrms' speciﬁc
eﬀects dominate the industry eﬀect in explaining debt maturity. However, by desegregating the
data by both industry and time periods, it can be observed that when statistically signiﬁcant,
the dummy variables of the present study have non-negligible slope coeﬃcients, leading to the
following comments.
As shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, when OLS regressions are performed over the entire sample
from 1998 to 2010, a large majority of dummy variables appear to be statistically signiﬁcant at
the 5% to 1% level. Indeed, whilst the information technology sector shows a negative value,
the materials, consumer discretionary, health care, telecommunication services and utilities
sectors have a positive dummy variables. This means that during this time, ﬁrms (shortened)
lengthened their debt maturity proﬁle for reasons other than those captured by the regressors
or, equally, by a (lower) higher amount than what the theories predict. As such, from 1998
to 2010, the results provide evidence that debt-maturity choice cannot solely be described by
a ﬁrm's characteristics since industry eﬀects appear to be an important factor. In order to
deepen the analysis, robustness tests are carried out for diﬀerent periods of time. Those periods
are selected in an attempt to reﬂect economic variations seen in the U.S. in the recent past.
Whilst 19981999 and 20032007 were periods of economic prosperity, 20002002, 2008 and
20092010 reﬂect recent economic downturns. Interestingly, as shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4,
while the materials, telecommunication services and materials sectors' debt maturities appear
to be almost insensitive to economic variations, except in 2008, the consumer discretionary,
energy and information technology sectors' debt maturities are found to vary more distinctly
with economic conditions.
Indeed, the consumer discretionary dummy variable appears to be statistically signiﬁcant
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and positive during economic prosperity, in particular in 19981999 and 20032007. The results
demonstrate that this sector, which is well-known for being very responsive to economic cycles,
has a longer-term debt maturity during economic prosperity than theories predict. This ﬁnding
goes against Flannery's prediction since lengthening debt maturity signals a deterioration in
credit-worthiness, which is unlikely to be the case in the consumer discretionary sector during
times of economic prosperity. Moreover, the energy sector is found to have a higher debt
maturity in the period 19982002 compared with other years, as shown by the positive and
statistical signiﬁcance of its dummy variable. This ﬁnding may reﬂect the strong merger and
acquisition activities seen in the U.S. energy market between 1998 and 2002.41 In the same
way, this 'credit exuberance' is also found between 2003 and 2007 since most of the sector
dummy variables are found to be positive sign and statistically signiﬁcant. Again, this might
be explained by the ease of credit seen during this period in the U.S. on the back of strong
leveraged buyout activities.
In contrast, the information technology sector, which underperformed the overall market
and was subject to the bursting of a bubble in the early 2000s, is found to have a lower
debt maturity than predicted by the ﬁrm's characteristics. Indeed, the information technology
sector shows an 'over'-credit rationing during the bursting of the 'dotcom' bubble as shown
by the negative and statistically signiﬁcant intercept between 2000 and 2004. Similar results,
albeit smaller in magnitude, are found in the telecommunication services sector in 20002002;
its corresponding dummy variable is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level only compared
with the 1% level of signiﬁcance found in other years. According to Economides (2004), the
incorrect prediction of internet expansion had negative repercussions not only in internet-
based business but also in the long-distance business and in the market for telecommunications
equipment. Hence, the lower statistical signiﬁcance of the telecommunication industries shows
some evidence of credit rationing as well.
Lastly, the results for 2008 diﬀer to those of earlier years in that none of the dummy variables
is statistically signiﬁcant. This result shows that the 2008 credit crisis aﬀected all sectors.
Hence, choices concerning debt maturity appear to result not only from ﬁrms' characteristics
but also from market- and industry-speciﬁc risks. These observations, therefore, suggest that
41Exxon merged with Mobil in 1999, and Chevron united with Texaco in 2000. In addition, Schlumberger acquired shares
in Western Geophysical in 2000 and Sema plc in 2001.
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market conditions are an important factor in explaining debt-maturity choice.42
Finally, the materials, telecom services and utilities dummy variables are found to be con-
sistently statistically signiﬁcant across the periods of time considered, except 2008. They,
furthermore, exhibit a positive slope coeﬃcient, independent of the time period considered.
This implies that these sectors have a distinctly higher debt-maturity structure than theories
suggest. There may be two reasons for this. First, despite a global trend towards deregula-
tion, these sectors remain the most controlled by the U.S. government. Smith (1986) argued
that regulated ﬁrms have longer debt maturity than non-regulated ﬁrms as the managers of
regulated ﬁrms have less discretion over future investment decisions, thus having less incentive
to mitigate agency problems by shortening the maturity of their debt. An explanation also
supported by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003) who ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant shortening of debt maturity after deregulation. Second, these sectors exhibit greater
concentration (i.e. less competition) since their high capital costs create economies of scale
that are large in relation to the size of the market, a situation which creates high barriers to
entry. These companies, despite being governed by anti-trust legislation, may still beneﬁt from
a lack of competition to lengthen their debt maturity. This hypothesis accords with Glazer
(1994) who argued that symmetric ﬁrms with a large proportion of long-term debt tend to
behave more collusively.
In order to examine this point more deeply, Figure 2.4 shows the average of debt maturity
from 1999 to 2010 within each sector as a function of the average number of competitors in the
sector.43 Interestingly, debt maturity decreases as the number of competitors increases. This
ﬁnding supports the theoretical conclusions of Brander and Lewis (1986). Even though Brander
and Lewis (1986) did not speciﬁcally address the debt-maturity problem they did demonstrate
that 'one ﬁrm's susceptibility to ﬁnancial distress depends on its ﬁnancial structure, and its
fortunes will usually improve if one or more of its rivals can be driven into ﬁnancial distress.'
One might, then, expect that as the number of competitors increases, ﬁrms face more competi-
tion and are thus more likely to be more aggressive in their ﬁnancing decisions to alleviate the
underinvestment problem and to maintain their competitive position. This ﬁnding obviously
42Recently, many empirical studies have focused on the market-timing hypothesis. This emphasises that the debt-maturity
decision is mainly driven by market conditions. See Barry, Mann, Mihov, and Rodriguez (2009), among others.
43The underlying statistics can be found in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.4: Debt Maturity as a function of number of competitors
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merits further research.
In summary, three conclusions may be drawn from the results. First, strong support is
found for the maturity-matching principle and the signalling hypothesis. Little evidence is
found in favour of the agency-cost hypothesis, whilst Diamond's liquidity-risk hypothesis can-
not be rejected. Since the study focuses exclusively on large cap ﬁrms, the results indicate
that the agency cost hypothesis does not appear to be meaningful for large cap ﬁrms, therefore
giving more weight to the maturity-matching principle and the signalling hypothesis in explain-
ing cross-sectional characteristics of debt maturity. Second, ﬁrms' characteristics describe, in
large part, their debt-maturity choices, although noticeable diﬀerences exist in debt maturity
across sectors as shown by the statistical signiﬁcance of some of the industry dummies. The
industry speciﬁcity of debt maturity is best revealed when economic variations are taken into
consideration, reﬂecting as it does industries' responses in managing debt maturity in diﬀerent
economic settings. Third, regulation and ﬁrms' competitiveness may inﬂuence ﬁrms' ﬁnancing
strategies. The last point merits further research. The following paragraphs aim to deepen
this analysis by focusing on the variation of debt-maturity choice within each sector.
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2.4.2.2 Regressions by sector
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 summarise OLS regressions performed for individual sectors. Both tables
display slope coeﬃcients of the variables within each sector, which are statistically signiﬁcant,
at least at the 10% level.44 Since the data are standardised, comparison of each variable is
possible. Table 2.5 provides the results obtained when a linear variable for the credit rating
is used, whilst Table 2.6 exhibits results when a quadratic function of the same rating is
employed.45
First, the coeﬃcients are found to be diﬀerent across sectors and over time. Hence, both
industry factors and market factors are likely to inﬂuence debt-maturity choice since ﬁrms'
characteristics do not account for debt-maturity choice comprehensively. It is worth noting
that a a greater aﬃnity is found during periods of economic prosperity than during periods
of economic turbulence. Whilst the MTOB ratio, size, credit score and leverage variables
are found to be of lesser importance during economic turbulence, the cash-coverage ratio,
interval measure and ﬁxed-to-total asset ratio variables are found to be materially signiﬁcant
independently of economic conditions. The results are nonetheless consistent with earlier
results and support the signalling hypothesis and the maturity-matching principle.
Indeed, in line with previous results, the MTOB ratio does not seem to be robustly ex-
planatory, as shown by the scarcity of statistical signiﬁcance across sectors and over time. As
shown in Table 2.6, the MTOB ratio is not found to be consistent with Table 2.5. In addition,
the sign of the total asset variable is found negative, contradicting the agency-cost hypothesis's
empirical prediction. Hence, the agency costs hypothesis is once again rejected.
In contrast, the total asset, credit rating, leverage and cash-coverage ratio variables are
found to be consistent with Flannery's empirical predictions. Indeed, the total asset variable
is found to be negative, which implies that the larger the ﬁrm, the shorter its debt maturity.
This observation is particularly relevant in the energy, health care and telecom sectors and
reﬂects investors' interest in large ﬁrms to facilitate collaterisation. Following Guedes and
Opler (1996), one may argue that larger companies are less likely to default, thus its shorter
maturity according to the signalling hypothesis.
44The underlying regressions can be found in the Appendix in Tables A.9, A.10, A.11, A.12 and A.14.
45The underlying regressions, which include a polynomial function for the credit rating variable, can be found in the
Appendix in Tables A.15, A.17, A.18, A.19 and A.20.
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Table 2.5: Regressions output summary - OLS within sector
This table summarises the regressions output within each sector for the diﬀerent periods of time considered. The underlying
regressions can be found in Tables A.9, A.10, A.11, A.12 and A.14. Only the slope coeﬃcients, which are statistically
signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level are displayed. The dependent variable is the long term to total debt ratio DLTT+DD1
DLTT+LCT
,
where LCT denotes Current Liabilities, which represents liabilities due within one year including the current portion of
long-term debt DD1. DLTT is the amount of Long Term debt, which represents debt obligations due more than one year
from the company's reporting date.
Energy Materials Industrial ConsumD ConsumS Health Care Info Tech Telecom Utilities
Market to Book Ratio
1998-2010 -0.139*** -0.093*** 0.053** -0.309*** -0.094* 0.116***
1998-1999 -0.187** -0.505*** -0.256***
2000-2002 -0.241***
2003-2007 -0.113** -0.139*** 0.122*** -0.324*** 0.143** 0.286***
2008 -0.272*
2009-2010 0.299*** 0.268* 0.343**
Size
1998-2010 -0.224*** -0.080** -0.096*** 0.079*** -0.119*** -0.189*** -0.052*
1998-1999 -0.332*** -0.194** -0.241**
2000-2002 -0.212*** -0.300***
2003-2007 -0.170*** -0.124** -0.127*** 0.099*** -0.073* -0.317*** -0.253*** -0.086*
2008 -0.309** 0.156*
2009-2010 -0.323*** -0.165**
Credit Score
1998-2010 0.078** 0.210*** 0.107*** 0.227*** 0.135*** 0.291*** 0.495*** 0.347*** 0.201***
1998-1999 0.236** 0.317*** 0.465*** 0.406*** 0.462***
2000-2002 0.266*** 0.391*** 0.427*** 0.118*
2003-2007 0.140*** 0.088** 0.158*** 0.087* 0.530***
2008
2009-2010 -0.243** 0.233*** 0.367*** 0.258**
Cash Coverage ratio
1998-2010 -0.279*** -0.204*** -0.168*** -0.113*** -0.078*** -0.290*** -0.106*** -0.338*** -0.295***
1998-1999 -0.272*** -0.167* -0.106** -0.210*** -0.131* -0.368*** -0.292**
2000-2002 -0.467*** -0.289*** -0.117** -0.357*** -0.232*** -0.309*** -0.267***
2003-2007 -0.392*** -0.115* -0.182*** -0.210*** -0.073* -0.297*** -0.153*** -0.573*** -0.595***
2008 -0.426*** -0.272** -0.187** -0.686***
2009-2010 -0.466*** -0.455*** -0.177** -0.316*** -0.516*** -0.506***
Interval Measure
1998-2010 0.047* 0.089** 0.252*** 0.166*** 0.225*** 0.082** 0.240*** 0.234***
1998-1999 0.279*** 0.415*** 0.134** 0.134* 0.275*** 0.234** 0.248***
2000-2002 0.215*** 0.358*** 0.130* 0.175** 0.169**
2003-2007 0.066* 0.140** 0.173*** 0.236*** 0.317*** 0.236*** 0.273***
2008 0.264*** 0.225** 0.318*** 0.245*
2009-2010 0.160* 0.285*** 0.185*** 0.234** 0.312***
Fixed to Total Asset ratio
1998-2010 0.512*** 0.543*** 0.745*** 0.657*** 0.420*** 0.498*** 0.356*** 0.463*** 0.846***
1998-1999 0.515*** 0.460*** 0.812*** 0.610*** 0.430*** 0.627*** 0.451*** 0.394*** 0.752***
2000-2002 0.613*** 0.651*** 0.794*** 0.611*** 0.423*** 0.376*** 0.151** 0.331** 0.822***
2003-2007 0.486*** 0.618*** 0.727*** 0.651*** 0.401*** 0.578*** 0.398*** 0.552*** 0.858***
2008 0.486*** 0.542** 0.718*** 0.710*** 0.582*** 0.380*** 0.576*** 0.534** 0.719***
2009-2010 0.600*** 0.417*** 0.818*** 0.703*** 0.505*** 0.558*** 0.532*** 0.232 0.826***
Leverage
1998-2010 -0.087*** 0.129*** 0.458*** 0.111*** 0.191*** 0.159*** -0.139***
1998-1999 0.283*** 0.326*** 0.221***
2000-2002 -0.128** 0.124** 0.302*** 0.242*** 0.276***
2003-2007 -0.120*** 0.122* 0.110*** 0.562*** 0.251*** 0.154*** 0.178** -0.167***
2008 0.185** 0.343***
2009-2010 0.250*** 0.373***
CHAPTER 2. INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY OF DEBT MATURITY 56
Moreover, the results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings since ﬁrms' credit ratings appears to be more
in line with Flannery's hypothesis than with Diamond's liquidity-risk model. Indeed, Table 2.6
shows that the sign related to the square root of the credit score does not have the predicted
sign46 and is not found to be consistent across sectors. Again, this ﬁnding might be due to the
general good-credit quality of the sample considered. In addition, the statistical signiﬁcance
of the leverage variable and its high slope coeﬃcients conﬁrms that high-leveraged ﬁrms tend
to borrow at the long end of the yield curve. However, four exceptions are the materials and
industrial sectors, which do not seem to be inﬂuenced by leverage, and the energy and utilities
sectors, which exhibit a negative relationship between debt maturity and leverage. This result
is in line with Ovtchinnikov (2010), who found that bankruptcy considerations are less relevant
for regulated ﬁrms since 'regulated ﬁrms have fewer incentives to operate eﬃciently and face a
lower threat of costly reorganization or liquidation than unregulated ﬁrms operating in a more
competitive environment.'
Furthermore, ﬁrms' cash-coverage ratios appear to be of high importance in explaining debt
maturity: it is statistically signiﬁcant for all sectors and has the predicted sign.47 This result
conﬁrms that a ﬁrm's solvency and credit quality have a material eﬀect on the ﬁrm's debt-
maturity structure. Once again, whilst Flannery's hypothesis can be validated, Diamond's
theory cannot be rejected for the reasons outlined above.
Finally, there is strong evidence in favour of the maturity-matching principle, as shown by
the statistically signiﬁcant and large slope coeﬃcients of the interval measure and ﬁxed asset to
total asset ratio. The results also show that the maturity-matching principle is almost of equal
importance for all industries except the information technology sector, which has lower slope
coeﬃcients, indicating that those variables have a lesser inﬂuence on debt-maturity choice than
in other sectors, an observation also reﬂected in the low R2 and high AIC and BIC values found
in both regressions. Stohs and Mauer (1996) argued that the 'management of debt maturity
may be of little importance to ﬁrms with large amounts of growth opportunities because such
46The predicted sign should have been positive since Diamond's theory predicted a fall in debt maturity for riskier ﬁrms.
47One sector worthy of comment is the consumer staples sector, which unsurprisingly presents the lowest slope coeﬃcient
for the cash-coverage ratio variable since the nature of this sector is generally less sensitive to economic variations. It thus
sees more stable earnings than the rest of the economy. In contrast, the consumer discretionary sector shows a positive
relationship between its size and its debt maturity, indicating that the cyclical nature of the consumer discretionary sector
may cause a stronger credit rationing in this sector compared with the rest of the economy.
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Table 2.6: Regressions output summary - OLS within sector - Polynomial Credit Rating
This table reproduces Table 2.5 and summarises the regressions output within each sector for the diﬀerent periods of time
considered but considers a polynomial function f : x→ x2 for the credit rating variable. The underlying regressions can be
found in Tables A.15, A.17, A.18, A.19 and A.20. Only the slope coeﬃcients, which are statistically signiﬁcant at least at
the 10% level are displayed. The dependent variable is the long term to total debt ratio DLTT+DD1
DLTT+LCT
.
Energy Materials Industrial ConsumD ConsumS Health Care Info Tech Telecom Utilities
Market to Book Ratio
1998-2010 -0.147*** -0.095*** 0.041* -0.314*** -0.104** 0.116***
1998-1999 -0.201** -0.505*** -0.255***
2000-2002 -0.247***
2003-2007 -0.115** -0.137*** 0.114*** -0.325*** 0.099* 0.137** 0.280***
2008 -0.253* 0.361*
2009-2010 0.327*** 0.268* 0.335**
Size
1998-2010 -0.246*** -0.088** -0.095*** 0.079*** -0.052* -0.159*** -0.215*** -0.052*
1998-1999 -0.380*** -0.170** -0.234*** -0.238**
2000-2002 -0.231*** -0.210** -0.313***
2003-2007 -0.176*** -0.131** -0.126*** 0.098*** -0.076* -0.301*** -0.249*** -0.084*
2008 -0.245** 0.158*
2009-2010 -0.275*** -0.146**
Credit Score2
1998-2010 0.191*** 0.119*** 0.227*** 0.139*** 0.275*** 0.466*** 0.312*** 0.199***
1998-1999 0.215** 0.340*** 0.402*** 0.422*** 0.418***
2000-2002 0.281*** 0.402*** 0.425*** 0.111*
2003-2007 0.125** 0.103** 0.154*** 0.093** 0.476***
2008
2009-2010 -0.182* 0.243*** 0.206* 0.299*** 0.271**
Cash Coverage ratio
1998-2010 -0.290*** -0.217*** -0.173*** -0.112*** -0.078*** -0.283*** -0.111*** -0.352*** -0.295***
1998-1999 -0.302*** -0.175* -0.105** -0.205*** -0.125* -0.393*** -0.287**
2000-2002 -0.488*** -0.288*** -0.117** -0.340*** -0.246*** -0.310*** -0.281***
2003-2007 -0.396*** -0.123* -0.189*** -0.211*** -0.073* -0.296*** -0.153*** -0.553*** -0.582***
2008 -0.364*** -0.272** -0.189** -0.681***
2009-2010 -0.425*** -0.465*** -0.179** -0.316*** -0.510*** -0.488***
Interval Measure
1998-2010 0.049* 0.091** 0.254*** 0.169*** 0.214*** 0.071** 0.242*** 0.228***
1998-1999 0.316*** 0.413*** 0.115** 0.146* 0.236*** 0.240** 0.243***
2000-2002 0.218*** 0.360*** 0.131* 0.159** 0.153**
2003-2007 0.066* 0.139** 0.175*** 0.238*** 0.304*** 0.238*** 0.270***
2008 0.265** 0.224** 0.313*** 0.250*
2009-2010 0.157* 0.277*** 0.184*** 0.225** 0.290**
Fixed to Total Asset ratio
1998-2010 0.516*** 0.543*** 0.747*** 0.656*** 0.421*** 0.502*** 0.344*** 0.465*** 0.847***
1998-1999 0.544*** 0.460*** 0.833*** 0.595*** 0.430*** 0.641*** 0.430*** 0.416*** 0.747***
2000-2002 0.619*** 0.651*** 0.785*** 0.602*** 0.426*** 0.422*** 0.127* 0.334** 0.821***
2003-2007 0.487*** 0.618*** 0.727*** 0.650*** 0.402*** 0.575*** 0.375*** 0.558*** 0.860***
2008 0.468*** 0.544** 0.715*** 0.706*** 0.576*** 0.363*** 0.598*** 0.515** 0.728***
2009-2010 0.592*** 0.418*** 0.813*** 0.701*** 0.510*** 0.529*** 0.557*** 0.831***
Leverage
1998-2010 -0.080** 0.127*** 0.459*** 0.108*** 0.173*** 0.158*** -0.134***
1998-1999 0.281*** 0.302*** 0.208**
2000-2002 -0.123** 0.100* 0.303*** 0.223*** 0.273***
2003-2007 -0.119*** 0.122* 0.112*** 0.561*** 0.244*** 0.126** 0.173*** -0.165***
2008 0.183** 0.345***
2009-2010 0.246*** 0.378***
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ﬁrms have little debt': companies within the technology sector are probably good examples.
As seen in the previous section, competition in this sector is likely to be tougher than in other
sectors, hence the reliance on short-term debt as a strategic tool.
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2.5 Conclusion
The debt-maturity decision is one of several ﬁnancing choices that a ﬁrm must make when
deciding how it will ﬁnance itself. This study captures some stylised facts about funding
decisions in diﬀerent industries and shows that the funding decision is, in part, industry-speciﬁc.
Using ﬁrm-level data over the entire sample, strong support in favour of the maturity-matching
hypothesis is observed as opposed to the agency-cost hypothesis, for which mixed evidence was
found. A ﬁrm's credit-worthiness also has a material eﬀect on the debt-maturity choice since
the results show strong support for Flannery's signalling hypothesis. Compared to existing
literature, the present results diﬀer in two ways: ﬁrst, the fact that little support is found for
the agency cost hypothesis, an hypothesis commonly supported in the literature, is likely due
to the focus put on large cap ﬁrms, which in turn, provides evidence that growth opportunities
eﬀect on the debt maturity choice for large cap ﬁrms is negligible. Second, the fact that little
support for the liquidity risk hypothesis is found in this study can be explained, again, by the
restriction of the sample to large cap ﬁrms. Large cap ﬁrms appear to be generally of good
quality, which implies that the sample used is not rich enough of poor quality ﬁrms to reﬂect
on the validity of this hypothesis. As such, the maturity-matching principle and the signalling
hypothesis appear to be most relevant in explaining debt maturity decision in large cap ﬁrms.
Moreover, whilst these theories for the most part describe the debt-maturity choice, seg-
regating the data into sectors reveals further important details: industries such as those in
the materials, telecommunication services and utilities sectors are found to have a higher
debt-maturity structure than theories predict. This ﬁnding is likely due to their concentrated
nature, long lived collateral and regulatory constraints, which in turn create high barriers to
entry. This observation is also supported by the strong inﬂuence of merger and acquisition
activities on debt maturity as seen in the energy sector.
In addition, the state of the economy also plays an important role in debt-maturity struc-
ture; it shows that underperforming sectors or sectors subject to the bursting of a speculative
bubble, such as the information technology sector in the early 2000s, face severe credit ra-
tioning which is reﬂected by the 'over-shortening' of their debt maturity. Finally, there is
clear evidence that the 2008 credit crisis aﬀected all sectors, in turn providing evidence that
economic conditions also aﬀect debt maturity choice.
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Thus, current theories fail to capture the industry speciﬁcity of debt-maturity choice. In
addition, it is clear that when a ﬁrm decides to ﬁnance itself through the issuance of a new
debt claim, managers also have to decide on the priority of that debt, whether the debt is
public or private and other contract provisions, including call and convertibility provisions
and restrictive covenants. Future work could attempt to investigate how ﬁrms in diﬀerent
sectors address these matters and how the above ﬁndings, in conjunction with other debt
characteristics, relate to market structure, the sector's competitiveness and the ﬁrm's strategy.
Table 2.7: Theory validation
Theory validation
Agency Cost Hypothesis (AC) Signalling and Liquidity Risk Hypothesis (SLR) Maturity Matching Principle
From this analysis # " "
Barclay and Smith (1995) " mixed n/a
Stohs and Mauer (1996) mixed " "
Guedes and Opler (1996) " " n/a
Ozkan (2000) " mixed "
Graham and Harvey (2001) # mixed "
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3.1 Introduction
There is a signiﬁcant month-on-month variation in the amount of debt issued in the euro
zone debt capital market. Between January 1999 and April 2010, ¿77 billion of debt were
issued on average on a monthly basis in the debt capital market, with monthly volatility of
27%. In the same year the amount of debt issued in the euro zone varied considerably. In
January 2007, for example, around ¿63 billion of debt were issued while just several months
later, in June 2007, ¿147 billion of debt were issued. What accounts for these changes? What
is the explanation for this variation within such a short period of time in the amount of debt
issued by non-ﬁnancial corporates?
This study explores the characteristics of corporate debt ﬁnancing in the euro zone and asks
whether market conditions are an important determining factor in corporate debt issuance.
Among other hypotheses that have been put forward, the study examines manager's market
timing strategy in issuing more debt than is needed for their ﬁnancing, ostensibly taking
advantage of favourable market conditions, that is, when interest rates are low compared with
past rates. The analysis extends the existing research on the market timing of debt issuance
by, ﬁrst, considering the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediaries, i.e. banks, on the market timing
of funding strategies and, second, emphasising short-term 'horizon timing' strategy.
Compared with previous work, this study uses data on the euro zone. Although the ﬁnanc-
ing structure of corporates in Europe has certainly changed signiﬁcantly in the recent past, it
remains primarily bank-orientated. Using euro zone data, thus, creates the opportunity not
only to test whether previous ﬁndings are applicable to other markets but also to concentrate
on the particular inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediaries (banks) on the timing strategy of debt
issuance. Furthermore, and again in contrast to earlier research, the study examines short-
term horizon timing strategy. More speciﬁcally, using monthly aggregate data on corporate
loan and bond issuance from January 1999 to April 2010, the study explores whether debt
issuance is more likely to happen when the cost of borrowing is low compared with earlier
levels. This decision is driven by the likelihood that economic circumstances will change over
the long term, that managers choose to invest the proceeds of their debt issuance into growth
opportunities and that the cost of carry of such a funding strategy will not be bearable.
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This study contributes to the existing knowledge and contradicts previous empirical litera-
ture on backward market timing - Barry et al. (2008), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Mittoo
and Bancel (2004) - since the results of the present work show little evidence that corporates
issue debt in hopes of timing the interest rate market. This is most clear when ﬁnancing is
done through ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks; a ﬁnding, which is speciﬁcally evidenced
in this study since, contrary to Barry et al. (2008), this research does not constraint the test-
ing of this hypothesis in the bond market but also uses loan data. The results suggest instead
that: (i) managers switch between bond and loan issuance depending on interest rate levels
as shown by the interest rate gap variables in the regressions, whose coeﬃcients turn to be
of opposite sign and equal in the two markets; and, (ii) managers tend to time their credit
spreads by issuing more bonds when their credit spreads are low compared to recent past levels.
Contrary to Barry et al. (2008), these results reject managers' ability to time interest rates but
suggest, instead, that market conditions inﬂuence the bond and the loan markets diﬀerently
therefore highlighting the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediates on market timing attempts of
debt issuance.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 outlines previous work on the topic; Section 2
describes at greater length the research strategy used here as well as the data sample; Section
3 summarises the results and is followed by a ﬁnal section that concludes the chapter.
3.2 Literature review
Doukas, Guo and Zhou (2011) have shown that capital structure may reﬂect previous
attempts to time the debt market. They show that corporates attempt to issue more debt in
'hot' debt markets1 as a result of adverse selection costs of equity as well as considerations
concerning ownership concentration. Based on arguments put forward by Myers and Majlufs
(1984), Doukas, et al. (2011) marshall empirical evidence suggesting that managers choose to
issue debt in order to avoid equity undervaluation stemming from the asymmetry of information
between managers and outside investors. In addition, they ﬁnd empirical evidence for Stulz's
(1988) argument, which states that ﬁrms with less dispersed ownership are more likely to issue
1They deﬁne 'hot' debt markets as those periods with clusters of debt issuance.
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debt in order to maintain control. Based on the analysis of Doukas, et al. (2011), interest rates
do not appear to be a key determining factor in levels of debt issuance.
This ﬁnding diﬀers from several other studies that claim to demonstrate that interest rates
are an important factor in decisions concerning levels of debt issuance. Graham and Harvey
(2001) asked 392 chief ﬁnancial oﬃcers (CFOs) in the US and Canada about capital budgeting,
the cost of capital and capital structure. They found that few executives time changes in their
credit rating, but they may attempt to time the interest rate market 'by issuing debt when
they feel that market interest rates are particularly low.' Bancel and Mittoo (2004) had similar
results from their survey of euro zone ﬁnancial oﬃcers, ﬁnding evidence that 'managers use
windows of opportunity to raise capital. Although transaction costs of debt are considered
important, few managers delay the issuance of debt because of the transaction costs.' Recently
Barry, Mann, Mihov and Rodriguez (2008, 2009) have claimed that ﬁrms issue more debt when
the level of interest rates is low. Using a large sample of data spanning 30 years, Barry et al.
(2008) conclude that managers issue more debt than equity, and more debt compared with
investment spending, when interest rates are low. This is referred to as 'backward market
timing'. As argued by Barry et al. (2008), there is a need for a benchmark for comparing
current interest rates with historical rates. They measure historical interest rate levels using
two diﬀerent measurements. One is a decile ranking of current average corporate rates against
rates over the previous ten years; the other introduces ﬁve- and ten-year lagged rates. A given
interest rate might, therefore, be high or low compared with historical rates since the window
used for comparing spot rates with historical rates is dynamic. Barry et al. (2008) argue that
the ﬁve- to ten-year horizon is used in an attempt to 'reﬂect [...] the memory of the decision
maker'. Thus, they claim that a good approximation for the optimal horizon may be the tenure
of executives.2
If their choice is sensiblein the sense that it may be a good proxy for managers' sentiments
concerning low interest rates compared with what they experienced in the pastit is surprising
and irrational that managers issue more debt today because current interest rates are lower
than they were ﬁve or ten years ago. Indeed, it is very likely that: within ten years, ﬁrst,
shifts in monetary and ﬁscal policy have occurred; second, economic activity has changed
2In addition, Barry et al (2008) tested for diﬀerent lags in their regression and found that the adjusted R2 is maximised
at 11 years.
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considerably; and third, that managers will not delay or anticipate their debt issuance by ten
years with the aim of getting the best rates, given that friction costs might not be bearable.
It seems unrealistic to think that managers would anticipate or delay their debt issuance by
a few years because of favourable market conditions. This would imply that they would keep
the proceeds of their debt issue as cash for several years. They would surely either invest this
cash into new investments, capital expenditure or engage in shares' repurchases. In this case,
we could say that they time the market by a few months, not by a few years.3 Following this
reasoning, it is unlikely that managers would be tempted to time the interest rate market by
comparing current interest rates over such a long horizon. If they did indeed believe that the
interest rate parity did not hold, they would try to issue more debt when the level of interest
rates is low compared with the recent past. It seems more sensible to argue that ﬁrms may
anticipate or delay their debt issuance by a few months because of expectations of an increase
or decrease in interest rates, but these periods would be limited and brief, given frictional costs
associated with such a funding strategy. With this in mind, debt market timing strategy is
tested here on a short-term horizon. In particular, this analysis uses a much shorter horizon
for comparing current interest rates with past rates. This, in turn, signiﬁcantly aﬀects the
results compared with those of Barry et al. (2008).
The second main question addressed in this study is whether ﬁnancial intermediaries play
a role in debt market timing strategies. It is well known that, in addition to providing ﬁnanc-
ing to corporates, banks also monitor borrowers' actions by conditioning the grant of loans
or loans' covenants. Diamond (1991) has argued that directly-placed debt depends on pub-
lic information only, as opposed to a bank loan which also requires information from costly
monitoring. This results from that fact that private information is more easily collected by
ﬁnancial intermediaries than by many investors. Consequently, and in keeping with both Barry
et al. (2008) and Doukas, Guo and Zhou (2011), this study examines whether interest rate
timing has a greater eﬀect on debt issuance in the bond market than in the loan market. Using
3Suppose, for example, that a manager issues debt at time t because current interest rates are low compared with the
previous ten years. As a rational manager, he now needs to decide where to invest the money he has just raised. As the
rates he can get from deposit are lower than the rates at which he borrowed, and because he aims to act in shareholders'
best interest, he has an incentive to invest this cash as soon as possible in a project whose expected return is higher than
the funding cost. One can, therefore, expect him to invest the cash he has raised within a few months so as to minimise the
destruction of shareholders' value. Even though he may feel that he managed to get interest costs lower than what he would
have got ten years earlier, he has eﬀectively tried to time the market by a few months, not a few years.
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a sample comprising aggregate data on euro zone corporate public debt securities and loans
granted by euro zone monetary ﬁnancial institutions, the present study investigates the rela-
tionship between debt issues and market conditions. This research speciﬁcally tests, in both
markets, whether the level of interest rates relative to historical levels, the credit spread and
other market indicators are important determinants of debt issuance, with the tests controlling
for investment spending, growth opportunities and ﬁnancing needs.
Despite a signiﬁcant increase in the issuance of corporate debt securities in the euro zone
market, reﬂects as it does the increasing sophistication and diversiﬁcation of corporate sources
of funding, euro zone debt ﬁnancing remains primarily bank-based. By considering both bond
and loan issuance, then, in countries where bank ﬁnancing is considerable, the comparison
of market timing behaviour in both bond and loan markets becomes a possibility. This, in
turn, allows for the measurement of the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediates on market timing
behaviour. In addition, because the data used range from 1999 to 2010, the study also considers
the recent severe credit crisis and sheds light on corporate behaviour during one of the most
critical economic downturns since the great depression. Finally, given the recent turmoil and
the large increase in volatility in interest rates, monthly data are used in order to examine
timing attempts.
3.3 Research approach
3.3.1 Research strategy
The main objective of the research is to understand why there are such variations in the
volume of debt issuance and whether managers engage into debt market timing strategies to
raise funding. The study considers market timing behaviour from a market perspective and
asks whether timing strategies are more pervasive in the euro zone bond market than in the
overall euro zone credit market, a primarily bank-based market. The ﬁrst set of results is a
descriptive analysis of the characteristics of issuance activity in the euro zone debt market.
Graphical observations of the eﬀects of interest rates on the amount of debt issued in both
bond and bank loan markets are presented and analysed. Then ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions are used to estimate the inﬂuence of a number of variables on debt and loan issuance
by non-ﬁnancial corporations, both in absolute terms and in terms relative to reﬁnancing needs
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and investment policy. The overall strategy to measure debt issuance timing is as follows and
is the core of this paper.
This study uses the deﬁnition of Barry et al. (2008) to investigate whether euro zone ﬁrms
are issuing debt with the goal of timing interest rates in a backward-looking sense. 'Backward
timing' of debt issuance is deﬁned as the practice of issuing debt securities, relative to ﬁnancing
needs and capital expenditure, when interest rates are low compared with historical levels. As
argued by Barry et al. (2008), it is important to deﬁne the concept of interest rate market
timing. Indeed, interest rate market timing can be viewed in a forward-looking sense or in the
backward-looking one. In the case of the former, success in forward-looking market timing can
be deﬁned as managers issuing more debt before interest rates rise so as to lower the ﬁrm's cost
of capital. This forward-looking timing has been and is still subject to much discussion:4 ﬁrst,
because results vary signiﬁcantly, and second, because it challenges some of the implications
of the eﬃcient market hypothesis.5 One implication of the hypothesis is that managers cannot
anticipate the interest rate market by issuing more debt before interest rates rise. Yet success
in forward-looking interest rate market timing would suggest that managers are potentially
better informed about interest rate changes than other market participants, which appears an
unlikely suggestion.
In the latter case of backward-looking market timing, of interest here, interest rate market
timing in the backward-looking sense of Barry, et al. (2008) is deﬁned as issuing debt when
interest rates are low compared with historical rates. Managers engaging in backward-looking
interest rate market timing issue more debt than is needed for their general ﬁnancing6 when
interest rates are at a low level compared with past levels. It is clear that managers seek to
obtain cheap ﬁnancing to lower their cost of capital. The reasons, though, why managers may
engage in such a market timing strategy are not obvious. It could be argued that managers
may engage in backward market timing either for speculative purposes, precautionary funding
purposes or to beneﬁt from low credit spreads.
4See, among others, Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003); Baker, Taliaferro and Wurgler (2005); Butler, Grullon and
Weston (2006); Barry, Mann, Mihov and Rodríguez (2009); and, Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010).
5Fama (1970) developed the eﬃcient market hypothesis, an hypothesis which asserted that ﬁnancial markets are informa-
tionally eﬃcient. Thus, prices on traded securities already reﬂect all available information; prices instantly change to reﬂect
new information.
6General ﬁnancing needs are deﬁned here as the sum of the ﬁnancing needs used for general business operations as well
as ﬁnancing for growth opportunities.
CHAPTER 3. MARKET TIMING OF DEBT ISSUANCE IN EUROPE 68
One hypothesis (H1) is that managers have mean return expectations on interest rates.
Thus, when interest rates are low compared with earlier rates, managers issue more debt today
as they expect interest rates to rise in the future. Managers are, therefore, taking a view on
interest rates' movements based on the information that they have on historical interest rate
levels. On the one hand, if managers choose interest rate market strategy to ﬁnance their
business and issue debt in advance of their ﬁnancing needs, they face the cost of carrying
cash until they invest it. On the other hand, if managers delay their debt issuance they face
other costs such as overdraft fees. For this strategy actually to be cost eﬀective, there must
be a mispricing in the interest rate markets. As such, this hypothesis goes against the pure
expectation hypothesis of interest rates, an hypothesis which asserts that various maturities
are perfect substitutes. This hypothesis can only be validated if the eﬀect is demonstrated in
both the euro zone bond market and bank loan market, as managers' expectations on interest
rates are not dependent on the type of market employed to obtain ﬁnancing. Otherwise, the
hypothesis must be rejected.
Another hypothesis (H2) is that managers tend to beneﬁt from low credit spreads to issue
more debt. In this case, managers are not timing the interest rates. Rather, they are timing
their credit spreads. As opposed to Barry et al. (2008), who used a simple credit spread
variable in their regressions, here the gap between actual and recent past credit spread is used
in order to be consistent with the notion of benchmarking discussed earlier. As such, we want
to observe whether managers issue more debt when their credit spread are low compared to
recent past levels. Should this hypothesis be true, then a negative relationship is should be
found between the ﬁrm's credit spread gap and the amount of debt issued.
Finally, the last hypothesis (H3) is that managers issue more debt for precautionary pur-
poses. Managers may expect diﬃcult market conditions in the future so they may wish to raise
more ﬁnancing than required when market conditions are favourable, preventing in this way
any liquidity issues in the near future. Another view would be that managers issue more debt
when interest rates are low compared with historical levels of interest rates since they can raise
more money for the same interest costs they paid in the past. In this case, managers would
not target speciﬁc debt levels but would eﬀectively adjust their debt levels towards speciﬁc
interest costs. In both cases, they are likely to end up with cash surpluses in the near future
without changing their net levels of debt. Either view implies that managers may wish to issue
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debt for precautionary purposes. As for H1, H3 can only be validated if this hypothesis is
demonstrated for both markets.
Having explained the research approach adopted in this analysis, the following part presents
the data used in the analysis and justiﬁes the selection of each of the variables used to test the
hypotheses presented above.
3.3.2 Data and sample characteristics
The data employed in this study is extracted from the on-line European Central Bank
(ECB) statistics database available at www.ecb.int. The variables are summarised in Tables
C.1 and C.3 in the Appendix. The data sample ranges from January 1999 to April 2010.
Motivating this choice was the wish to focus on the period after the introduction of the euro.
Second, and in contrast to previous empirical studies such as that of Barry, Mann, Mihov and
Rodriguez (2008), this study employs a sample period that includes the recent credit crisis,
thus allowing for the testing of the market timing hypothesis under extreme credit conditions.
The dependent variables in the regressions are the net amount of debt securities issued
in the euro zone debt capital market (NDS), deﬁned as the sum of total gross debt issuance
minus the sum of debt redemption within a month, and as the net amount of loans granted
by monetary ﬁnancial institutions (LOAN). It may be argued, moreover, that the timing of
debt issuance is driven by the desire to reﬁnance expensive debt. Regressions with the gross
level of debt issued in the debt capital market (GDS) as dependent variable are, therefore,
also performed.7 For each type of debt, nominal proceeds and cash ﬂows are adjusted by the
monthly consumer price index of the euro zone (HICP) to obtain proceeds in constant euros
(measured as at 1 January 2010); comparisons of the quantities issued across time can be valid
as a result.
The independent variables aim to reﬂect the inﬂuence both of market conditions, growth
opportunities and ﬁnancing needs. Each of the independent variables are explained below.
The eﬀects of historical interest rate levels on debt issuance decisions is captured by the
use of the gap between the current and the historical levels of interest rates in the regressions.
It is based on levels observed in the preceding three to nine months, respectively: rateGapi =
7Unfortunately, the gross volumes of loans granted by MFIs are not available in the ECB database.
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rlt − rlt−i, where (rl) is the euro zone ten-year government benchmark bond yield calculated
and published by the ECB. If managers issue more debt when current interest rates are low
compared with earlier rates, then a negative relationship between the amount of debt issued
and the diﬀerence between current and earlier interest rates should be found.
In the same way, the eﬀects of past credit spread levels to debt issuance decisions is repre-
sented in the regressions by the diﬀerence between current and the three- to nine-month lagged
credit spread levels: creditspreadGapi = cbst − cbst−i. The credit spread (cbs) is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the average yield on BBB-rated bonds (cbr) issued by non-ﬁnancial
corporates in the euro zone and the euro zone government benchmark bond (rl). Again, a
negative relationship is expected between the gap in the credit spread and the amount of debt
issued.
The term spread (ts) represents managers' expectations on future economic conditions. It
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the Euribor 6-month (rs) and the yield of benchmark bonds
of ten-year maturity (rl). According to Harvey (1986, 1989, 1991, 1993),8 the term structure
of interest rates is a powerful predictor of real growth. Even though the term structure, as any
forecasting tools, has some pitfalls in predicting future economic conditions, it is generally well
accepted that the term spread provides one of the best measurements of real growth two to
six quarters into the future.9 An upward yield curve can be seen as the start of an economic
expansion, while a ﬂat or inverted yield forecasts a slowdown of the economy or a recession,
respectively. In the present context, one should expect managers to issue more debt when the
term spread predicts diﬃcult upcoming economic circumstances. One would thus expect to
ﬁnd a negative relationship between the term spread and the amount of debt issued in both
the bond and bank loan markets.
Moreover, as argued by Barry, Mann, Mihov and Rodríguez (2008), corporates may post-
pone their investments to wait for rates to fall. Managers may think that some projects add
value when interest rates are low because of the lower discount rate. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to measure debt issuance relative to capital expenditure and growth expectation. Capital
expenditure (CAPEX) is deﬁned as the sum of the gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF) and
8Empirical evidence for the forecasting power of the yield curve is large. This includes but is not restrained to Estrella
and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella and Mishkin (1996), Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996) and Hu (1993).
9See Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1996).
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changes in inventories and acquisition, less disposals of valuables (CIAD). These data are spe-
ciﬁc to non-ﬁnancial corporates in the euro zone and are published quarterly by the ECB.
Linear interpolations were employed to approximate the data on a monthly basis. In addition,
the market-to-book ratio (MTOB) of the Bloomberg euro area 500 index is used as a proxy
for growth expectation; it is one of the most common proxies used in the literature.10
Finally, in testing whether managers issue more debt compared to their ﬁnancing needs
when interest rates are low compared with past levels, the retained earnings (REARN) are
included as a control variable. Retained earnings are used as a proxy for ﬁrms' ﬁnancing
needs: the higher the retained earnings, the lower the ﬁrm's ﬁnancing needs. (REARN) is
proxied by pequity/PER − pequity × Divyield/100, where (pequity), (Divyield) and (PER)
are the price, the dividend yield and the price-earning ratio of the Bloomberg euro area 500
index, respectively.
The research approach adopted in this analysis has been explained in this section. Diﬀerent
variables relationship to testable propositions was also discussed. The results are presented in
the next section.
3.4 Results
The results of this study are presented in two parts. First, the overall ﬁnancing structure of
euro zone non-ﬁnancial corporations and the changes seen in the way euro zone corporates have
obtained ﬁnancing over the last decade are presented. Second, the market timing hypothesis
of debt issuance, as detailed in Section 2, is tested using OLS regressions, and the results are
discussed.
3.4.1 Financing structure of euro zone non-ﬁnancial corporations
Figure 3.1 shows the ﬁnancing structure of euro zone non-ﬁnancial corporations from the
ﬁrst quarter of 1999 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. Financing sources are reported as a percentage
of total liabilities; it is worth noting, though, that they are inﬂuenced by changes in valuation.11
10Smith and Watts (1992) have argued that the more growth options in a ﬁrm's investment set, the larger the ﬁrm's
market-to-book ratio.
11Shares and other equity are marked to market. Debt liabilities are disclosed at nominal value. The valuation of debt
liabilities is subject to changes in foreign exchange, should the nominal value of the debt be in a currency other than the
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As may be seen in Figure 3.1, shares and other equity are the main ﬁnancing instruments used
by euro zone non-ﬁnancial corporations, followed by loans and bond securities. Whilst bond
ﬁnancing represents less than 10% of the ﬁnancing structure of non-ﬁnancial corporates, bank
loans remain the main debt instrument used, representing between 30% and 40% of corporates'
total liabilities.
To better understand changes in the ﬁnancial structure of non-ﬁnancial corporates over this
time period, Figure 3.2 shows both equity, bond and loan transaction ﬂows, which, this time,
are not inﬂuenced by valuation eﬀects. Again, it is apparent that non-ﬁnancial corporates in
the euro zone are still primarily ﬁnanced through equity. Be that as it may, Figure 3.2 reveals
that the annual issuance of bonds and loans granted by the monetary ﬁnancial institutions
grew substantially between Q1 2003 and Q4 2007. Based on Figure 3.2 and in conjunction
with Figure 3.1, it is notable that the large rise in loans and bond issuance did not result in
an increase in the share of these debt instruments of total corporate liabilities. This is the
result of the fact that the prices of shares rose substantially over this period of time and that
interest rates were relatively low compared with those of previous years. These observations
are consistent with a study, published in the August 2008 ECB Monthly Bulletin, on the role
of banks in the monetary policy transmission channel. That study argued that the large rise
in loans issuance was due not only to the increase in non-ﬁnancial corporations' funding needs
following strong fundamental performance but also to the fact that banks tended to engage
in riskier lending. Indeed, it was argued that ﬁnancial innovation and changes in accounting
standards may have given banks incentive to increase leverage when asset prices increase, and
vice versa. This credit exuberance resulted in a 'loan overhang' problem and contributed, to a
large extent, to the recent credit turmoil.
In contrast, from Q1 2008 to Q4 2009, a dramatic drop occurred in loan issuance. This
reﬂects the recent credit crisis. It is also worthwhile to note the negative trend between bond
and loan issuances, a trend which is more clearly apparent during the recent crisis. This ﬁnding
suggests that the recent strong emergence of bonds occurred as a substitute, albeit on a smaller
scale, for bank loans. Hence, the drying up of banks' liquidity in the crisis makes it particularly
interesting to examine the role of banks.
euro. It is worth noting that more than 86% of debt issued in the euro zone is denominated in eu. See ECB Monthly
Bulletin, Section 4 Financial Market, Subsection 4.1 Securities other than shares by original maturity, residency of the issuer
and currency. Available at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=10000043
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Figure 3.1: Financing structure of euro area non-ﬁnancial corporates (end of period; percentage of total
liabilities)
Figure 3.1 shows the ﬁnancing structure of Euro-area non-ﬁnancial corporates from the ﬁrst quarter 1999 to the
fourth quarter of 2009. Data are extracted from the quarterly accounts by institutional sector - Eurostat - ECB
euro accounts. Selected data are speciﬁc to non-ﬁnancial corporates in the Euro-area and provide a snapshot of
the ﬁnancing structure of non-ﬁnancial corporations on a quarterly basis. These items are inﬂuenced by valuation
changes. Each of the items shown is calculated as a percentage of the total liabilities.
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Figure 3.2: Financing structure of euro area non-ﬁnancial corporates (net transaction ﬂows - EUR billions)
Figure 3.2 shows the ﬁnancing structure of euro area non-ﬁnancial corporates from the ﬁrst quarter 1999 to the
fourth quarter of 2009. Data are extracted from the quarterly accounts by institutional sector - Eurostat - ECB
euro accounts. Selected data are speciﬁc to non-ﬁnancial corporates in the euro area and provide an overview
of the transaction ﬂows for non-ﬁnancial corporations on a quarterly basis. Each of the item is reported in EUR
billions.
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Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 show the interrelationship between market conditions, i.e. interest
rates and credit spread changes, and variations of bond (gross and net volume) and loan issues
(net volume) over the time series. In particular, Figure 3.3 shows the net amount of loans
granted by monetary ﬁnancial institutions (MFIs) to non-ﬁnancial corporations against the
level of long-term interest rates and credit spreads. Once again, this ﬁgure clearly emphasises
the recent liquidity crisis and shows that, despite a decrease in borrowing spread after October
2008, the amount of net loan issuance decreased substantially. This result demonstrates either
that the demand for loans collapsed or that banks engaged in credit rationing over the course
of 2008 to 2010 even though the quality of corporate credit improved on average over this
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period. In either case, this result indicates the presence of a severe constraint on quantity
during that time. In addition, looking at the entire panel, it is evident that there is a general
trend for loan issuance when levels of both interest rates and credit spreads are higher than
earlier levels. Even when data are observed on a shorter horizon, i.e. when current interest
rate and credit spread levels are compared with levels from the recent past, similar results
are found. Therefore, these ﬁndings provide early evidence against managers' market timing
ability to time the interest rates and credit spread markets when undertaking loans.
Figure 3.4 shows the net amount of bonds issued in the euro zone against both interest rate
and credit spread levels. Looking at the entire panel, i.e. on a long-term horizon, it is hard
to identify a general trend in favour of interest rate timing since it appears that, on average,
an increase (decrease) in net bond issuance corresponds to an increase (decrease) in interest
rates and credit spreads. However, this observation is not so clear when we observe the data
on a shorter term horizon. Indeed, it can be observed that in many cases, large debt issuance
peaks occurred right after a brief drop in both interest rate and credit spread levels. This last
observation is more clearly evident during the credit crisis and is of considerable importance as
it suggests that short-term variations in debt issuance may be driven by changes in the market.
Thus, in conjunction with earlier results, it appears that bond and loan markets respond to
market conditions in an opposite direction and that bonds may serve as substitutes for loans.
The latter is seen to greater extent during the credit crisis, when bank intermediation failed.
In contrast to Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 shows the gross amount of debt issued by non-ﬁnancial
corporations in the euro zone debt capital market, including debt reﬁnancing. The ﬁgure
depicts a quite constant growth rate over time. It is worth noting that the gross debt appears
to be negatively correlated to interest rates and credit spreads until early 2007. From that time
onwards, the trend is much less evident. From the end of 2006 to the third quarter of 2007
there was a large peak in debt issuance. In conjunction with Figures 3.4 and 3.6, the proceeds
were used not only to reﬁnance existing debt but also to raise cash ahead of reﬁnancing needs,
as shown by the large amount of debt redeemed in August 2007, as seen in Figure 3.4.
Similarly, as shown in Figure 3.4, between November 2008 and April 2010 ¿142 billion
of net debt were issued in the euro zone debt capital market. During that same period of
time, ¿56 billion of loans were redeemed, as seen in Figure 3.3. On a net basis, then, about
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Figure 3.3: Grant of loans by Monetary Financial Institutions between 2000 and 2010 (net transaction
ﬂows - EUR millions)
Figure 3.3 shows the net volume of loans granted by Monetary Financial Institutions to non-ﬁnancial corporates
between January 1999 and February 2010. Selected data are speciﬁc to non-ﬁnancial corporates in the euro area
and provide an overview of the loan transaction ﬂows from MFIs to non-ﬁnancial corporations on a monthly basis.
Volume is reported in EUR millions, government bond rate and credit spread are reported in percent. Credit spread
is proxied by the average credit spread of BBB rated corporates over euro government bond benchmark.
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¿86 billion were raised in the euro zone debt capital market. If the reduction in capital
expenditure is also considered, a reduction which was roughly ¿57 billion over the same period
of time, one can conclude that, during this period, corporates not only issued debt in the debt
capital market to pay back their existing loans, but they also reduced their investments in
order to keep, as cash, the proceeds of their debt issued. In this way, corporates issued debt
for 'precautionary' purposes. Given the high credit spreads and interest rates at the time, it
appears especially unlikely that market timing was managers' main motivation. These early
results are in accordance with Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbrenner (2009), who
found that cash balances are held, in part, to hedge against negative credit shock, as observed
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Figure 3.4: Net volume of non-ﬁnancial corporate bonds issued in the euro area between January 1999
and February 2010 (net issuance volume - EUR millions)
Figure 3.4 shows the net volume of non-ﬁnancial corporate bonds issued in the euro area debt capital market
between January 1999 and February 2010. Selected data provide an overview of net volume of bond issued activity
(gross volume of bond issued minus volume of debt redemption) on a monthly basis. Volume is reported in EUR
millions, government bond rate and credit spread are reported in percent. Credit spread is proxied by the average
credit spread of BBB rated corporates over euro government bond benchmark.
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Figure 3.5: Gross volume of non-ﬁnancial corporate bonds issued in the euro area between January 1999
and February 2010 (gross issuance volume - EUR millions)
Figure 3.5 shows the gross volume of non-ﬁnancial corporate bonds issued in the euro area debt capital market
corporates between January 1999 and February 2010. Selected data provide an overview of bond issuance activity
on a monthly basis. Volume is reported in EUR millions, government bond rate and credit spread are reported in
percent. Credit spread is proxied by the average credit spread of BBB rated corporates over euro government bond
benchmark.
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in 2007.
Finally, Figure 3.6 shows the amount of gross debt issued compared with the amount of debt
redeemed on a monthly basis. The ﬁgure shows a very high degree of correlation between the
two curves. This indicates that the largest part of debt issued is used to reﬁnance existing debt.
It is worth noting that the diﬀerential in timing between debt issuance and debt redemption is
low. One can, thus, conclude that managers do not reﬁnance their existing debt well in advance
of their debt redemption time; nor do they delay their debt issuance. This conclusion follows
that of Bancel and Mittoo (2004), who found that managers use windows of opportunity to
raise capital, but that this opportunism is limited by transaction cost constraints. Hence, they
neither anticipate nor delay their debt issues to any exceptional degree. Furthermore, this
conﬁrms that choosing a short horizon for interest rate comparison is an appropriate approach
to follow.
In summary, the ﬁnancial structure of euro zone non-ﬁnancial corporations has changed
signiﬁcantly over the past decade. That said, ﬁrms continue to be ﬁnanced primarily through
equity and bank loans. An examination of the time series suggests that: (i), bond and loan
markets appear to move in a direction opposite to changes in both interest rates and credit
spreads; (ii), managers do not seem to schedule their debt reﬁnancing far earlier, or far later,
than their debt redemption times; and (iii), managers may issue more debt for precautionary
purposes during periods of economic stress.
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Figure 3.6: Gross debt issuance versus redemption (nominal value - EUR millions)
Figure 3.6 shows the gross volume of non-ﬁnancial corporate bonds issued in the euro area corporate bond capital
market between January 1999 and April 2010 versus the gross amount of debt redeemed over the same period of
time. Volumes are reported in EUR millions.
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3.4.2 Backward timing of debt issuance
This section presents the key ﬁndings. The results do not show evidence in favour of
hypothesis H1, which states that ﬁrms time the interest rate market by issuing debt when
the levels of interest rates are low compared with those in the near past. In contrast, there
is strong evidence in the bond market favouring H2, which postulates that managers tend
to beneﬁt from low credit spread to issue new more debt. Finally, the results provide some
support for H3, which asserts that managers issue more debt for precautionary purposes. The
results obtained contradict Barry, et al. (2008), who claimed that managers time the interest
rate market, but are in line Diamond (1991), who suggested that bond issuers may switch to
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loans when interest rates are high.
3.4.2.1 Hypothesis 1 - Interest rate timing of debt issuance
The key results are shown in Tables 3.1 to 3.4. For each type of debt, namely bonds and
loans, regressions are run based on data from 1999 to 2010 and from 1999 to 2007, using both
gross and net volumes of debt issuance (GDS, NDS, LOAN).
Tables 3.1 to 3.4 provide some evidence of interest rate timing in the bond market (GDS,
NDS), as interest rate gap variables (rateGap6 , rateGap9 ) are found to be negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, independently of the time period considered. This result is clearest when
control variables are added to the regressions, as in Tables 3.2 and 3.4. This demonstrates that,
on average, the bond market sees more activity when current interest rates are low compared
with six or nine months previous.
In contrast, and as shown in Tables 3.1 to 3.4, it is apparent that the amount of loans
granted by MFIs is higher when current interest rates are higher compared with past rates.
The interest rate gap variables (rateGap3 , rateGap6 , rateGap9 ) are found to be positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, independently of the time period considered. Even after controlling for
capital spending (CAPEX), growth opportunities (MTOB) and ﬁnancing needs (REARN), as
per Tables 3.2 and 3.4, similar results are found. Hence, the results indicate that an increase
in interest rates results in an increase in loan issuance.12
Interestingly, the coeﬃcients of the interest rate gap variables are found to be of a similar
scale in both the bond and loan markets. This is more clearly evident when the credit crisis is
excluded from the sample, as in Table 3.4. These observations are of high importance since they
demonstrate that both the bond and loan markets not only move in opposite directions but
also tend to vary at the same pace and with similar magnitude. The results, thus, emphatically
reject the hypothesis that managers time interest rates. Instead, it demonstrates that ﬁrms
switch between the bond and loan markets and do so based on interest rate conditions. It
is also worth noting that capital expenditure and retained earnings are important drivers of
12In order to check the sensitivity of our results to the selected interest rate gap horizon, we ran further tests, this time
using a twelve- to eighteen-month horizon. The results can be found in Tables B.3 toB.6 in the Appendix. They show that
the interest rate eﬀect persists, albeit to a lower degree compared with earlier results. This conﬁrms that interest rate timing
diminishes as time goes on. Hence, focusing on short-term timing appears to be the right approach.
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Table 3.1: Interest rates timing and the level of debt issued in the euro area debt capital market between
1999 and 2010
The regressions below test for the interest rates timing hypothesis in the euro area debt capital market between January
1999 and February 2010. The dependent variable is the gross level of bond (GDS), the net level of bond (NDS) and the net
volume of loans (LOAN) issued in the euro area debt capital market on a monthly basis. The term spread (ts) is measured
as the diﬀerence between the 10 year government bond benchmark yield to maturity (rl) and the 6 month Euribor (rs). The
credit spread is measured as the diﬀerence between corporate bond rate, proxied by the average 10-year yield to maturity of
BBB-rated bond issued by non-ﬁnancial corporates in the euro area, and the 10-year government bond benchmark yield to
maturity (rl). Measures of the current interest rate and credit spread levels compared to their past levels are done through
the rank of the current interest rate and credit spread over the past 10 months levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread -0.489∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.632∗∗∗ -0.103 -0.160 -0.228∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ -0.531∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.304) (0.103) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
credit spreadGap3 -0.224
∗∗ -0.217∗∗ 0.168∗∗
(0.041) (0.026) (0.042)
rateGap3 -0.082 -0.093 0.292
∗∗∗
(0.553) (0.333) (0.000)
credit spreadGap6 -0.306
∗∗ -0.237∗∗ 0.132
(0.031) (0.046) (0.129)
rateGap6 -0.147 -0.161
∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.306) (0.085) (0.001)
credit spreadGap9 -0.357
∗∗ -0.269∗ 0.120
(0.033) (0.050) (0.179)
rateGap9 -0.123 -0.147
∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.071) (0.000)
Observations 130 127 124 130 127 124 130 127 124
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.193 0.183 0.013 0.030 0.032 0.468 0.465 0.489
AIC 2900.0 2821.9 2748.9 2636.0 2574.1 2515.7 2862.3 2796.2 2723.8
BIC 2911.5 2833.3 2760.2 2647.4 2585.5 2527.0 2873.8 2807.5 2735.1
F 9.646 11.08 10.20 2.046 2.791 2.548 48.94 42.72 46.47
p 0.00000887 0.00000173 0.00000494 0.111 0.0433 0.0591 4.86e-21 5.49e-19 5.30e-20
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.2: Interest rates timing and the level of debt issued in the euro area debt capital market between
1999 and 2010 controlling for growth opportunities and ﬁnancing needs
This table shows the results obtained when growth opportunities proxied by the Bloomberg 500 Index's market to book ratio
(MTOB) and ﬁnancing needs proxied by capital spending (CAPEX) and retained earnings (REARN) are added into the
regressions. The remaining variables are similar to those as in Table 3.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread -0.072 -0.093 -0.138 -0.226 -0.236 -0.351∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗
(0.658) (0.565) (0.398) (0.198) (0.119) (0.023) (0.002) (0.004) (0.028)
credit spreadGap3 -0.091 -0.239
∗∗ 0.118
(0.259) (0.023) (0.165)
rateGap3 -0.055 -0.088 0.170
∗∗
(0.543) (0.444) (0.033)
credit spreadGap6 -0.187
∗ -0.308∗∗ 0.094
(0.080) (0.012) (0.231)
rateGap6 -0.175
∗∗ -0.246∗∗ 0.108
(0.047) (0.029) (0.133)
credit spreadGap9 -0.268
∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ 0.169∗
(0.040) (0.010) (0.051)
rateGap9 -0.211
∗∗ -0.199∗∗ 0.143∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.038)
MtoB -0.234 -0.067 0.091 0.115 0.294∗∗ 0.275∗ 0.120 0.104 0.073
(0.128) (0.650) (0.565) (0.397) (0.044) (0.070) (0.253) (0.354) (0.524)
CAPEX 0.413∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ -0.012 0.134 0.148 0.097 0.110 0.089
(0.032) (0.006) (0.001) (0.948) (0.457) (0.346) (0.428) (0.359) (0.442)
REARN 0.150 0.105 -0.005 -0.196 -0.257∗ -0.332∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.391) (0.972) (0.141) (0.068) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 130 127 124 130 127 124 130 127 124
Adjusted R2 0.381 0.373 0.351 0.018 0.053 0.060 0.520 0.527 0.557
AIC 2864.3 2792.8 2723.2 2638.2 2573.9 2514.9 2851.7 2783.4 2709.1
BIC 2884.4 2812.7 2743.0 2658.2 2593.8 2534.6 2871.8 2803.3 2728.9
F 14.25 13.50 12.10 2.373 2.981 2.223 29.26 26.59 30.47
p 2.80e-12 1.16e-11 1.51e-10 0.0333 0.00949 0.0456 1.44e-21 5.85e-20 8.48e-22
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Interest rates timing and the level of debt issued in the euro area debt capital market between
1999 and 2007
The regressions below test for the interest rates timing hypothesis in the euro area debt capital market between January
1999 and February 2010. The dependent variable is the gross level of bond (GDS), the net level of bond (NDS) and the net
volume of loans (LOAN) issued in the euro area debt capital market on a monthly basis. The term spread (ts) is measured
as the diﬀerence between the 10 year government bond benchmark yield to maturity (rl) and the 6 month Euribor (rs). The
credit spread is measured as the diﬀerence between corporate bond rate, proxied by the average 10-year yield to maturity of
BBB-rated bond issued by non-ﬁnancial corporates in the euro area, and the 10-year government bond benchmark yield to
maturity (rl). Measures of the current interest rate and credit spread levels compared to their past levels are done through
the rank of the current interest rate and credit spread over the past 10 months levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread -0.410∗∗ -0.455∗∗ -0.517∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗ -0.315∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
credit spreadGap3 -0.187
∗∗ -0.172∗ 0.104
(0.036) (0.072) (0.232)
rateGap3 -0.026 0.034 0.302
∗∗∗
(0.866) (0.708) (0.002)
credit spreadGap6 -0.279
∗∗ -0.107 0.047
(0.023) (0.318) (0.610)
rateGap6 -0.105 -0.090 0.259
∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.358) (0.002)
credit spreadGap9 -0.407
∗∗∗ -0.081 0.040
(0.004) (0.493) (0.671)
rateGap9 -0.096 -0.162
∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.551) (0.077) (0.000)
Observations 104 101 98 104 101 98 104 101 98
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.170 0.204 0.057 0.045 0.069 0.323 0.331 0.365
AIC 2337.1 2260.8 2183.2 2103.3 2045.0 1984.3 2296.2 2227.9 2155.0
BIC 2347.7 2271.3 2193.6 2113.9 2055.5 1994.7 2306.8 2238.3 2165.3
F 6.710 7.824 9.285 2.778 2.585 3.580 21.58 19.16 22.03
p 0.000358 0.0000991 0.0000194 0.0451 0.0576 0.0168 7.40e-11 7.72e-10 6.91e-11
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Interest rates timing and the level of debt issued in the euro area debt capital market between
1999 and 2007 controlling for growth opportunities and ﬁnancing needs
This table shows the results obtained when growth opportunities proxied by the Bloomberg 500 Index's market to book ratio
(MTOB) and ﬁnancing needs proxied by capital spending (CAPEX) and retained earnings (REARN) are added into the
regressions. The remaining variables are similar to those as in Table 3.4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread 0.031 0.104 0.032 -0.599∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.202 -0.178 -0.159
(0.837) (0.508) (0.846) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.110) (0.175) (0.252)
credit spreadGap3 -0.096 -0.181
∗∗ 0.074
(0.194) (0.045) (0.429)
rateGap3 0.001 0.080 0.169
∗
(0.996) (0.479) (0.084)
credit spreadGap6 -0.120 -0.194
∗∗ 0.064
(0.214) (0.048) (0.457)
rateGap6 -0.180
∗ -0.150 0.109
(0.066) (0.236) (0.199)
credit spreadGap9 -0.230
∗∗ -0.158 0.097
(0.022) (0.178) (0.272)
rateGap9 -0.214
∗∗ -0.262∗∗ 0.201∗∗
(0.044) (0.019) (0.023)
MtoB -0.286∗∗ -0.116 -0.021 0.139 0.318∗∗ 0.362∗∗ 0.085 0.070 0.009
(0.021) (0.315) (0.868) (0.307) (0.029) (0.011) (0.450) (0.539) (0.939)
CAPEX 0.608∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ -0.177 -0.021 0.089 0.241 0.289∗ 0.251∗
(0.033) (0.007) (0.008) (0.431) (0.932) (0.705) (0.159) (0.077) (0.094)
REARN 0.008 -0.039 -0.055 -0.295∗ -0.357∗ -0.425∗∗ 0.207 0.198 0.213
(0.969) (0.838) (0.785) (0.089) (0.053) (0.023) (0.140) (0.158) (0.118)
Observations 104 101 98 104 101 98 104 101 98
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.460 0.445 0.149 0.154 0.172 0.382 0.399 0.436
AIC 2287.9 2220.2 2150.8 2095.4 2035.6 1975.7 2289.5 2219.7 2146.1
BIC 2306.5 2238.5 2168.9 2113.9 2054.0 1993.8 2308.1 2238.0 2164.2
F 16.84 15.21 13.95 3.731 3.748 3.576 13.35 12.08 14.10
p 3.12e-13 4.24e-12 3.45e-11 0.00221 0.00218 0.00316 5.64e-11 5.03e-10 2.74e-11
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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debt issuance, conﬁrming that managers neither delay nor anticipate their debt issuance to
any exceptional degree towards their ﬁnancing needs.13
These results go against Barry, et al. (2008), who found strong support for interest rate
timing in the US bond market. If we had ignored loans and concentrated exclusively on the
euro zone bond market, then this study would have reached a conclusion similar to that of
Barry, et al. (2008). A negative relationship was, indeed, found between the interest rates gap
and bond issuance. As just demonstrated, however, this ﬁnding becomes spurious when loans
are considered: the results indicate a switch between the two markets. One can, therefore,
interpret the survey results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mitto (2004), which
claim market timing attempts, by arguing that managers consider themselves to be seeking
timing the interest rate market only because they turn to the bond market when interest rates
are low. Yet, our results are in accordance with Diamond (1991), who argued that, on top of
middle-rated borrowers, who rely exclusively on banks to obtain ﬁnancing, come higher-rated
borrowers, who undertake bank loans in periods of high interest rates or low future proﬁtability.
This results in an increase, on aggregate, of the total amount of loan issues and a decrease in
directly placed debt. This can be explained by the fact that, when real interest rates are high
or future proﬁtability is low, moral hazard is more severe. As a consequence, high-quality ﬁrms
need monitoring to demonstrate their good quality. They may, thus, rely on banks, whose role
is not only to provide funds but also to monitor to alleviate moral hazard.
In summary, the results demonstrate that ﬁrms do not time interest rates to issue debt but,
instead, they switch between debt markets with changes in interest rate conditions.
3.4.2.2 Hypothesis 2 - Credit spread timing of debt issuance
As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.3, there is a negative relationship between the credit spread
movements of non-ﬁnancial corporations and both the gross and net volume of bonds issued.
Even after controlling for capital spending, growth opportunities and ﬁnancing needs, as in
Tables 3.2 and 3.4, evidence is found that managers issue more bonds when their credit spreads
are low compared to recent past levels. It is worth noting that this eﬀect is most evident when
13In accordance with Mitto and Bancel (2004), this is surely the result of transaction costs such as overdraft fees or is an
attempt to avoid costs generated by the double payment of coupons.
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the sample includes the credit crisis, as both the coeﬃcients and their statistical signiﬁcance
are greater.
Interestingly, these observations are however, not found when bank loans are considered.
Indeed, when the net volume of bank loans is used as the dependent variable, the credit spread
gap variables are found to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant in a few instances. Again,
the credit spread gap variables are more meaningful when the credit crisis is included in the
sample,14 as in Tables 3.2 and 3.1. Hence, credit spread movements appear to have little eﬀect
on loan issuance during stable economic conditions, that is, during the pre-crisis period (1999-
2007), whilst they are strongly positively correlated with loan issuance during the credit crisis,
i.e. opposite sign to what we should expect.15
There are several observations worthwhile citing. First, the results support the hypothesis
that managers issue more bonds when their credit spreads are low compared to past credit
spreads, providing as such evidence that they tend to time their credit spreads when they
issue bonds. This ﬁnding is in contrast with Barry et al. (2008) whose results indicate higher
credit spreads during periods of high bond issuance. It is worthwhile recalling here that the
present study uses the gap between the actual and recent past credit spreads to observe credit
spread timing attempts as opposed to Barry et al. (2008), who do not benchmark current
credit spreads to past values but use credit spread levels. Barry et al. (2008) explain that the
positive relationship that they ﬁnd between bond issuance and credit spread levels might be
due to the absence of credit spread timing in the bond market 'unless the demand to purchase
debt issues increases along with the increased supply of debt issues at low rates, [...], leading to
lower relative bond prices and thus higher credit spreads.' The results presented in this study
tend to give more weight to their latter explanation since it can be observed in Tables 3.2 and
3.1, that (i) there a strong relationship between bond issuance and credit spread gap therefore
rejecting the hypothesis of absence of credit spread timing attempts and (ii) that the credit
14The explanatory power of the credit spread variables is marginally reduced when control variables are included in
the regressions, as seen in Table 3.2. The t-statistics are nevertheless very similar to those when control variables are not
considered, as in Tables 3.1. The decrease, then, in the statistical signiﬁcance of these variables can be considered insigniﬁcant.
15In order to check the sensitivity of our results to the selected credit spread gap horizon, we ran further tests, which,
used a twelve- to eighteen-month horizon. The results can be found in Tables B.3 toB.6 in the Appendix. They show that
the credit spread eﬀect remains evident when the gross volume of bond is considered, but it disappears almost completely
when the net volume of bonds is considered. This suggests that managers concentrate on recent credit spread levels to issues
bond, as opposed to earlier levels as suggested by Barry, et al. (2008). Again, focusing on short-term timing seems to be the
right approach.
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spread gap variables tend to be less inﬂuential when current credit spreads are benchmarked to
the past three months levels than to the nine months levels potentially advocating a potential
decrease over time of the eﬀect of credit spread on bond issuance. This second point merits
further research.
Second, the fact that credit spread timing is present in the bond market, but not in the
loan market, provides evidence that there is a discordance between bond and loan variations
in credit spread changes. There may be several reasons for this. First, it may be the case that
the chosen credit spread variable in this study is not appropriate for the loan market since it is
based on bond market data16, hence the little inﬂuence observed of the credit spread changes
on loan issuances. Another reason for this observation may lay in the fact that the bond market
reacts more quickly to changes in market conditions than the loan market does. Indeed, it may
simply be the case that the bond market prices the arrival of new information more quickly
than the loan market does hence is more sensitive to credit spread changes. Last, it may be
the case that credit spread timing is limited in the loan market because raising capital through
ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks is very often more constraining than raising capital in
the public market. Indeed, according to Diamond (1991), directly placed debt depends only
on public information, in contrast to bank loans which also depend on information from costly
monitoring of borrowers' actions17. So in theory, the covenants imposed by banks are such
that private information retained by managers is very limited and may explain why we observe
managers' inability to time credit spread in the loan market. This explanation should be
taken with caution since this study does not provide accurate measures of the asymmetry of
information between managers and debt investors hence cannot conclude ﬁrmly on the the
validity of this last explanation. That said and keeping with Doukas (2011), further research
could investigate further whether the asymmetry of information between managers and debt
investors could explain the discordance between bond and loan variations in credit spread
changes.
16Please refer to Data and Sample characteristics section.
17Diamond (1991) argued that banks act as borrowers' monitors, verifying both that borrowers did not default on their
debt in the past and that they did not take actions that may have increased moral hazard. Diamond (1991) referred to this
as the 'borrower's track record' and argued that banks' monitoring actions help reduce asymmetries of information between
borrowers and lenders, thus mitigating moral hazard. Diamond (1991) argued that the terms of directly placed debt depend
on public information including borrowers' credit records. The latter serves as a forecast for managers' actions, although
managers are no longer monitored.
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Finally, the fact that the statistical signiﬁcance of the credit spread variables in both
markets improve when the credit crisis is included in the sample is likely to be the result of (i)
a more enterprising credit spread timing in the bond market on the back of unusual volatility
in credit spreads, and (ii) the shortage in banks' liquidity. Indeed, as shown in Section 3.4.1,
it is apparent that credit spreads gained on volatility during the period of the credit crisis.
This increase in volatility, while reﬂecting market concerns about corporate credit quality and
the political response to the credit shock, probably forced ﬁrms to concentrate even more on
windows of opportunity to raise capital than they would in less volatile markets. Hence, one
sees the apparently stronger credit spread timing in the bond market during the credit crisis.
With regards to the loan market, during stable economic times, credit spreads fail fully to
explain variations in loan issuance. In accordance with Diamond (1991), this might stem from
the fact that, when real rates are high or future proﬁts are low, the need for monitoring by
higher-rated borrowers leads to an increase in the quality of the average new loan made at
these times (while the probability of default decreases). Thus, on aggregate, the quality of the
loan borrowers' pool is likely to remain almost constant, resulting in little eﬀect on variations
in loan issuance. Yet, the fact that the credit spread is found to be positive and statistically
signiﬁcant when the credit crisis is included in the sample suggests that not only the borrower's
credit quality but also the lender's credit quality needs to be considered in explaining variations
in loan issuance. The drying-up of banks' liquidity resulted in a shortage of corporates' loan
issuance and, at the same time, raised concerns about corporates' ability to reﬁnance their
existing debt. This results, therefore, suggests that managers faced loan rationing not because
of their credit quality but because of banks' failure.
In summary, the results demonstrate that managers attempt to issue more bonds when
their credit spread is low compared to recent past levels, advocating evidence of credit spread
attempts in the bond market. This ﬁnding is not observed in the loan market enhancing, there-
fore, the discordance of the variations of the bond and the loan markets in market conditions
changes and the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediates on credit spread timing attempts.
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3.4.2.3 Hypothesis 3 - Precautionary debt issuance
This part presents the results obtained for the third hypothesis of this analysis, which
postulates that managers may issue more debt for precautionary purposes when they expect
diﬃcult market conditions in the near future. This hypothesis is tested through the introduc-
tion of the term spread in the regressions, which act as a proxy for managers' expectations of
upcoming economic conditions. As such, a negative relationship is expected between volumes
of debt issuance and term spreads.
As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.3, a negative relationship is found between the amount of
debt issued and the term spread, which suggests that managers issue more debt when the yield
curve is inverted, thus evincing the managers' wish to issue debt in advance of a potential
economic deterioration. It is worth noting that this ﬁnding is more clearly evident between
1999 and 2007, when the relationship between term spread and debt issuance is found to be
statistically signiﬁcant, and with the expected sign over that period independent of the type
of debt considered.
The results are, however, not as evident either when control variables are introduced in the
regressions, with its statistical signiﬁcance partly reduced, as shown in Tables 3.2, 3.4 or in
the sensitivity tests, as in Tables in Tables B.3, B.4, B.5 and B.6 in the Appendix. This may
be due to the correlation of -0.69 between (ts) and (CAPEX), which in turn may induce a
slight degree of collinearity in the regressions and hence diminish the term spread signiﬁcance
in explaining debt issuance variations when controlling for capital spending.18 In conjunction
with the results obtained in section 2.1, these results nevertheless show some evidence that
managers are likely to issue more debt when they expect economic conditions to worsen in the
near future.
This interpretation, however, demands clariﬁcation since there may be other interpretations
of this result. First, it may be the case that managers issue more debt when the yield curve is
ﬂat simply because the proceeds they will obtain for a given coupon and a given maturity will
be higher than if the yield curve were steep. Thus, ﬁrms may rely on their cash balances when
the yield curve is steep because the cost of long-term borrowing is too high. This would then
result, on aggregate, in a fall in debt issuance. In that respect, it could be said that managers
18Dropping one of these two variables would lead to a speciﬁcation error, hence both variables are kept in the regressions
despite a slight degree of collinearity.
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time the market in a partial market timing sense; it does not demonstrate any timing ability
but, instead, suggests that ﬁrms issue the type of bond that they value the most. Should
this explanation hold, then it would contradict the tax hypothesis of Brennan and Schwartz
(1978) developed in Chapter 2, which asserts that long-term debt should be favoured when
the yield curve is upward sloping in order to accelerate the present value of interest expenses.
Finally, this observation may also have its origin in Faulkender (2005), who claimed that
managers attempt to time the yield curve simply to boost their near-term results and increase
managerial compensation. Both interpretations call for further research since it requires details
on the characteristics of debt issues such as the maturity of debt, the nature of the coupon
(ﬁxed or ﬂoating) as well as details concerning interest rate swap activities.19 As the data
used in this analysis include both long-term and short-term debt, these interpretations of the
results remain inconclusive. They were, nevertheless, worthy of mention.
In summary, the results obtained in this section, in conjunction with the results found
in Section 3.4.1, show some signs of precautionary debt issuance. As discussed here, as seen
earlier, and in accordance with Bancel and Mittoo (2004), precautionary debt issuance may,
however, be limited by transaction costs, among other possible limitations.
3.5 Conclusion
Using a detailed set of data including monthly ﬁgures, this study ﬁnds no evidence that
managers time the interest rate market to issue debt. Indeed, the interest rate gap coeﬃcients
appear to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the bond market, however, they turn to be
of opposite sign and of the same magnitude in the loan market. As such and contrary to Barry
et al. (2008), the results suggest that managers do not issue more debt when interest rates
are low compared with past levels but, instead, they provide evidence that managers switch
between bonds and loans according to changes in interest rate market conditions.
In addition, there is no excessive delay in their debt issuance and, in general, debt issuance
scheduling matches debt redemption. The results nevertheless show that managers tend to issue
more bonds when their credit spread is low compared to recent past credit spreads advocating,
therefore, a form of timing in bond issuance. This result contradicts Barry et al. (2008), who
19See Faulkender (2005), Chavaa, Purnanandam (2007) and Geczy, Minton and Schrand (2005).
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do not ﬁnd support for the credit spread timing hypothesis. As explained earlier, the reason
why our results diﬀer is likely due to the fact that this study benchmarks current credit spread
levels to past credit spread levels as opposed to Barry et al. (2008), who simply use credit
spread levels. The fact that credit spread gaps as opposed to credit spread levels is used in
this study seems to be more in line with the benchmarking of interest rates justiﬁed earlier
but also gives the possibility to test more accurately backward market timing, which is the
core interest of this paper. Another key ﬁnding is the fact that credit spread timing does not
seem to be attempted in the loan market since the credit spread gap variables appear to have
little eﬀect on loan issuance or have the wrong sign in some instances highlighting the inﬂuence
of ﬁnancial intermediates on credit spread attempts. We suggest diﬀerent routes to explain
this ﬁnding and call for further research on the possible eﬀect of asymmetry of information
between managers and investors in explaining the discordance between the bond and the loan
market variations in credit spread changes. Finally, the results show only mixed evidence that
managers issue more debt when they expect economic conditions to worsen in the near future.
Hence, it is not entirely clear that managers issue more debt for precautionary purposes.
As yet, time series variations in corporate debt issuance have been discussed from an em-
pirical perspective only. Unfortunately, no existing theory has the power fully to explain why
such variations occur. Debt market timing remains little covered, and the heterogeneity of
empirical results demonstrates that debt issuance is a complex mechanism, subject to multiple
inﬂuences. This calls for another model: future research could attempt to explore links between
debt issuance decisions and cash management strategies at the microeconomic level; it might
well be fruitful to describe debt issuance in the same framework as the famous framework for
cash management of Baumol-Allais-Tobin (1952) or that of Miller and Orr (1966).
Chapter 4
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4.1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in the role of market timing in ﬁrms' ﬁnancial decisions.1
An extensive literature on the ability of managers to time equity issues as a driver of changes
in capital structure has developed over the past ten years and challenges some implications of
the eﬃcient market hypothesis.2 Although these studies have examined the ability of man-
agers to time the issuance of equity, more recent studies suggest that managers also attempt
to time the exposure of debt interest rates exposureBarry, Mann, Mihov and Rodríguez
(2009), Faulkender (2005) and Faulkender and Chernenko (2006)and scheduling decisions
for debt issuanceBarry, Mann, Mihov and Rodriguez (2008, 2009) and Doukas, Guo and
Zhou (2010). In addition, recent evidence has suggested that the maturity of corporate debt
predicts bond excess returns Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) and Butler, Grullon and
Weston (2006). These ﬁndings in turn led Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) to develop
a pioneering theory, which claims to explain why time-series variations in debt maturity are
observed in debt markets and outlines a set of empirical predictions.
Whilst previous empirical studies on the market timing of debt maturity only considered
ﬁrms in market-based ﬁnancial systems, they never attempted to examine whether diﬀerences
in ﬁnancial systems play a role in managers' ability to time the market. The aim of the present
research is to test Greenwood, Hanson and Stein's (2010) theory on time series-variation in the
maturity of corporate debt. Using a sample comprising new issues of euro zone corporate debt
securities and loans, the relationship between the maturity of corporate new debt issues and
the maturity structure of government debt issues is analysed in the framework of Greenwood,
et al. (2008). The four propositions which result from this model and that are presented in
detail in the research strategy section, are the core of this paper and are tested empirically.
1Interestingly, Graham and Harvey (2001) have conducted a survey of 392 chief ﬁnancial oﬃcers (CFOs) about the cost
of capital, capital budgeting and capital structure. They found that CFOs are concerned about ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and credit
ratings when issuing debt, and they attach some importance to the maturity matching principle when choosing between
short- and long-term debt. Relatively few executives time changes in credit ratings. Executives try to time the market in
other ways. Indeed they found strong evidence that ﬁrms attempt to time interest rates by issuing debt 'when they feel that
market interest rates are particularly low '. They also found that ﬁrms issue short-term debt when 'they feel that short term
rates are low relative to long term rates.' This is in keeping with Faulkender's (2005) ﬁnding since corporations attempt to
time the market when managing their interest rate exposure on debt. By combining the initial exposure of newly issued debt
securities with corporates' use of interest rate swaps, Faulkender found that the ﬁnal interest rate exposure is largely driven
by the slope of the yield curve at the time the debt is issued.
2See, among others, Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1995), Graham and Harvey
(2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2000).
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While similar in spirit to Greenwood, et al. (2010), this study contributes to the existing
research on the debt market timing literature in the following ways. First, previous empiri-
cal works have unearthed some stylised facts about debt maturity timing, but the evidence
is largely based on US ﬁrms. Without testing the robustness of these ﬁndings outside the
environment in which they were uncovered, it is hard to determine whether these empirical
regularities are merely spurious correlations, or whether they eﬀectively support the theory
of Greenwood, et al. (2010). This calls for research in another market such as the euro zone
credit market, the second largest after the US credit market. Moreover, and in accordance with
the above, another beneﬁt of focusing on the euro zone debt market stems from the fact that
it is well known to be more bank-orientated than the US debt market. Despite a signiﬁcant
increase in the issuance of corporate bonds, reﬂecting as it does an increasing sophistication
and diversiﬁcation of corporate sources of funding, the European debt capital market remains
small in scale compared with the US market. In addition, the recent ﬁnancial crisis has re-
inforced the role played by banks in the credit channel and raises the question about the
extent of ﬁnancial intermediates' inﬂuence on market timing behaviour. There is, therefore, a
need to broaden existing research on debt maturity market timing and to place it more ﬁrmly
within the context of ﬁnancial system characteristics. Thus, it is important to consider not
only issuances in the European public debt capital market but also loans granted by European
monetary ﬁnancial institutions (MFIs) to test whether ﬁnancial intermediaries or, inversely,
the state of development of the bond market aﬀects corporate debt maturity timing.
Second, and contrary to Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010), who have artiﬁcially con-
structed a measure of long-term debt issues based on annual outstanding amounts which, in
turn, do not accurately reﬂect corporate debt issuance and may be inﬂuenced by valuation
changes,3 this study not only uses outstanding amounts at month's end but also uses monthly
gross and net amounts of debt issued in the euro zone from 1999 to 2010. By doing so, this
study beneﬁts from a more accurate set of data and better tracks maturity changes. Further-
more, given the recent ﬁnancial turmoil, the large increase in volatility in the interest rates
3'Speciﬁcally, outstanding in the ﬂow of funds accounts are related to the ﬂows in the following way: Outstanding BtB
= Outstanding Bt-1B+ Flow BtB+ DiscontinuityBtB where t is the time period. Discontinuities result from changes in
valuation, breaks in source data, and changes in deﬁnitions. For most series, the value of the discontinuity is zero for nearly
all time periods. However, in a few instances, the discontinuity is nonzero for almost all time periods, or is quite large in a
particular quarter, such as a period when there is a sharp increase or decrease in equity prices or a major break in source
data.', Flow of funds account of the United States, page 1.
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and in the wider credit market, it seems necessary to use monthly data to examine attempts
at market timing.
Third, despite the study of Greenwood, et al. (2010) being based on a larger panel than the
present study, they disregard data from 2007 onwards. By considering data from 1999 through
to 2010, this study includes the most severe credit crisis and pays attention to corporate
behaviour during one of the most critical economic downturns since the great depression.
Finally the result contribute to the existing literature in the following way. The results pro-
vide some support in favour of the ﬁrst, second and third empirical predictions of Greenwood,
et al. (2010). Indeed, consistent with the theory of Greenwood. et al. (2010), the results
show that corporates aim to mirror government debt maturity and tend to so more actively
during the credit crisis, which represents a ﬁnding compared to Greenwood et al. (2010) or
when government debt and market liquidity are high. The other key ﬁnding of this work is
the fact that each of these propositions are found to be of greater relevance in the corporate
bond market as opposed to the corporate loan market. This new ﬁnding suggests that ﬁnancial
intermediaries may act as a hedge to gap-ﬁlling strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 4.2 summarises previous studies
on this topic and develops the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010). Section 4.3 provides an
overview of the research methodology. Section 4.4 shows the results obtained, and the ﬁnal
Section 4.5 acts as a conclusion.
4.2 Literature review
This section presents a review of the literature on the market timing hypothesis of corporate
debt maturity. The ﬁrst part presents an overview of empirical studies, which have shown that
managers' ability to successfully time the market is still a much debated topic. The second
part describes and discusses the only existing theory, one that attempts to explain why time-
series variations in the maturity of corporate debt structure may exist. The eﬃcient market
hypothesis asserts that ﬁnancial markets are informationally eﬃcient and that prices on traded
securities already reﬂect all available information. It also states that prices instantly change
to reﬂect new information. Therefore, one implication of this theory is that managers cannot
successfully time the market when they issue new securities. However, a number of studies
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have challenged this prediction, ﬁnding that managerial timing may lead ﬁrms to a lower cost
of capital.4 If these studies examine the ability of managers to time the issuance of equity,
recent studies suggest that managers also attempt to time the maturity of their debt issues.
Graham and Harvey's (2001) survey shows evidence that managers attempt to issue short-
term debt 'when short-term interest rates are low compared to long-term rates' because they
are 'waiting for long-term market interest rates to decline'. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) found
similar results from their survey of European ﬁnancial oﬃcers, putting forward evidence that
maturity choice is driven by the maturity matching principle but also by a trade-oﬀ between
the risk of reﬁnancing risk and the interest rate environment.
One explanation may be that managers borrow at short maturities when the yield curve
is upward sloping simply to keep their current interest expenses low or to boost their near-
term results (Faulkender (2005)). It is worth noting that this explanation is still valid in
the classical asset-pricing setting where the pure expectation hypothesis5 of the term structure
holds (Greenwood, et al. (2010)). Another explanation might be that managers believe that the
level of interest rates is mean reverting. As a result, they borrow short-term debt when the level
of long-term interest rates is high, and vice versa, to exploit the predictability of bond market
returns. This market-conditions alternative is supported by Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler
(2003), who found that when the share of long-term debt issues in total debt issues is high,
future excess bond returns are low, that is, future term spreads widen. Their results indicate
that managers try to time the debt market by issuing short-term debt when the expected
return on short-term debt is below the expected return on long-term debt. However, because
of diﬃculties in interpreting predictability regressions, they cannot determine whether ﬁrms
are trying unsuccessfully to time an eﬃcient market on the one hand, or ﬁrms are successfully
timing an ineﬃcient market, on the other.
Since the original work by Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003), other studies have con-
tradicted the ability of corporate issuance to predict market interest rates. Butler, Grullon,
and Weston (2006) severely criticised Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler's (2003) argument, say-
ing that the latter's argument emphasised managers' better ability to forecast interest rates
4Among others, see Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1995) and Baker and Wurgler
(2000).
5The pure expectation hypothesis asserts that interest rates at various maturities are perfect substitutes. According to
this hypothesis, interest rate market timing attempts are, thus, done in vain.
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movements compared with other market participants and failed to provide 'an explanation for
this result that is consistent with the eﬃcient market hypothesisaggregate pseudo market
timing'.
The concept of 'pseudo market timing' is based on Schultz's (2003) simple argument that
ﬁrms' ﬁnancing decisions are driven by current market conditions. In the context of debt
issuance, the pseudo market timing hypothesis asserts that the higher the proceeds from debt
issuance, the more likely that ﬁrms will issue debt.6 Using the same approach for equity
issuance as that used for pseudo market timing, 7 Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) have
shown that after accounting for structural shifts in monetary and ﬁscal policy, there is no
evidence that corporate managers are able to predict future variations in bond returns or
successfully to lower their cost of capital by timing the maturity of their debt issues. Indeed,
they argued that structural shifts in monetary and ﬁscal policy in the US during the early 1980s
increased the relative cost of long-term debt, thus creating an incentive for ﬁrms to issue more
short-term debt relative to long-term debt. Firms are, therefore, just reacting to (as opposed
to forecasting) the increase in the relative cost of long-term debt by issuing more short-term
debt.
Subsequently, Baker, Taliaferro and Wurgler (2005) defended the evidence for managerial
market timing, showing by simulation techniques that pseudo market timing bias8 explains
only 0.7 per cent of the value of the long-term share coeﬃcient found by Baker, Greenwood
and Wurgler (2003). Even when accounting for the eﬀect of regime shifts, Baker, Taliaferro
and Wurgler (2005) found that market-timing biases are too small to reject the hypothesis that
the maturity of new corporate bond issues predicts variations in bond returns.
Finally, another method for testing whether debt-maturity timing exists is to examine ﬁrm-
level data on corporate debt issuance. Accounting for provisions that change bond maturity,
6Schultz (2003) wrote: 'The premise of the pseudo market timing hypothesis is that the more ﬁrms can receive for their
equity, the more likely they are to issue stock even if the market is eﬃcient and managers have no timing ability. In this case,
equity sales will be concentrated at peak prices ex-post, even though companies cannot determine market peaks ex-ante.'
7Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2006) found that large unpredictable macroeconomic shocks can create the illusion of
successful market timing by managers. Since equity issues are positively correlated with current equity prices, equity issues
go down dramatically during unexpected declines in the market, making the pre-shock equity issuance look relatively high
just before the crash in the market and the post-shock equity issuance look relatively low just after the market crashes. After
controlling for unexpected shocks to current market conditions, Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) found no evidence that
managers can predict aggregate equity market returns.
8When using traditional iid-orientated event study methods, the clustering of events after periods with positive abnormal
returns causes a statistical bias in estimated average abnormal returns. In the context of market timing studies, this sample
bias is called market timing bias. See Baker, Taliaferro and Wurgler (2005).
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such as call and put features, allows for the more accurate measurement of the eﬀective ma-
turity of bond issues. Barry, C. Mann, Mihov and Rodríguez (2009) found some evidence
supporting forward debt-maturity timing before accounting for these provisions.9 However,
once accounting for these, they found no evidence of timing success in the long run and argued
that the early evidence for debt-maturity timing may be a result of the imprecise measurement
of the maturity of debt issues in aggregate data.
As previously discussed, the debate around managers' ability successfully to time the in-
terest rate market is still ongoing. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus in the literature
that market conditions inﬂuence debt maturity choices. The reason why market conditions
could lead managers to engage in timing their debt maturity remains little covered. The only
existing theory which explains time series variation in corporate debt maturity is developed by
Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) and is the basis of this empirical work.
Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) have proposed a 'gap-ﬁlling' theory, based on bond
market return predictability, to explain time-variation in corporate maturity choice. They
argued that corporate issuers tend to beneﬁt from this predictability since they act as macro-
liquidity providers, ﬁlling the liquidity gap left by government when it changes its debt maturity
proﬁle. More speciﬁcally, they argued that in a segmented bond market,10 where the preference
of an important class of investors (preferred habitat investors) for investing in long duration
assets creates an inelastic demand for long-term bonds, any supply shocks associated with a
change in the structure of government debt maturity result in an arbitrage in expected returns.
When the government issues long-term bonds in excess of preferred habitat investors' de-
mand, a tendency which making the price of long-term securities attractive, arbitrageurs will
tend to beneﬁt from this excess supply by borrowing short and investing long. An increase in
the supply of long-term government bonds thus raises arbitrageur's expected return premium.
In other words, when the supply of long-term government debt is in excess of habitat investors'
9Barry, C. Mann, Mihov and Rodríguez (2008, 2009) deﬁned 'forward-looking' timing success as issuance decisions which
are followed by interest rate movements that demonstrate the manager's ability to time future interest rates. They also deﬁned
'backward timing' of debt issuance as the practice of issuing debt, relative to ﬁnancing needs and capital expenditure, when
interests are low compared with historical levels.
10A segmented bond market is a market where ﬁnancial instruments of diﬀerent terms are not substitutable. As a result,
the supply and demand in the markets for short-term and long-term instruments is determined largely independently. This
means that prospective bondholders have ﬁxed maturity preferences; they thus decide in advance whether they will invest
in short-term or long-term instruments. For example, Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) have classiﬁed pension funds as
long-term investors because of the structure of their liabilities.
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demand for long-term government assets, the expected return diﬀerential between long-term
and short-term return is high. However, given the limited capital and the undiversiﬁable na-
ture of the required trade, arbitrageurs will enforce the expectations hypothesis but only to
a certain extent, leaving behind some residual predictability in bond returns. This is exactly
where corporate issuers come to play. When the supply of government bonds is large, precisely
in excess of habitat investors demand, arbitrageurs will borrow short-term debt to invest in
long-term assets, and corporates will have an incentive to issue short-term debt at lower cost.
In the framework of Greenwood, et al. (2010), both arbitrageurs and corporates enforce the
pure expectation hypothesis.
Indeed, even though ﬁrms are assumed to be ﬁnancially constrained and to have an optimal
capital structure target with a share of long-term debt such that deviations from their target
incur costs, a high expected return premium will give an incentive to ﬁrms to shift away from
the long end of the yield curve to borrow at short maturities. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein's
theory implicitly supports the idea that corporates have some bargaining power in the debt
capital market since they act as liquidity providers. Overall, this presumes that ﬁrms have
direct access to the debt capital market. A natural question is to ask whether this gap-ﬁlling
behaviour is also found when ﬁnancial intermediaries act as lenders. If investors preferred to
invest in long maturities, one would expect banks to facilitate the grant of long-term loans
so as to beneﬁt from the violation of the pure expectation hypothesis. As such ﬁnancial
intermediates would potentially mitigate the gap-ﬁlling behaviour of non-ﬁnancial corporates
when granting loans.
In addition, Greenwood, et al. (2010) have argued that gap-ﬁlling behaviour is limited by
the degree to which ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained. Once again, how does that translate
when ﬁnancial intermediaries come into the picture? According to the working paper of Gaul,
Palvia and Uysal (2010), the ﬁnancial constraints of both borrowers and lenders should be
considered when studying maturity timing. They ﬁnd evidence that the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility
not only of the borrower but also of the lender aﬀects the relation between government debt
maturity and corporate loan maturity. While similar in spirit to Greenwood, et al. (2010)
and Gaul, et al. (2010), the present approach for testing the eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediaries
on debt maturity timing behaviour is diﬀerent. Here the concern is with the magnitude and
the 'speed' of reactivity of corporates issuances after a shock of government debt maturity. In
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other words, how quickly do corporates adjust the maturity of their new security issues towards
a shock in government debt maturity? What is the magnitude of these changes in the debt
capital market compared with the loan market? Regardless of whether market timing practices
actually lower the cost of capital, the present study examines whether ﬁnancial intermediation
aﬀects the market timing behaviour of non-ﬁnancial corporates in their debt maturity timing
decisions.
4.3 Research methodology
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether ﬁnancial intermediation has an
eﬀect on potential market timing behaviour of corporate debt maturity. Such an investigation
implies comparing diﬀerent debt maturity market timing behaviours that are diﬀerent in terms
of funding sources. In particular, making use of aggregate data on corporate bonds and loans,
the study asks whether maturity market timing behaviour is more prevalent in the euro zone
debt capital market than it is in the overall euro zone credit market, the latter being primarily
bank-based. The overall research strategy is explained in the following and is the core of this
chapter.
4.3.1 Research methodology and empirical predictions
For each of the four empirical propositions, which result from the theory of Greenwood, et al.
(2010), the study starts with graphical observations of debt maturity changes against a number
of selected variables. These main propositions are then tested using both vector autoregressive
(VAR) analyses and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein's
(2010) empirical predictions are as follows.
Proposition 1 'When the government issues long-term debt, corporates will issue short-term debt
to ﬁll the liquidity gap left by the government.'
This ﬁrst proposition is rather straightforward as it implies that a negative relationship
between the share of long-term government debt and the share of long-term corporate debt is
expected. This proposition also suggests that VAR analysis should show a negative impulse
response of corporate debt maturity to a positive shock in the maturity of government bonds.
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Proposition 2 'Gap ﬁlling behavior is more pronounced when there is a large supply of government
debt compared to corporate debt.'
This second proposition claims that the relationship between corporate debt maturity and
government debt maturity should be of a greater degree when the government debt is larger.
In order to test this hypothesis, the aggregate maturity of government debt is ﬁrst adjusted by
the size of the government debt (government debt maturity * size of government debt) and then
the sample is segregated into three sub-datasets according to the size of the government debt.
Hence, in the ﬁrst set of results, a negative relationship between the size-adjusted government
debt maturity and the share of long term corporate debt is expected whilst in the second set
of results, a stronger relationship between government and corporate debt maturity should be
found as the size of the government debt increases. Similarly, the VAR analyses should depict
a negative impulse response of corporate debt maturity to a positive shock in the maturity of
government bonds adjusted for the size of government debt.
Proposition 3 'Firms with no or low binding ﬁnancial constraints are in a better position to exhibit
gap ﬁlling behavior.'
Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) have interpreted this proposition as a cross-sectional
statement and claimed that ﬁrms with stronger balance sheets exhibit more enterprising gap-
ﬁlling behaviour. In contrast to Greenwood, et al. (2010), this proposition is considered
diﬀerently here. It is argued that, on aggregate, the liquidity of the credit market may aﬀect
gap-ﬁlling behaviour. Indeed, when the credit market is liquid, i.e. when credit spreads are
low, credit facilities may be more accessible. Thus, the ease of obtaining credit may give
ﬁrms a greater ﬂexibility to choose their debt maturity proﬁle than when the credit market
is illiquid. Hence, the relationship between government debt maturity and corporate debt
maturity is expected to be stronger when credit spreads are low. We test this hypothesis by: (i),
adjusting the government debt maturity variable by the corporate credit spread (government
debt maturity/credit spread); and (ii), segregating the sample into three sub-datsets according
to credit spread tier levels. The latter will, therefore, enable the running of regressions based on
these three diﬀerent sub-datsets. In the ﬁrst case, a negative relationship is expected between
the government debt maturity adjusted by credit spread and corporate debt maturity. In the
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 103
second case, the coeﬃcient between corporate debt maturity and government debt maturity is
expected to be of higher scale in the lowest credit spread tier dataset.
Proposition 4 'When government debt maturity is high, subsequent returns on long term bonds
are high as well.'
This proposition is probably the most controversial one since, as discussed earlier, the exist-
ing literature provides only mixed results with regards to the predictive power of government
bond maturity for bond excess returns. Nonetheless, in the context of the theory of Greenwood,
et al. (2010), this proposition implies that corporate debt maturity also has predictive power
since, according to Proposition 1, corporate and government debt maturity behave inversely.
In order to test this proposition and provide robust results, bond excess returns are calculated
over three horizons, speciﬁcally twelve, twenty-four and thirty-six months forward. A negative
relationship between excess return and government debt maturity and a positive relationship
between corporate debt maturity and excess return is therefore expected.
All of these tests are run over non-ﬁnancial corporate public debt issues and loans granted
by MFIs, controlling for ﬁnancing interest rates and term spreads. The next section presents
the data and the manner of constructing the variables in testing Greenwood, Hanson and
Stein's hypotheses.
4.3.2 Data and model calibration
The data employed in this study is extracted from the European Central Bank (ECB)
statistics database available at www.ecb.int. The variables are summarised in Tables C.1 and
C.2. The sources and reference of the data can be found in Table C.3.
The data sample ranges from January 1999 to February 2010 and includes a dummy variable
to consider data from 2007 to 2010. Data (un)availability aside, this choice is driven by two
factors: ﬁrst, the desire to concentrate on the period after the introduction of the euro; and
second, the desire to observe gap-ﬁlling behaviour during the credit crisis. In addition, and
contrary to Greenwood, et al. (2010), who use a large sample based on annual ﬁgures, this
study focuses on a shorter time period while using monthly ﬁgures.
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Following Greenwood, et al. (2010), the study starts by testing the diﬀerent propositions in
a static framework by considering levels of long-term debt to total outstanding debt for both
government and non-ﬁnancial corporations. Long-term debt is deﬁned as debt with maturity
of more than one year. The amount of long-term debt and total debt outstanding are ob-
tained at the end of each month for government (DGovtLT−out and D
Govt
out ), non-ﬁnancial corporate
bonds (BondCorpLT−out and Bond
Corp
out ) and loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations (Loan
Corp
LT−out and
LoanCorpout ).
In this framework, the dependent variables in the regressions are the ratio of long-term
to total non-ﬁnancial corporate debt outstanding (BondCorpLT−out/Bond
Corp
out ) and the ratio of
long-term to total amount of outstanding loans granted by monetary ﬁnancial institutions
(LoanCorpLT−out/Loan
Corp
out ). In the same way, the explanatory variable (D
Govt
LT−out/D
Govt
out ) repre-
sents the share of long-term government level.
Even though this ﬁrst approach is powerful, in the sense that it looks at government and
non-ﬁnancial corporations' debt portfolios on an aggregate basis, it fails to reﬂect debt is-
suances with accuracy. Indeed, transaction costs are such that corporates may not adjust their
liabilities' structure immediately after a change in market conditions. Corporations may, how-
ever, react to new market conditions by adjusting the maturity of their new debt issuances.
As such, it is necessary to observe how corporate debt issues react to shocks in the supply of
government debt.
Thus, gross and net nominal proceeds of debt securities for non-ﬁnancial corporations
(BondCorpgross, Bond
Corp
net
11) are obtained, as are both general government (DGovtgross, D
Govt
net ) pro-
ceeds and loan transaction ﬂows from MFIs to non-ﬁnancial corporations (LoanCorpnet ). Gross
and net amounts of long-term debt for each type of issuer are also collected. (BondCorpLT−gross,
BondCorpLT−net) are, respectively, the gross and net amounts of long-term debt issued by non-
ﬁnancial corporations. Similarly, (LoanCorpLT−net) are transaction ﬂows for long-term loans granted
by MFIs to non-ﬁnancial corporations. It is worth noting that monthly transactions are not
biased by valuation changes and, thus, they accurately represent the notional amount of debt
issued on a monthly basis.12
11(BondCorpnet ) is calculated as the sum of total gross debt issuance minus the sum of debt redemption within a month.
12'Monthly transactions are calculated from monthly diﬀerences in outstanding amounts adjusted for reclassiﬁcations, other
revaluations, exchange rate variations and any other changes which do not arise from transactions. See p79 of the Technical
notes available at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=10000022.
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As in the ﬁrst part, the dependent variables in the regressions are the ratio of long-term to
total non-ﬁnancial corporate debt issues (BondCorpLT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross andBond
Corp
LT−net/Bond
Corp
net )
and the ratio of long-term to total loans transacted by MFIs (LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
13 In
the same way, the explanatory variables (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross and D
Govt
LT−net/D
Govt
net ) represent the
long-term government issue share calculated as the ratio of long-term to total government debt
issues on a gross and net basis, respectively. Accordingly, and in keeping with Greenwood, et
al. (2010), in both cases a negative relationship between the dependent variables just described
and the long-term government debt level share is expected.
In addition, the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010) predicts that gap-ﬁlling behaviour is
more pronounced when the stock of government debt is large. Thus, two diﬀerent variables are
used to proxy the size of the government bond market: one is the ratio of government debt to
GDP (DGovtout /GDP ), whilst the other is the ratio of government debt to the size of the credit
market (DGovtout /TotalDebtout), where TotalDebtout = D
Govt
out +Bond
Corp
out +Loan
Corp
out . Moreover,
their theory predicts that gap-ﬁlling behaviour is more pronounced when market liquidity is
high. Hence, there is another variable based on the maturity of the government debt adjusted
by borrowing credit spread ( 1creditspread ×
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
), where the credit spread (creditspread)
is calculated as the diﬀerence between the average yield on BBB-rated bonds issued by non-
ﬁnancial corporates in the euro area (cbr) and the euro area government benchmark bond
(cbr−rl). This variable is expected negatively to aﬀect corporate debt maturity. Furthermore,
as the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010) predicts that, when government debt maturity is
high, subsequent returns on long-term bonds are higher than returns on short-term bonds,
bond excess returns are also considered in this study. Excess bond returns are calculated
over three diﬀerent horizons as the diﬀerence between capital gain plus interest received on
long-term bond and that on short-term bonds.
The control variables are deﬁned as follows. The impact of the shape of the yield curve
is measured through the introduction of the term spread (termspread) in the regressions.
The term spread is measured as the diﬀerence between yield of benchmark bonds of ten-year
maturity (rl) and the Euribor 6-month (rs). Finally, regressions are run over data from 1999
13For consistency, it is necessary to ensure that both the numerators and the denominators of the ratios are of the same
nature (gross/gross, net/net, outstanding/outstanding).
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to 2010 but also include a dummy variable to represent data from 2007 to 2010 in order to
observe the credit crunch's eﬀect on timing behavior.
This section has explained the research approach adopted in this analysis, as well as the
careful selection of any measurements involved and testable propositions for each variable
included in the analysis.
4.4 Results
Each of the propositions of Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) are tested in a qualitative
and quantitative manner through graphical observations, VAR analyses and OLS regressions.
4.4.1 Proposition 1
Proposition 1: 'When the government issues more long-term debt, ﬁrms respond by tilting their debt
issuance away from long-term debt.'
4.4.1.1 Evidence from time series observations
Figure 4.1 (a) shows both the share of long-term debt over total corporate debt
(BondCorpLT−out/Bond
Corp
out ) and outstanding loans (Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) issued between 1999
and 2010. This ratio is plotted against the share of long-term sovereign debt (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out )
over the same period of time. As shown in Figure 4.1(a), there is a negative trend between
the share of long-term debt issued by corporations and the share of long-term debt issued
by government. A similar trend, albeit on a lower scale, is observed for the share of long-
term corporate loans. It is worth noting two periods of time, January 1999 to January 2005
and October 2008 to February 2010, where the trends are particularly evident. These early
observations are in accordance with Greenwood, Hanson and Stein's (2010) ﬁrst proposition.
In addition, using the gross amount of newly issued securities, Figure 4.1 (b) shows the
share of long-term to total debt issued by government and corporations between 1999 and 2010.
These ratios are based on gross amounts and transaction ﬂows (BondCorpLT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross,
LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ) and are plotted against the share of long-term sovereign debt over the
same period of time (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross). Consistent with previous empirical works, large time
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Figure 4.1: Government and corporate Debt Maturity
(a) Government and corporate long term to total debt outstanding from 1999 to 2010
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(b) Government and corporate long term to total new debt issues from 1999 to 2010
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variations of the debt maturity of newly issued securities by both government and corporates are
observed. Despite large swings in the maturity of new debt issuance, it is hardly distinguishable
whether movements in government maturity are correlated with movements in corporate debt
maturity.
Therefore, based on Figures 4.1 (a) and (b), one can certainly expect that the stock of
long-term government bonds rather than new government bond issues drives the maturity of
corporate debt. This obviously calls for a quantitative analysis, which is presented in the next
two sections.
4.4.1.2 Evidence from VAR analyses
In this section, a VAR analysis is undertaken to observe the eﬀect of a positive shock in
government debt maturity on corporate debt and loan maturity. The impulse response of
corporate public debt and corporate loan is shown in the ﬁrst and second column, respectively.
Graphs (a) and (b) use the ratio of long-term to total debt outstanding for both government
and corporate public debt and loans. As observed in Graph (a) there is a negative response
in corporate debt maturity to a shock in the aggregate maturity of government debt. The
conﬁdence interval is, however, too broad to reject the hypothesis that a change in the aggregate
maturity of government debt has no eﬀect on the aggregate maturity of corporate debt. To
the contrary, a positive response is found when considering the corporate loan market. Again,
this last result should be mitigated as the conﬁdence interval is broad.
Graphs (c) and (d) represent the impulse response of a shock in the aggregate maturity
of government debt on the maturity of new corporate bond and loan issues. The eﬀect is as
expected in the public debt market but not in the loan market. It is worth noting that, for
both cases, the conﬁdence interval is slightly reduced compared with previous results. The
economic intuition behind these results may be that managers do not respond to a change in
government bond maturity by entering into liabilities management exercises, such as a bond
exchange. Instead, they respond by adjusting the maturity of their new debt issues, which
accounts for the bigger eﬀect of a change in aggregate debt maturity on new bond and loan
issues.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Response (IR) to a shock in government debt maturity
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Finally, Figures (e) and (f) represent the impulse response function of a shock in maturity
of new government bond issues on the maturity of new corporate issues. The results are mixed,
and one cannot reject the hypothesis that the maturity of the newly issued government bonds
has no eﬀect on the maturity of newly issued corporate bonds and loans. This is consistent
with the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010) as it implies that market timing starts once the
supply of government bonds exceed investors' demand for long-term sovereign bonds. Thus,
the total share of long-term government bonds is more relevant than new government issues.
Overall, there is some support for Proposition 1 of Greenwood, et al. (2010). This is
particularly pertinent to the corporate bond market. In line with the results of the previous
section, the results conﬁrm that the aggregate government debt maturity, and not the maturity
of its new bond issues, to some extent drives the maturity of both corporate aggregate debt
maturity and, more so, the maturity of newly issued debt securities. The next set of results
aims to deepen the current analysis and is based on OLS regressions.
4.4.1.3 Evidence from OLS regressions
Tables 4.1 summarises the results obtained from tests on data ranging from 1999 to 2010,
which also includes a dummy variable for both the intercept and the share of government bond
debt maturity so as to represent `gap-ﬁlling' behaviour from 2007 and 2010. For each type of
debt, the regressions have been run on the aggregate maturity, as well as the maturity of gross
and net new issues. As shown in Tables 4.1, the results are in keeping with the ﬁrst prediction
of Greenwood, et al. and consistent with previous results.
As shown in Table 4.1, when statistically signiﬁcant, there is a positive relationship between
the aggregate maturity of government debt and the aggregate maturity of both corporate bonds
and loans. In addition, a negative albeit non-statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the
maturity of corporate bond issues and aggregate government debt maturity is found. It is
worth noting that for both bond and loan markets, the relationship between the maturity of
gross and net government bond issues is statistically signiﬁcant only in one instance. Hence,
the remainder of the analysis will consider the maturity of government debt based on the
outstanding amount. After controlling for short-term interest rates, term spreads, the size of
government debt and credit spreads, as in Tables 4.2, the observations are broadly consistent
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with the ﬁrst proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010) and more relevant than previously since
negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are found in more instances.
Interestingly, when the credit crisis is included in the regressions via the dummy variables,
the coeﬃcients of our interest become negative as expected and are found to be substantially
of a higher magnitude and with a greater statistical signiﬁcance. In addition, the intercept
during the crisis is found positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The results, therefore, suggest
that the gap-ﬁlling eﬀect is of a higher degree during unstable economic conditions. It is also
worth noting that this observation is particularly relevant in the bond market as per Table
4.2 since, in a few instances, the positive relationship between government debt maturity and
bond maturity observed when the credit crisis is excluded from the sample becomes negative, as
expected, when the credit crisis is included. Notwithstanding, one possible reason for observing
such a change in gap-ﬁlling coeﬃcients during the crisis may be the substantial quantitative
easing observed over the course of the recent credit crisis. Since monetary authorities purchased
a large amount of long-term assets, it certainly created a shock in demand in the long-term
credit market. This, in turn, pushed the yield curve down to its lowest levels. Consequently,
corporates likely had incentive to borrow at the long end of the yield (i) in order to diminish
liquidity issues in the near future, (ii) in order to satisfy the demand for long-term assets and
(iii) because of the low interest rates. Since details on monetary actions are not provided in
this study, it is nevertheless impossible to explain conclusively the eﬀect of quantitative easing
on gap ﬁlling. This result calls for further research.
Overall, the results found in this section are in keeping with the results found earlier
and consistent with Greenwood, et al.'s (2010) ﬁrst proposition. It is found that the aggregate
maturity of government debt, as opposed to the maturity of new government bond issues,
drives the maturity of newly issued corporate debt securities. It is also found that `gap-ﬁlling'
behaviour is more clearly evident during the recent credit crisis.
4.4.1.4 Summary
Based on graphical observations, VAR analyses and OLS regressions, some support is found
in favour of Greenwood, et al.'s (2010) ﬁrst proposition. The empirical prediction is found to
be stronger in the corporate bond market than in the corporate loan market and, in addition,
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stronger when the credit crisis is included in the sample. The results, therefore, call for further
research on the eﬀect of quantitative easing on gap ﬁlling. Furthermore, and consistent with
the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010), the aggregate maturity of government debt, and not the
maturity of new bond issues, is found to be more relevant in explaining changes in corporate
debt maturity.
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 115
4.4.2 Proposition 2
Proposition 2: 'Gap-ﬁlling behaviour is more pronounced when the stock of government debt is large
relative to the stock of corporate debt.'
4.4.2.1 Evidence from graphic observations
In this section, scatter plots are performed to observe the eﬀect of the size of government
debt on the relationship between the maturity of government and corporate debt. The data,
ranging from 1999 to 2010, are segregated according to the 33rd percentile ranking of the ratio
of government debt to GDP. Data corresponding to the lowest percentile of the debt-to-GDP
ratio, i.e. from 0 to 33%, are found in the ﬁrst row of both ﬁgures, from 34% to 67% in the
second row, and so on. The ﬁrst and second column refers to the bond and loan market,
respectively.
Figure 4.3 Graphs (a), (c) and (e) show the scatter plot of the aggregate maturity of bonds
(BondCorpLT−out/Bond
Corp
out ) against the aggregate maturity of government debt (D
Govt
LT−out/D
Govt
out )
based on data corresponding to the lowest, medium and highest 33rd percentile of the ratio of
government debt to GDP. In the same way, Figure 4.3 Graphs (b), (d) and (f) show the scatter
plot of the aggregate maturity of loans (LoanCorpLT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) against the aggregate maturity
of government debt (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out ) based on data corresponding to the lowest, medium and
highest 33rd percentile of the government debt-to-GDP ratio. The remaining graphs in Figure
4.3 are displayed in the same way.
As shown in Figure 4.3, there is a negative trend between the aggregate maturity of govern-
ment and corporate debt. As expected when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high, slope coeﬃcients
are found to be higher as well. This is found for both the corporate bond and loan markets,
although it is worth noting that the eﬀect of the size of government debt on market timing
behaviour is more noticeable in the bond market, as shown by the higher slope coeﬃcient
increase. In addition, R2 is found to be stronger for high debt-to-GDP ratios. Based on these
graphs, there is clear evidence that the higher the debt-to-GDP ratio, the stronger the inﬂuence
of aggregate maturity of government debt on the aggregate maturity of corporate debt.
Similarly, Figure 4.4 summarises the results obtained when considering the maturity of
corporate new debt issues. Figure 4.4 graphs (a), (c) and (e) show the scatter plot of the ma-
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Figure 4.3: Impact of the size of government debt stock on the maturity of corporate debt outstanding
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Figure 4.4: Eﬀect of the size of government debt stock on the maturity of corporate debt new issues
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turity of new corporate bond issues (BondCorpLT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross) against the aggregate maturity
of government debt (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out ), based on data corresponding to the lowest, medium and
highest 33rd percentile of the ratio of government debt to GDP. In the same way Figure 4.4
graphs (b), (d) and (f) are based on loan market data (LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
As shown in Figure 4.4, the results are not as clear as previously, although the overall trend
is in keeping with what is expected. As shown in 4.4 graph (a), there is a positive relationship
between the aggregate maturity of government debt and corporate new bond issues maturity.
This is opposite to what should be expected, however. When the debt-to-GDP ratio gets higher,
as in graph (c) and (e), the relationship is found to be negative and stronger, as expected. In
contrast, as shown in graphs (b), (d) and (f), mixed results are found in the corporate loan
market as the trend does not become increasingly negative as the debt-to-GDP ratio rises.
This might be due to the fact that over the period of the credit crisis, the net transaction ﬂows
decreased dramatically, a decrease which may correspondingly bias the results.
Overall, based on these graphs, there is some evidence that the higher the debt-to-GDP
ratio, the stronger the inﬂuence of the aggregate maturity of government debt on the maturity
of corporate new debt issues. Therefore, and in accordance with the second proposition of
Greenwood, et al. (2010), there is some support for the notion that gap-ﬁlling behaviour is
more pronounced when the stock of government debt is large.
4.4.2.2 Evidence from VAR analyses
In this section, a VAR analysis is undertaken to observe the eﬀect of a positive shock in
government debt maturity, adjusted for the size of government debt, on corporate debt and
loan maturity. The impulse response of corporate public debt and corporate loan is shown in
the ﬁrst and second columns, respectively.
In order to observe the eﬀect of the size of government debt on market timing behaviour
two impulse variables are constructed: (i) the aggregate maturity of government debt adjusted
by the share of the government debt outstanding to the total debt outstanding in the economy
(
DGovtout
TotalDebtout
); and, (ii) the maturity of new government bond issues adjusted by the ratio of
the government debt issued to the total debt issued (
DGovtnet
TotalDebtnet
× D
Govt
LT−net
DGovtnet
). According to the
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 119
second proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010), a negative impulse response to a shock in
(TotalDebtout × D
Govt
LT−out
DGovtout
) and/or (
DGovtnet
TotalDebtnet
× D
Govt
LT−net
DGovtnet
) is expected.
Figure 4.5 graphs (a) and (b), show the impulse response of a shock in government debt
maturity, adjusted for the size of government debt, on the ratio of long-term debt to total debt
outstanding in both corporate bond and loan markets. As observed in graphs (a) and (b), there
is a negative response in the medium to long term in corporate debt and loan maturity to a
shock in the aggregate maturity of government debt. In contrast to the results in the previous
section, the conﬁdence interval is now reduced enough to accept the hypothesis that when
government debt supply is large, a positive change in the aggregate maturity of government
debt has a negative eﬀect on the aggregate maturity of corporate debt.
Graphs (c) and (d) represent the impulse response of a shock in the aggregate maturity
of government debt on the maturity of new corporate bond and loan issues. The impulse
response is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant in the short term; it then becomes negative
and statistically signiﬁcant in the medium to long term. This result is found to be very similar
in both bond and loan markets. Therefore, one can accept the hypothesis that when the
government debt supply is large, a positive shock in the aggregate maturity of government
bonds negatively aﬀects the maturity of newly issued corporate bonds and loans.
Finally, Figures (e) and (f) represent the impulse response function of a shock in the
maturity of new government bond issues on the maturity of new corporate issues. The results
are mixed and almost insigniﬁcant; therefore, one cannot reject the hypothesis that when the
government debt supply is large, the maturity of newly issued government bonds has no eﬀect
on the maturity of newly issued corporate bonds and loans.
Overall, there is some support for the second proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010). The
results conﬁrm that when the government debt supply is large, a positive change in aggregate
government debt maturity results in a negative change in corporate debt maturity. This is
found to be equally relevant in both the corporate bond and loan markets. The next set of
results aims to deepen the current analysis and is based on OLS regressions.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse Response of a shock in government debt maturity
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4.4.2.3 Evidence from OLS regressions
As for Proposition 1, Table 4.2 summarises the results obtained. Some support is found
for the second proposition of Greenwood, et al (2010), as the results tend to demonstrate that
when the share of government debt is large, gap-ﬁlling is more prevalent.
In Table 4.2, the independent variables of interest are the aggregate maturity of government
debt adjusted for the size of government debt. In particular, the maturity of government debt
is adjusted (i) by the ratio of the country's debt to GDP (
DGovtout
GDP ×
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
), and (ii) by
the share of the government debt outstanding to the total debt outstanding in the economy
(
DGovtout
TotalDebtout
×D
Govt
LT−out
DGovtout
). As reported in Table 4.2, when statistically signiﬁcant, the relationship
between the size-adjusted government debt maturity and the maturity of both corporate bonds
and loans is found, as expected, to be negative in a few instances.14 As such, and consistent
with earlier ﬁndings, it is found here that the government size eﬀect has, as expected, an
explanatory power in describing corporate debt maturity.
In order to check these ﬁndings robustly, a second set of tests follows in which the sample
is segregated into three sub-datasets according to the 33rdand 66th percentile of the size of
the government debt. The results are summarised in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 and demonstrate
that the relationship between government debt maturity and both corporate bond and loan
maturity is increasingly stronger as the size of the government debt increases. Speciﬁcally, it
is found that when the government debt is larger, as in Table 4.5, the relationship between
government debt maturity and corporate debt maturity becomes statistically signiﬁcant or with
a higher coeﬃcient than in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Hence, the results conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings and
demonstrate that the eﬀect of the size of government debt contributes in explaining corporate
debt maturity.
Overall, the results found in this section are in keeping with the second proposition of
Greenwood, et al. (2010) as the results demonstrate that corporates ﬁll the liquidity gap more
aggressively when government debt is large.
14We suspect the low statistical signiﬁcance of the results is driven by the high correlation between the variable (
D
Country
out
GDP
×
DGovtLT−out
DGovt
out
) and the short-term interest rate and term spread, as shown in Table C.4. This table can be found in the Appendix.
In contrast, when (TotalDebtout_×D
Govt
LT−out
DGovt
out
) is used, the results are of higher magnitude and consistent with what is
expected. In addition and in a non-reported Table, mixed results are observed with regards to the inﬂuence of the maturity
of new issues adjusted by the size of government debt new issues on the maturity of corporate new debt securities.
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4.4.2.4 Summary
Through graphical observations, VAR analyses and OLS regressions, some support is found
in favour of the second proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010). The results provide some
evidence that gap-ﬁlling behaviour is more pronounced when the stock of government debt is
large. The empirical prediction is found almost equally relevant for both types of debt but, in
contrast, is more clearly discernible when the credit crisis is included in the sample, enhancing
as it does more aggressive attempts by corporations to ﬁll liquidity gaps during turbulent
market conditions or subsequent to monetary actions.
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4.4.3 Proposition 3
Proposition 3: 'Firms will exhibit more aggressive gap-ﬁlling behavior when market liquidity is high.'
4.4.3.1 Evidence from graphic observations
In this section, scatter plots are performed to observe the eﬀect of market liquidity on the
relationship between the maturity of government and corporate debt. The data, ranging from
1999 to 2010, are segregated according to the 33rd percentile ranking of the corporate borrowing
spread (creditspread). Data corresponding to the highest percentile of credit spread, i.e. from
68% to 100%, is found in the ﬁrst row of both ﬁgures, from 34% to 67% in the second row,
and so on. The ﬁrst and second columns refer to the bond and loan markets, respectively.
Figure 4.6 graphs (a), (c) and (e) show the scatter plots of the aggregate maturity of bonds
(BondCorpLT−out/Bond
Corp
out ) against the aggregate maturity of government debt (D
Govt
LT−out/D
Govt
out ),
based on data corresponding to the highest, medium and lowest 33rd percentile of corporate
borrowing spreads. In the same way, Figure 4.6 graphs (b), (d) and (f) show the scatter plots
of the aggregate maturity of loans (LoanCorpLT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) against the aggregate maturity of
government debt (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out ), based on data corresponding to the highest, medium and
lowest 33rd percentile of corporate borrowing spreads. The remaining graphs in Figure 4.6 are
classiﬁed accordingly.
As shown in Figure 4.6, there is a negative trend between the aggregate maturity of gov-
ernment and corporate debt. Noticeable diﬀerences are, however, found when comparing both
corporate bond and loan markets. The results found in the bond market are as expected since
the negative relationship between the aggregate maturity of government and corporate debt
is found to be stronger when market liquidity is high, i.e. when corporate borrowing spread
levels are low. In contrast, there is mixed evidence in the loan market that higher market
liquidity results in stronger attempts at gap-ﬁlling. The sign of the coeﬃcients are found to
be negative, as expected, although the slope coeﬃcients are not found to be distinctly higher
when corporate borrowing spread levels are low.
Similarly, Figure 4.7 summarises the results obtained when considering the maturity of
corporate new debt issues. Figure 4.7 graphs (a), (c) and (e) show the scatter plots of the ma-
turity of new corporate bond issues (BondCorpLT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross) against the aggregate maturity
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Figure 4.6: Impact of corporate credit spread level on the maturity of corporate debt outstanding
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(b) High creditspread, X:
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, Y:
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Figure 4.7: Impact of the corporate credit spread level on the maturity of new corporate debt issues
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(c) Medium creditspread, X:
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of government debt (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out ), based on data corresponding to the highest, medium
and lowest 33rd percentile of corporate borrowing spreads. In a similar vein, Figure 4.7 graphs
(b), (d) and (f) are based on loan market data (LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
As shown in Figure 4.7, there is only mixed evidence in favour of the third proposition of
Greenwood, et al.(2010). If the slope coeﬃcients are found with the right sign in the bond
market, that is not the case in the loan market. As shown in Figure 4.7 graphs (a), (c) and
(e), there is a negative relationship between the aggregate maturity of government debt and
corporate new bond issues. However, slope coeﬃcients are not found consistently higher with
credit spread levels. Moreover, as shown in 4.7 graphs (b), (d) and (f), the relationship between
the aggregate maturity of government debt and the maturity of corporate new loan issues is
found to be positive. This is obviously opposite to what is expected.
Overall, based on these graphs, there is only mixed evidence that the higher the market
liquidity, the stronger the inﬂuence of the aggregate maturity of government debt on the
maturity of corporate new debt issues. There is some evidence in favour of the third proposition
of Greenwood, et al. (2010) when bond market data are considered. There is little support for
this hypothesis when corporate loan data are analysed.
4.4.3.2 Evidence from VAR analyses
In this section, a VAR analysis is undertaken to observe the eﬀect of market liquidity on
gap-ﬁlling behaviour. In particular, the positive shock in government debt maturity is adjusted
by the corporate credit borrowing spread: when the corporate credit spread is low, i.e market
liquidity is high, then according to the third proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010), gap
ﬁlling should be stronger. As a consequence, a negative relationship between government debt
maturity, adjusted to market liquidity, and the maturity of corporate bonds and loans should
be found.
In order to observe the eﬀect of market liquidity on market timing behaviour, two impulse
variables are constructed: (i) the aggregate maturity of government debt adjusted by corporate
credit borrowing spread ( 1creditspread ×
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
), and (ii) the maturity of new government bond
issues adjusted by corporate credit borrowing spread ( 1creditspread ×
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
). According to
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 130
the third proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010), a negative impulse response to a shock in
either ( 1creditspread ×
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
) or ( 1creditspread ×
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
), or both, is expected.
Figure 4.5 graphs (a) and (b) show the impulse response of a shock in the market liquidity
of government debt maturity on the ratio of long term debt to total debt outstanding in both
the corporate bond and loan markets. As observed in graphs (a) and (b), a positive impulse
response is found in both markets. The conﬁdence interval is, however, too large to reject the
hypothesis that when market liquidity is high, a positive change in the aggregate maturity of
government debt has no eﬀect on the aggregate maturity of corporate debt.
Graphs (c) and (d) represent the impulse response of a shock in the aggregate maturity
of government debt on the maturity of new corporate bond and loan issues. As expected, a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant impulse response is found in the short term when looking
at the corporate bond market. One can, therefore, accept the hypothesis that when market
liquidity is high, a positive shock in the aggregate maturity of government bonds has a negative
eﬀect on the maturity of newly issued corporate bonds. However, this result is not found in the
corporate loan markets, as the interval conﬁdence level is too broad to reject the hypothesis
that when market liquidity is high, a positive shock in the aggregate maturity of government
bonds has no eﬀect on the maturity of newly issued corporate loans.
Finally, graphs (e) and (f) represent the impulse response function of a shock in the maturity
of new government bond issues on the maturity of new corporate issues. As expected, a negative
and almost statistically signiﬁcant impulse response is found when looking at the corporate
bond market. One cannot reject the hypothesis that when market liquidity is high, a positive
shock in the aggregate maturity of government bonds negatively aﬀects the maturity of newly
issued corporate bonds. In contrast, this result is not found in the corporate loan markets. A
positive impulse response is found, but the interval conﬁdence level is too broad to reject the
hypothesis that, when market liquidity is high, a positive shock in the aggregate maturity of
government bonds has no eﬀect on the maturity of newly issued corporate loans.
Overall there is only mixed evidence in favour of the third proposition of Greenwood, et
al. (2010). Indeed, based on VAR analyses there is only, mixed evidence that the higher
the market liquidity, the stronger the inﬂuence of the aggregate maturity of government debt
on the maturity of corporate new debt issues. There is some evidence in favour of the third
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Figure 4.8: Impulse Response of a shock in government debt maturity
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proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010) when bond market data are considered. However there
is little support for this hypothesis when corporate loan data are analysed. The next set of
results aims to deepen the current analysis and is based on OLS regressions.
4.4.3.3 Evidence from OLS regressions
As for Propositions 1 and 2, the main results can be found in Table 4.2. In addition, Tables
4.7, 4.8 and 4.6 summarise the results obtained by segregating the data according to corporate
borrowing spreads' 33rd percentile. The results obtained from these tests are consistent with
previous results and lend some support for the third proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010),
but only in the corporate bond market.
In the ﬁrst set of results, seen in Table 4.2, the independent variables of interest are the
maturity of government debt adjusted by corporate credit spreads ( 1creditspread ×
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
).15
According to the third proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010), a negative relationship between
this variable and the maturity of corporate debt is anticipated as it is expected that gap-ﬁlling is
stronger when the credit market is liquid. As shown in Tables 4.2, when statistically signiﬁcant,
the relationship between the aggregate maturity of government debt adjusted for credit spread
and the maturity of corporate bonds is found to be negative as expected. In contrast, this
observation is not found when corporate loans are considered. Hence, corporates appear to
be more inﬂuenced by credit spread changes when deciding on the maturity of their bonds
compared to bank loans.
In addition, further tests have been run to test the eﬀect of market liquidity on gap-ﬁlling
behaviour. Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 summarise the results obtained when data are segregated
according to their corresponding corporate credit spread levels. Table 4.6 corresponds to the
lowest 33rd credit spread percentile sample, whilst Tables 4.7 and 4.8 refer to the medium
and top samples. As expected, a stronger negative relationship is found between the maturity
of corporate bonds and the maturity of government debt when (creditspread) is low (i.e. a
lower negative relationship in Table 4.6 than in Table 4.8). Hence, the bond market appears to
behave in accordance with the third proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010) as the inﬂuence
of the aggregate maturity of government debt on both the aggregate maturity of corporate
15Please note that regressions using the maturity of new government issues adjusted by corporate borrowing spread have
not been carried out: this variable was not statistically signiﬁcant in the previous section - VAR analysis.
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bonds and the maturity of new bond issues is found to be gradually stronger across the high,
medium and low credit spread samples.
In contrast, the loan market depicts a diﬀerent trend, with the strongest gap ﬁlling observed
in the second sample corresponding to the middle range of credit spreads. One interpretation
of this last result may be that when market liquidity is low, only good-quality ﬁrms may be
able to time the market as poor-quality ﬁrms may face credit rationing from their lenders. On
an aggregate basis, fewer ﬁrms would, therefore, ﬁll the maturity gap left by the government.
In contrast, when market liquidity is high, poor-quality ﬁrms may have incentive to borrow
long-term debt independently of changes to government debt maturity. Thus, in this case only
good-quality ﬁrms time the market, which on aggregate results in lower variations of corporate
loan maturity. A cross-sectional analysis using disaggregated data would be necessary to
investigate further.
Moreover, and in keeping with the above, it is worth noting that segregating the data
according to the (creditspread) at the 33rd percentile has a slight eﬀect on the eﬀect of the
size of government debt depicted in section 2. First, the slope coeﬃcients corresponding to
these variables are found to be statistically signiﬁcant in more instances, especially in the
high credit spread sample. When statistically signiﬁcant, the inﬂuence of the maturity of
government debt adjusted to the size of government debt is found more distinctly negative in
the ﬁrst and third samples than in the second one, i.e. when the credit spread is either in the
top or bottom 33rd percentile. This last ﬁnding is relevant for both markets, although it is
more accentuated in the loan market.
Overall, the results obtained in the corporate bond market are in keeping with the third
proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010) since one observes clearer attempts at gap-ﬁlling when
market liquidity is high. However, it is worth noting that this ﬁnding is not observed in the
loan market, likely due to the fact that credit rationing is stronger in the loan market than in
the bond market.
4.4.3.4 Summary
Based on graphical observations, VAR analyses and OLS regressions, only mixed support is
found in favour of the third proposition of Greenwood et al. (2010). The results provide some
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 134
T
ab
le
4.
6:
P
ro
p
os
it
io
n
3
u
si
n
g
th
e
lo
w
cr
ed
it
sp
re
ad
sa
m
p
le
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
se
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
o
b
ta
in
ed
b
a
se
d
o
n
d
a
ta
,
w
h
ic
h
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
(c
re
d
it
sp
re
a
d
)
b
el
o
n
g
s
to
th
e
b
o
tt
o
m
3
3
rd
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
.
F
o
r
ea
ch
ea
ch
ty
p
e
o
f
d
eb
t,
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
h
av
e
b
ee
n
ru
n
o
n
to
b
o
th
th
e
a
g
g
re
g
a
te
m
a
tu
ri
ty
,
th
e
m
a
tu
ri
ty
o
f
g
ro
ss
a
n
d
n
et
n
ew
is
su
es
.
(D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
/
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
,
B
on
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
/
B
on
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
,
L
oa
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
/
L
oa
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
)
a
re
th
e
ra
ti
o
s
o
f
lo
n
g
te
rm
to
to
ta
l
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
b
o
n
d
,
co
rp
o
ra
te
b
o
n
d
a
n
d
lo
a
n
o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
(D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
/
D
G
o
v
t
g
r
o
s
s
,
B
on
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
/
B
on
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
)
a
re
ra
ti
o
s
o
f
lo
n
g
te
rm
to
to
ta
l
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
b
o
n
d
,
co
rp
o
ra
te
n
ew
b
o
n
d
is
su
es
(g
ro
ss
vo
lu
m
e)
.
(L
oa
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
/
L
oa
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
)
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
lo
n
g
te
rm
to
to
ta
l
lo
a
n
n
ew
is
su
es
(n
et
vo
lu
m
e)
.
(
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
G
D
P
×D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
/
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
,
T
ot
a
lD
eb
t o
u
t
×D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
/
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
,
T
ot
a
lD
eb
t n
e
t
×D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
/
D
G
o
v
t
g
r
o
s
s
)
a
re
th
e
ra
ti
o
s
o
f
lo
n
g
te
rm
to
to
ta
l
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
d
eb
t
ra
ti
o
a
d
ju
st
ed
fo
r
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
d
eb
t
si
ze
.
(
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
G
D
P
)
is
th
e
to
ta
l
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
d
eb
t
o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
to
G
D
P
,
(T
ot
a
lD
eb
t o
u
t
)
is
th
e
to
ta
l
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
d
eb
t
o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
a
n
d
(T
ot
a
lD
eb
t n
e
t
)
is
th
e
to
ta
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
d
eb
t
n
ew
is
su
es
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
-0
.9
45
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
86
∗∗
-0
.8
61
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
60
∗∗
∗
0.
28
6
-0
.7
19
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
43
∗
-0
.6
86
∗∗
-0
.5
86
∗∗
∗
0.
05
8
-0
.3
68
∗
-0
.6
69
∗
-1
.0
58
∗∗
∗
0.
22
9∗
∗
0.
33
7
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.3
57
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.8
64
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.4
06
)
T
o
ta
lD
eb
t o
u
t
G
D
P
×
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
0.
29
0∗
∗
0.
18
4
0.
22
6
0.
09
5
-0
.2
92
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.3
32
)
(0
.2
06
)
(0
.4
60
)
(0
.1
50
)
T
ot
a
lD
eb
t o
u
t
×
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
-0
.5
68
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
17
0.
19
3
-0
.8
75
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
51
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
42
)
(0
.3
80
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.8
40
)
rs
-0
.1
93
0.
43
3∗
0.
67
3∗
∗∗
-0
.4
81
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
35
-0
.2
97
∗∗
0.
36
7
0.
59
3∗
∗
-0
.5
14
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
32
-0
.1
57
0.
43
4∗
0.
66
1∗
∗∗
-0
.4
25
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
32
(0
.2
04
)
(0
.0
78
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.6
02
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.9
05
)
(0
.1
93
)
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.6
16
)
te
rm
sp
re
ad
-0
.4
68
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
56
-0
.5
33
∗∗
∗
0.
20
2
-0
.5
06
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
73
-0
.0
86
-0
.5
46
∗∗
∗
0.
24
0
-0
.1
92
-0
.0
41
-0
.1
50
-0
.1
08
0.
22
6
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.8
22
)
(0
.7
86
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.3
94
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.7
40
)
(0
.6
78
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.3
08
)
(0
.1
20
)
(0
.8
70
)
(0
.5
20
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.4
00
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
64
7
0.
10
1
0.
19
3
0.
59
2
-0
.0
47
0.
69
4
0.
10
0
0.
20
5
0.
58
7
-0
.0
17
0.
77
9
0.
07
8
0.
18
8
0.
91
7
-0
.0
72
A
IC
-2
38
.5
-1
45
.7
-1
24
.4
-2
22
.7
17
9.
3
-2
43
.9
-1
44
.8
-1
24
.3
-2
21
.3
17
8.
9
-2
58
.3
-1
43
.7
-1
23
.3
-2
91
.7
18
1.
2
B
IC
-2
31
.4
-1
38
.6
-1
17
.3
-2
15
.5
18
6.
4
-2
35
.0
-1
35
.9
-1
15
.3
-2
12
.4
18
7.
8
-2
49
.4
-1
34
.8
-1
14
.4
-2
82
.8
19
0.
1
F
27
.2
8
2.
60
6
4.
41
8
21
.7
6
0.
36
3
25
.3
4
2.
19
3
3.
78
0
16
.2
8
0.
82
0
38
.9
6
1.
90
7
3.
49
2
11
9.
3
0.
27
6
p
9.
02
e-
10
0.
06
50
0.
00
89
5
1.
61
e-
08
0.
78
0
2.
15
e-
10
0.
08
76
0.
01
08
6.
39
e-
08
0.
52
1
3.
96
e-
13
0.
12
9
0.
01
57
2.
55
e-
21
0.
89
2
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
b
et
a
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
;
p
-v
a
lu
es
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 135
T
ab
le
4.
7:
P
ro
p
os
it
io
n
3
u
si
n
g
th
e
m
ed
iu
m
cr
ed
it
sp
re
ad
sa
m
p
le
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
se
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
o
b
ta
in
ed
b
a
se
d
o
n
d
a
ta
,
w
h
ic
h
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
(c
re
d
it
sp
re
a
d
)
b
el
o
n
g
s
to
th
e
m
ed
iu
m
3
3
rd
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
a
n
d
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
th
e
sa
m
e
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
4
.6
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
-0
.6
47
∗∗
∗
-0
.3
07
-0
.0
11
-0
.8
13
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
30
-0
.6
28
∗∗
∗
-0
.3
33
-0
.0
07
-0
.7
95
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
54
-0
.4
66
0.
16
7
-0
.0
36
-0
.0
97
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.9
66
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
04
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.1
23
)
(0
.9
80
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
97
)
(0
.7
71
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.6
93
)
(0
.8
12
)
(0
.8
09
)
T
o
ta
lD
eb
t o
u
t
G
D
P
×
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
0.
08
9
-0
.1
18
0.
02
1
0.
08
2
0.
13
5
(0
.4
43
)
(0
.5
04
)
(0
.9
26
)
(0
.4
79
)
(0
.5
22
)
T
ot
a
lD
eb
t o
u
t
×
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
-0
.4
80
∗∗
∗
0.
12
8
-0
.1
44
-0
.6
29
∗∗
∗
0.
05
5
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.5
45
)
(0
.5
89
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.8
30
)
rs
-0
.8
92
∗∗
∗
0.
29
3
0.
10
4
-0
.8
25
∗∗
∗
0.
36
8
-0
.8
92
∗∗
∗
0.
29
3
0.
10
4
-0
.8
25
∗∗
∗
0.
36
9
-0
.9
28
∗∗
∗
0.
30
3
0.
09
3
-0
.8
72
∗∗
∗
0.
37
2
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
19
)
(0
.7
29
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
23
)
(0
.7
32
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
09
)
(0
.7
58
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
00
)
te
rm
sp
re
ad
-0
.8
98
∗∗
∗
0.
59
2∗
∗
0.
14
5
-1
.2
06
∗∗
∗
0.
01
5
-0
.9
45
∗∗
∗
0.
65
5∗
∗
0.
13
4
-1
.2
49
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
57
-0
.5
49
∗∗
∗
0.
49
9∗
0.
25
0
-0
.7
49
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
25
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.6
15
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
57
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.6
71
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.8
48
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.4
76
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.9
40
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
71
3
0.
33
7
-0
.0
65
0.
71
4
0.
04
6
0.
71
0
0.
32
8
-0
.0
91
0.
71
1
0.
03
3
0.
79
4
0.
32
6
-0
.0
83
0.
85
9
0.
02
4
A
IC
-2
45
.7
-1
47
.0
26
4.
2
-2
32
.1
14
2.
3
-2
44
.4
-1
45
.5
26
6.
2
-2
30
.6
14
3.
8
-2
59
.9
-1
45
.5
26
5.
9
-2
62
.9
14
4.
2
B
IC
-2
38
.5
-1
39
.8
27
1.
5
-2
24
.8
14
9.
5
-2
35
.4
-1
36
.5
27
5.
3
-2
21
.6
15
2.
8
-2
50
.8
-1
36
.4
27
4.
9
-2
53
.9
15
3.
3
F
37
.4
0
8.
44
6
0.
10
9
37
.6
8
1.
71
5
27
.9
3
6.
36
4
0.
08
20
28
.0
5
1.
37
2
43
.4
6
6.
33
1
0.
15
4
68
.0
2
1.
26
8
p
8.
25
e-
12
0.
00
01
73
0.
95
4
7.
38
e-
12
0.
17
9
4.
15
e-
11
0.
00
04
63
0.
98
7
3.
89
e-
11
0.
26
1
4.
75
e-
14
0.
00
04
81
0.
96
0
2.
64
e-
17
0.
29
9
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
b
et
a
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
;
p
-v
a
lu
es
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 136
T
ab
le
4.
8:
P
ro
p
os
it
io
n
3
u
si
n
g
th
e
h
ig
h
cr
ed
it
sp
re
ad
sa
m
p
le
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
se
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
o
b
ta
in
ed
b
a
se
d
o
n
d
a
ta
,
w
h
ic
h
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
(c
re
d
it
sp
re
a
d
)
b
el
o
n
g
s
to
th
e
to
p
3
3
rd
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
a
n
d
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
th
e
sa
m
e
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
4
.6
a
n
d
4
.7
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
g
r
o
s
s
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
B
o
n
d
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
o
u
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
L
T
−
n
e
t
L
o
a
n
C
o
r
p
n
e
t
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
-0
.4
05
∗∗
-0
.3
76
∗
-0
.1
14
-0
.5
78
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
11
-0
.4
90
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
41
-0
.1
09
-0
.6
34
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
11
0.
01
3
-0
.5
77
∗
-0
.3
90
-0
.0
58
-0
.2
92
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.0
71
)
(0
.6
37
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.6
34
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.2
06
)
(0
.6
64
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.6
49
)
(0
.9
54
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.2
62
)
(0
.5
53
)
(0
.3
87
)
T
o
ta
lD
eb
t o
u
t
G
D
P
×
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
-0
.4
12
∗∗
0.
65
8∗
∗∗
0.
02
4
-0
.2
71
∗∗
0.
00
2
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.9
31
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.9
93
)
T
ot
a
lD
eb
t o
u
t
×
D
G
o
v
t
L
T
−
o
u
t
D
G
o
v
t
o
u
t
-0
.6
48
∗∗
0.
31
2
0.
42
8
-0
.8
08
∗∗
∗
0.
28
1
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.3
39
)
(0
.2
68
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.4
54
)
rs
-0
.8
18
∗∗
0.
66
8
-0
.0
21
-0
.9
82
∗∗
∗
-0
.4
58
-0
.1
10
-0
.4
61
-0
.0
61
-0
.5
17
∗
-0
.4
62
-0
.2
87
0.
41
3
-0
.3
72
-0
.3
20
∗
-0
.6
88
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.9
68
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.3
66
)
(0
.8
06
)
(0
.3
87
)
(0
.9
31
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.5
00
)
(0
.4
55
)
(0
.4
24
)
(0
.5
42
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.2
49
)
te
rm
sp
re
ad
-0
.5
78
∗
0.
94
9∗
∗
-0
.0
54
-1
.2
67
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
00
0.
24
7
-0
.3
66
-0
.1
01
-0
.7
25
∗∗
-0
.5
05
0.
20
5
0.
57
2
-0
.5
72
-0
.2
91
-0
.8
40
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.9
02
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.5
81
)
(0
.4
91
)
(0
.8
86
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.4
61
)
(0
.6
12
)
(0
.2
93
)
(0
.3
73
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.1
82
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
51
5
0.
24
7
-0
.0
61
0.
80
0
0.
01
1
0.
56
7
0.
39
0
-0
.0
88
0.
82
3
-0
.0
14
0.
58
1
0.
24
5
-0
.0
54
0.
91
7
0.
00
1
A
IC
-2
28
.5
-1
25
.0
25
7.
1
-2
40
.1
30
3.
2
-2
32
.6
-1
33
.4
25
9.
1
-2
44
.5
30
5.
2
-2
34
.1
-1
24
.1
25
7.
7
-2
77
.7
30
4.
5
B
IC
-2
21
.4
-1
17
.9
26
4.
3
-2
33
.0
31
0.
3
-2
23
.7
-1
24
.5
26
8.
1
-2
35
.6
31
4.
1
-2
25
.1
-1
15
.1
26
6.
7
-2
68
.8
31
3.
4
F
16
.2
5
5.
69
1
0.
17
2
58
.4
7
1.
16
4
15
.0
7
7.
86
7
0.
12
7
50
.9
3
0.
85
1
15
.9
1
4.
49
5
0.
44
5
11
9.
3
1.
00
7
p
0.
00
00
00
46
5
0.
00
24
2
0.
91
5
1.
11
e-
14
0.
33
5
0.
00
00
00
15
7
0.
00
00
94
8
0.
97
2
5.
71
e-
15
0.
50
2
8.
33
e-
08
0.
00
44
0
0.
77
5
2.
53
e-
21
0.
41
6
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
b
et
a
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
;
p
-v
a
lu
es
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
∗
p
<
0
.1
,
∗∗
p
<
0
.0
5
,
∗∗
∗
p
<
0
.0
1
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 137
evidence that gap-ﬁlling behaviour is more pronounced when market liquidity is high, yet the
empirical prediction is not found to be equally relevant in both markets. Gap-ﬁlling behaviour
in the corporate bond market increases almost linearly with market liquidity, as opposed to
the corporate loan market where a non-linear relationship is found.
The next section partly reproduces previous empirical works on the predictive power of
changes in the structure of government debt maturity on bond excess returns while also exam-
ining the fourth proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010).
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4.4.4 Proposition 4
Proposition 4: 'Corporate maturity choices forecast (Government) bond returns.'
4.4.4.1 Evidence from time series observations
This analysis reproduces previous empirical works on the predictive power of changes in
the structure of government debt maturity on bond excess returns and examines the fourth
proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010). The results found in this section partly support the
fourth proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010), which asserts that the maturity structure of not
only government but also corporate debt predicts bond excess returns. The latter is expected
to aﬀect bond excess returns in a lower scale than government maturity changes do. A positive
relationship between government debt maturity and excess returns is expected which, in turn,
implies that a negative relationship between the maturity of corporate debt and excess returns
should be found since corporates are expected to mirror government debt maturity structure.
Figure 4.9 shows the one-year-, two-year- and three-year-ahead excess return against the
share of long-term government debt and corporate bond and loan debt (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out ,
BondCorpLT−out/Bond
Corp
out , Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) between 1999 and 2010. As shown in this
ﬁgure, there is a positive trend between the share of long-term government debt and bond
excess returns. Interestingly, this observation is more distinctly discernible when the two-year
and three-years-ahead excess returns are considered. This early evidence supports the hypoth-
esis that when the government increases the maturity of its debt by borrowing at the long
end of the yield curve, it lowers long-term bond prices, thus increasing excess returns as a
consequence.
In the same way, the second and third columns of Figure4.9 shows the share of long-term
corporate bonds and loans against bond excess returns. As expected, a negative trend between
corporate debt maturity and excess return is found. Again, this observation is more clearly
evident when bond excess returns are calculated over a longer horizon.
Therefore, based on Figure 4.9, the negative (positive) relationship between the maturity of
government (corporate) debt maturity and bond excess returns supports the fourth proposition
of Greenwood, et al. (2010). This obviously calls for a quantitative analysis, which is presented
in the next section.
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4.4.4.2 Evidence from OLS regressions
This analysis reproduces previous empirical works on the predictive power of changes in
the structure of government debt maturity on bond excess returns while also examining the
fourth proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010). The results are based on data ranging from
1999 to 2010 and are presented in Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11. In keeping with previous empirical
works by Greenwood, et al. (2010), Baker, Greenwood and Wugler (2003), Butler, Grullon
and Weston (2006) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2008), some support is found in favour of
the predictive power of changes in government debt maturity structure on excess returns.
Surprisingly, changes in corporate debt maturity structure appear to have more predictive
power on excess returns than do government debt maturity changes.
Indeed, the dependent variables of interest are the one-year-ahead, two-year-ahead and
three-year-ahead bond excess returns. These dependent variables are regressed on the aggregate
maturity of both government (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out ) and corporate debt (Bond
Corp
LT−out/Bond
Corp
out ,
LoanCorpLT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) as well as on the maturity of both government and corporate new issues
(BondCorpLT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross, Loan
Corp
LT−net/Loan
Corp
net ). According to the fourth proposition of
Greenwood, et al. (2010), a positive relationship between bond excess returns and government
debt maturity is expected, in turn implying an expected negative relationship between bond
excess returns and corporate debt maturity since corporates are meant to mirror government
debt maturity strategy.
As shown in Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11, there is only mixed evidence that government debt
maturity has a predictive power in bond excess returns. Indeed, if the share of long-term to
total Government debt is found as a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of the three-year-ahead
bond excess returns, that is not, however, the case for the other two horizons. In addition and
contrary to the ﬁnding of Greenwood, et al. (2010) that when the government share goes up
by one percentage point, excess bond returns increase by 82.4 basis points at the three-year
horizon, the present results only show a rise of 32.8 basis points. Moreover, there is no evidence
that the maturity of new government bond issues has predictive power as this variable is not
statistically signiﬁcant across the diﬀerent horizons.
In contrast, there is strong evidence that both long-term corporate bonds and loans have
predictive power on government bond excess returns. Indeed in these regressions, the share of
corporate bonds and loans emerges as a statistically signiﬁcant predictor at all three horizons.
In addition, the inﬂuence of these variables on the bond excess returns is stronger than the
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Table 4.9: Proposition 4 testing based on data from 1999 to 2010, 12 months bond excess returns
This table summarises the results obtained based on data ranging from 1999 to 2010. The dependent variable is the 12
months ahead bond excess return. The independent variables are the ratios of long term to total government bond, corporate
bond and loan outstanding respectively (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out , Bond
Corp
LT−out/Bond
Corp
out , Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) and the ratios of
long term to total government bond, corporate bond and loan new issues (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross, Bond
Corp
LT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross,
LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12
BondCorpLT−out
BondCorpout
-0.162∗ -0.166∗
(0.079) (0.086)
BondCorpLT−gross
BondCorpgross
-0.015
(0.878)
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
-0.118 -0.113
(0.201) (0.254)
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
-0.013
(0.893)
LoanCorpLT−out
LoanCorpout
-0.154∗ -0.161∗
(0.096) (0.083)
LoanCorpLT−net
LoanCorpnet
0.063
(0.495)
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.010 0.005 -0.003 0.015 0.011
AIC -385.4 -383.5 -383.9 -382.0 -385.1 -383.6
BIC -379.9 -375.1 -378.4 -373.6 -379.6 -375.3
F 3.139 1.568 1.651 0.827 2.824 1.639
p 0.0790 0.213 0.201 0.440 0.0955 0.199
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.10: Proposition 4 testing based on data from 1999 to 2010, 24 months bond excess returns
This table summarises the results obtained based on data ranging from 1999 to 2010. The dependent variable is the 24
months ahead bond excess return. The independent variables are the ratios of long term to total government bond, corporate
bond and loan outstanding respectively (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out , Bond
Corp
LT−out/Bond
Corp
out , Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) and the ratios of
long term to total government bond, corporate bond and loan new issues (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross, Bond
Corp
LT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross,
LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24
BondCorpLT−out
BondCorpout
-0.419∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
BondCorpLT−gross
BondCorpgross
0.090
(0.345)
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
-0.039 -0.041
(0.692) (0.674)
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
0.035
(0.724)
LoanCorpLT−out
LoanCorpout
-0.466∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
LoanCorpLT−net
LoanCorpnet
0.187∗∗
(0.030)
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.167 -0.008 -0.016 0.209 0.237
AIC -333.6 -332.5 -313.1 -311.2 -339.1 -342.0
BIC -328.3 -324.5 -307.7 -303.2 -333.7 -333.9
F 22.41 11.65 0.158 0.141 29.09 17.50
p 0.00000691 0.0000273 0.692 0.869 0.000000429 0.000000281
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
CHAPTER 4. MARKET TIMING AND THE MATURITY OF CORPORATE DEBT 143
Table 4.11: Proposition 4 testing based on data from 1999 to 2010, 36 months bond excess returns
This table summarises the results obtained based on data ranging from 1999 to 2010. The dependent variable is the 36
months ahead bond excess return. The independent variables are the ratios of long term to total government bond, corporate
bond and loan outstanding respectively (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out , Bond
Corp
LT−out/Bond
Corp
out , Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) and the ratios of
long term to total government bond, corporate bond and loan new issues (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross, Bond
Corp
LT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross,
LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36
BondCorpLT−out
BondCorpout
-0.430∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
BondCorpLT−gross
BondCorpgross
0.084
(0.402)
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
0.328∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
0.035
(0.729)
LoanCorpLT−out
LoanCorpout
-0.609∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
LoanCorpLT−net
LoanCorpnet
0.032
(0.702)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.173 0.098 0.089 0.364 0.358
AIC -249.3 -248.0 -240.7 -238.8 -273.8 -272.0
BIC -244.2 -240.3 -235.6 -231.1 -268.7 -264.3
F 21.08 10.86 11.20 5.606 54.72 27.19
p 0.0000138 0.0000583 0.00118 0.00504 6.02e-11 5.29e-10
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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share of government debt. It is also worth noting that, in most cases, the share of corporate
loans has a stronger predictive power than the share of corporate bonds. The results are
in keeping with those found in the previous sections as the maturity of new corporate debt
issues is observed to have little predictive power compared with the one found when using
aggregate maturity. This again is consistent with the view that gap-ﬁlling should be viewed
on an aggregate basis.
The results found in this section are rather surprising since previous empirical works found
consistent results supporting the argument that government and corporate debt maturity has,
respectively, a positive and negative eﬀect on bond excess returns. There might be several
reasons behind the inconsistency of the present results. These can be econometric or economic.
This analysis uses monthly data as opposed to the annual data used by Greenwood, et al.
(2010). As such, despite the number of observations remaining very similar and even higher, it
might be the case that the length of the data panel is too short to obtain consistent and robust
results. Another reason might be that the proxy used to measure government debt maturity
is not precise enough and, thus, does not reﬂect bond market segment to an exacting degree.
Finally, another reason for the inconsistency of these results may be more economically linked
to the nature of European economies. It might be the case that the recent changes in the
European ﬁnancial system and the gradual economic integration of European economies aﬀect
the predictive power of government debt maturity on government bond excess returns. Since
this analysis is, as far as I am aware, the ﬁrst one to test the theory of Greenwood, et al.
(2010) in the European Union, it is almost impossible conclusively to determine the cause of
the results' inconsistency. Further research could attempt to test whether the inconsistency of
these last results derives from the economic circumstances postulated above.
4.4.4.3 Summary
Based on graphical observations and OLS regressions, only mixed support is found in favour
of the fourth proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010). The results provide strong evidence
that the aggregate maturity of corporate debt has predictive power on government bond excess
returns. There is a weak evidence, however, that the maturity of government debt predicts
bond excess returns. This is inconsistent with the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010) as
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corporates are expected to mirror government debt maturity strategy. Further research could
attempt to investigate this issue further and examine whether these results can be explained
by fundamental economic factors such as the integration of European economies.
4.5 Conclusion
How to interpret the time series variations in corporate debt maturity? According to
Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010), corporates act as macro-liquidity providers in segmented
bond markets, ﬁlling the liquidity gap left by government when it changes its maturity proﬁle.
Using a detailed set of data on a monthly basis, some evidence is found in favour of the
empirical predictions of Greenwood, et al (2010).
Based on graphical observations, Var analyses and OLS regressions, some support is found
in favour of the ﬁrst, second and third empirical predictions of Greenwood, et al. (2010).
Consistent with the theory of Greenwood. et al. (2010), the results show that corporates aim
to mirror government debt maturity. This ﬁnding is particularly evident during the credit crisis
or when government debt and market liquidity are high. In addition, the aggregate maturity
of government debt, as opposed to the maturity of new government bond issues, is found to
be more relevant in explaining changes in corporates' debt maturity. This ﬁnding conﬁrms
the economic intuition of Greenwood, et al. (2010) that the maturity of the government bond
portfolio inﬂuences the overall corporate debt market. Hence, it is of greater importance in
explaining corporate market timing behaviour than new issues of government bonds. Each
of these propositions are found nevertheless to be of greater relevance in the corporate bond
market as opposed to the corporate loan market. This new ﬁnding suggests that ﬁnancial
intermediaries may act as a hedge to gap-ﬁlling strategies.
In contrast, only mixed support is found in favour of the fourth proposition of Greenwood,
et al. (2010). The results provide some evidence that the aggregate maturity of corporate debt
has predictive power on government bond excess returns. There is, however, weak evidence
that the maturity of government debt predicts bond excess returns. This is inconsistent with
the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010) as corporates are expected to mirror government
debt maturity strategy. Further research could attempt to investigate further this issue and
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investigate whether these results can be explained by fundamental economic factors such as
the integration of European economies.
In conclusion, the theory of Greenwood, et al (2010) is a major pioneering work that has
attempted to explain why time series variations in corporate debt maturity are seen in debt
markets. However, a few ﬁndings, such as the diﬀerence in gap-ﬁlling strategies in the corporate
bond and loan markets, cannot be explained by their theory. A possible extension of the theory
of Greenwood, et al. (2010) would be to include banks in the model and impose them so as to
act as arbitrageurs in a sense consistent with Greenwood, et al. (2010), but also to constraint
them (to some extent) so as to match the maturity of their assets with the maturity of their
liabilities as the risk management literature prescribes.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The present work has concentrated on three speciﬁc concerns with regards to the debt
management of non-ﬁnancial corporations, namely the cross sectional variation of debt matu-
rity, the market timing of debt issuance and the time series variation of debt maturity. This
Chapter summaries the thesis and its contributions and suggests directions for future research.
This study has centred exclusively on empirical evidence and stylised facts with regards to
the management of non-ﬁnancial corporate debt and has broadened current research by explor-
ing the inﬂuence of industry speciﬁcity, ﬁnancial intermediaries and market conditions on debt
maturity and debt issuance decisions. The present work contributed to the existing knowledge
since it demonstrated that: (i) in addition to ﬁrms' characteristics, the cross-sectional variation
of debt maturity can be explained by industry-speciﬁc factors, which are not adequately ad-
dressed in the existing literature; (ii) that the agency cost hypothesis does not appear to have
explanatory power for large cap ﬁrms, therefore giving more weight to the maturity-matching
principle and the signaling hypothesis in explaining debt maturity structure, (iii) that man-
agers tend to time their credit borrowing spread when they issue bonds and switch to the
loan market during high interest rate periods, therefore contradicting earlier ﬁndings claiming
that interest rate timing attempts explain time-series variations of debt issuance; and, (iv)
while corporates' debt maturity mirrors government debt maturity when directly placed debt
is considered, ﬁnancial intermediates act as barriers to the gap-ﬁlling strategies in corporate
debt maturity.
Chapter 2 explored the determinants of corporate debt maturity and its variation across
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industries. Building on the existing literature, this cross-sectional analysis stressed the impor-
tance of industry-speciﬁc factors in explaining debt maturity. Using ﬁrm-level data, the study
started with several stylised facts in funding decisions across diﬀerent sectors of the economy
by describing the sample. A careful measurement of the inﬂuence of ﬁrms' characteristics was
then obtained through ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions over diﬀerent periods of time
in order to obtain a control sample. The industry speciﬁcity of debt maturity was ﬁrst mea-
sured against this benchmark by introducing dummy variables representing each sector into
the regressions and then shown in more detail through industry based OLS regressions.
The study demonstrated that describing debt maturity decisions solely through ﬁrms' char-
acteristics, as the current literature prescribes, is not an exhaustive approach since the results
showed evidence that the maturity of non-ﬁnancial corporations also has an industry-speciﬁc
component. First, the results provided evidence that under-performing sectors or sectors sub-
ject to the bursting of speculative bubbles face even more severe credit rationing than is theo-
retically predicted. As such, industry-speciﬁc economic factors, which evidently inﬂuence debt
maturity structure, fail to be represented in the existing literature. This ﬁnding, combined
with the evidence of the eﬀects of the 2008 credit crisis on all sectors' debt proﬁle, indicates
a form of extreme credit risk aversion. Second, the results showed that some industries such
as materials, telecommunication services and utilities consistently have a higher debt maturity
structure than the theories suggest. This observation, supported by the evident inﬂuence of
merger and acquisition activities on debt maturity in the energy sector, led to the formation
of the hypothesis that market structure may inﬂuence debt maturity. Intuitively, the fact that
these industries have longer debt proﬁles than other sectors presumably results from the nat-
ural monopoly structure of these sectors which, in addition to regulation constraints, create
both high barriers to entry and less incentive to alleviate the underinvestment problem by
shortening the maturity of their debt. Finally, the results demonstrate that the agency cost
hypothesis, which is commonly found as a key determinant of debt maturity decision in the
literature, appears to be insigniﬁcant for large cap ﬁrms, which compose this sample, giving
in turn more weight to the maturity-matching principle and signaling hypothesis in explaining
debt maturity choices.
Chapter 3 examined the time series variations in corporate debt issuance from an empirical
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perspective and outlined stylised facts of market timing funding strategies. A critical review
of the existing literature led to emphasis being placed on short-term backward timing and the
inﬂuence of ﬁnancial intermediates on market timing funding strategy. In addition, since no
existing theory has the power to explain in full why such variations exist, three hypotheses
were postulated and formed the basis for the empirical analysis. The hypotheses were: (i)
managers have an expectation of mean returns based on interest rates so that, when interest
rates are low compared with past rates, managers may wish to issue more debt today in the
expectation that they will rise in the future; (ii) managers issue more debt when credit spreads
are low compared to recent past credit spread levels; and, (iii) managers issue more debt
for precautionary purposes. Using a set of aggregate data detailed on a monthly basis, the
study initiated the discussion by observing the dynamics of both the European bond and loan
markets. Then OLS regressions were used to test the formulated hypotheses.
The results suggested that managers do not issue more debt when interest rates are low
compared with recent past rates. Indeed, the results demonstrated that interest rate market
timing is not a well-established funding strategy. Instead, the main contribution of this work
laid in the fact that results provided clear evidence that managers switch between the bond
and loan markets depending on interest rates since the interest rate gap variables appear to
be of opposite sign and of same magnitude in the two markets. Moreover, there was no clear
evidence that there is no excessive delay in when managers choose to issue debt; in general, debt
issuance scheduling matches fairly well debt redemption. In addition, the study demonstrated
that managers tend to issue more bonds when their credit spreads are low compared with past
values; a ﬁnding not observed in the loan market, highlighting the possible eﬀect of ﬁnancial
intermediates on credit spread timing attempts. The results, however, showed only mixed
evidence that managers issue more debt when they expect economic conditions to worsen in
the near future.
Finally, Chapter 4 presented and tested the empirical predictions of the theory of Green-
wood, et al. (2010). Their major pioneering work claims to explain why time series variations
in corporate debt maturity are seen in debt markets by arguing that corporations act as macro-
liquidity providers in segmented bond markets, therefore ﬁlling the liquidity gap left by gov-
ernment when it changes its maturity proﬁle. Greenwood, et al. (2010) set out four empirical
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predictions, which formed the underlying hypotheses of this study's analysis. Using a detailed
set of data including both bonds and loans on a monthly basis, the novelty of this study was
in primarily centring on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediates on gap-ﬁlling behaviour, as well
as in using both graphical observations and VAR analyses in addition to OLS regressions to
test the empirical predictions of Greenwood, et al. (2010).
Consistent with the theory of Greenwood, et al. (2010), the results supported the hypothesis
that corporates mirror government debt maturity. This was found to be particularly clear when
government debt and market liquidity are high, as well as during the recent credit crisis. The
latter is likely the result of recent monetary actions. Each of these propositions are nevertheless
found to be of greater relevance in the corporate bond market than in the corporate loan
market. These new observations thus suggest that ﬁnancial intermediates may act as barriers
to gap-ﬁlling strategies. In contrast, only mixed support was found in favour of the fourth
proposition of Greenwood, et al. (2010), which asserts that the maturity of both government
and corporate debt has predictive power on government bond excess returns.
5.1 Future research
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, current theories fail to capture the industry speciﬁcity of
debt maturity choice. One immediate extension of this work could be to test the hypothesis
formulated in this chapter, a hypothesis which suggests that market structure may inﬂuence
debt maturity. Literature on market structure has not been explored in detail in this thesis
and the inﬂuence of market structure on debt maturity is, to the best of my knowledge, little
covered in the empirical literature. As such, there is an obvious gap here to be bridged.
More broadly, since the present work centred on the maturity of debt alone, future work could
attempt to explore how the above ﬁndings, in conjunction with other debt characteristics, such
as its priority and its covenants, relate to market structure, a sector's competition and ﬁrms'
strategies.
Moreover, as seen in Chapter 3, debt market timing remains little covered, and the het-
erogeneity of the existing empirical literature demonstrates that debt issuance is a complex
process which is not yet comprehensively described. This clearly calls for another model with
the ability to describe and ultimately to forecast the mechanisms of debt issuance. A pos-
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sible approach towards creating such a model would have as its foundation optimal control
theory and, in particular, inventory management modeling. Viewing debt management as the
management of an inventory of 'cash needs' could be a compelling course to follow and could
beneﬁt from the advanced tools developed in this domain. Future research could, for example,
build on earlier work on cash management from Baumol-Allais-Tobin (1952) or Miller and Orr
(1966) and extend their models by allowing for borrowing.
Finally given the recent economic turmoil in Europe and the current sovereign debt crisis
in some European countries, an immediate extension of Chapter 4 could be to segregate the
data and investigate, on a country-by-country basis, the empirical predictions of the theory
of Greenwood, et al. (2010). This would, then, naturally open into a wider discussion of the
integration of European economies and capital markets while also raising questions about its
eﬀects on gap-ﬁlling behaviour. More generally and in conjunction with the observation that
gap ﬁlling diﬀers in the corporate bond and loan markets, a possible extension of the theory
of Greenwood, et al. (2010) would be the inclusion of ﬁnancial intermediaries in the model
and the imposition of them as arbitrageurs in a sense taken from Greenwood, et al. (2010),
while also constraining them, to some extend, to match the maturity of their assets with the
maturity of their liabilities as the risk management literature prescribes.
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Table A.1: Debt maturity structure in corporate ﬁnance part 1
Authors Assumptions Is short term or long term optimal?
Modigliani &
Miller (1958)
Stiglitz (1969)
 Frictionless market: no transaction costs, etc
 Competitive markets: individuals and ﬁrms are
price-takers
 Individual and ﬁrms can undertake transactions at
the same prices
 All agents have the same information
 No Taxes
 No Bankruptcy costs
Financial policy is irrelevant. [12, 17]
Kraus (1973)  Frictionless market: no transaction costs, etc
 Eﬃcient markets
 All agents have the same information
 No Taxes
 No Bankruptcy costs
Irrelevance of debt maturity:
Viewing the refunding decision as a zero-sum
game in an eﬃcient market, the ﬁrms share-
holders would be indiﬀerent between issuing
bonds having diﬀerent call provisions but equal
market values.[15]
Stiglitz (1974)  Frictionless market: no transaction costs, etc
 Competitive markets
 Individuals and ﬁrms can undertake ﬁnancial trans-
actions at the same prices
 Perfect market for perfectly safe bonds of all matu-
rities: amount they pay upon maturity is perfectly
know for certain: the price of these diﬀerent matu-
rities at all other date is variable
 No Taxes
 No Bankruptcy costs of any ﬁrm in any state of
nature
 All ﬁrms have already made their real decisions: the
value of the project for each company is given
 General equilibrium with all markets clearing
Irrelevance of debt maturity: The value of the
ﬁrm and the price of all maturities of all bond
are unchanged.
Intuitively,  individuals can exactlyundo
any ﬁnancial policy undertaken by the
ﬁrm[16]
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Table A.2: Debt maturity structure in corporate ﬁnance part 2
Authors Assumptions Is short term or long term optimal?
Morris (1976)  Competitive markets
 Presence of Taxes
 Net income and short term interest rates are nor-
mally distributed, independent and identically dis-
tributed between periods.
Relating debt maturity to asset life, a hedg-
ing policy where the debt maturity is approxi-
mately equal to the asset life is not necessar-
ily the least risky maturity policy... a hedg-
ing, which would involve short term borrowing
would oﬀer the potential beneﬁts of less vari-
able net income.
[13]
Myers (1977)  Complete, eﬃcient and strictly perfect Capital mar-
kets
 Presence of Tax beneﬁts
 Growth opportunities seen as call options
Shortening the maturity of the debt can over-
come the incentive problem associated with
future investment opportunities but generate
costs associated with a policy of rolling over
(i.e. issuing and redeeming debt continu-
ously). This seems to be a good solution, but
there are costs of maintaining such a continu-
ous, intimate and ﬂexible relationship.
[14]
Brennan and
Schwartz
(1978)
 Frictionless markets: absence of transaction costs
 Competitive markets
 Presence of Tax beneﬁts
 Presence of bankruptcy costs
The optimal leverage ratio decreases with ma-
turity. The rolling over of short term debt is
preferred as bankruptcy may be avoided while
the tax saving is still enjoyed.
[3]
Boyce and
Kalotay
(1979)
 Presence of Tax beneﬁts
 Absence of bankruptcy costs and equity ﬁnancing
Long term debt and short term leverage de-
pend on tax conditions. That is, the total tax
beneﬁt of debt is dependent of the maturity
structure. In particular, if the term structure
of interest rates is rising then long-term debt
is optimal.[2]
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Table A.3: Debt maturity structure in corporate ﬁnance part 3
Authors Assumptions Is short term or long term optimal?
Barnea,
Haugen, and
Senbet (1980)
 Presence of agency problem
 Asymmetry of information
 Managerial risk incentives
 Myer's type foregone growth opportunities
Debt maturity structure and call provisions
can resolve the agency problem of debt as-
sociated with informational asymmetry, risk
incentives and Myer's type foregone growth
opportunities.[1]
Brick and
Ravid (1985)
 Presence of tax beneﬁt
 Presence of bankruptcy costs
 Non-stochastic interest rates
Long term debt may be preferred because
of tax-related advantages. Long term (short
term) debt will increase the present value of
debt tax beneﬁts if the term structure of in-
terest is increasing (decreasing).[4]
Flannery
(1986)
 Signaling hypothesis
 Presence of transaction costs
 Changes and uncertainty in risk free rates are ig-
nored.
If bond market investors cannot distinguish
between Good and Bad ﬁrms, Good ones will
consider their long-term debt to be relatively
under-priced and will, therefore, issue short
debt. Conversely, in the same circumstances,
Bad ﬁrms will sell overpriced long debt.[8]
Brick and
Ravid (1991)
 Presence of tax beneﬁt
 Presence of bankruptcy costs
 Stochastic interest rates
Long term debt is favored because of tax-
related advantages and the uncertainty of the
interest rates.[5]
Diamond
(1991-1993)
 Liquidity risk hypothesis
 Asymmetry of information
 Absence of Taxes
The optimal maturity structure trades oﬀ a
preference for short maturity due to expecting
their credit rating to improve against liquid-
ity risk. Borrowers with high credit ratings
prefer short-term debt, and those with some-
what lower ratings prefer long-term debt. Still
lower rated borrowers can issue only short-
term debt.[6]
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Table A.8: Outstanding debt distribution across sectors
This table shows the average and standard deviation of the outstanding debt distribution for each sector. Average 1 is the
average ratio of the debt maturing during the ﬁrst year over the total debt maturing from the ﬁrst year to the ﬁfth year
dd1
dd1+dd2+dd3+dd4+dd5
. Averages 2 to 5 are calculated the same way using debt maturing from the second year from the balance
sheet date and so on. This ratio does not include debt maturing after the ﬁfth year from the balance sheet date as this
information is not available in COMPUSTAT. Figure 2.2 is the graphic representation of this table. This table shows the
average and standard deviation of the debt maturity proﬁle for each sector. The corresponding formula with COMPUSTAT
code is LongTermDebtratio = DLTT+DD1
DLTT+LCT
, where LCT denotes Current Liabilities, which represents liabilities due within
one year including the current portion of long-term debt DD1 . DLTT is the amount of Long Term debt, which represents
debt obligations due more than one year from the company's balance sheet date according to U.S. and Canadian GAAP
Deﬁnition. The numerator DLTT is adjusted by DD1 .
1999
Sector GICS code DD1
DLTT
DD2
DLTT
DD3
DLTT
DD4
DLTT
DD5
DLTT
1−
∑5
i=1
DDi
DLTT
ENERGY 10 2.23% 9.32% 6.73% 7.51% 11.84% 62.14%
MATERIALS 15 8.02% 11.56% 9.69% 9.60% 7.77% 53.93%
INDUSTRIAL 20 8.69% 9.22% 7.35% 10.43% 9.93% 56.70%
CONSUMER DISCR. 25 10.24% 8.58% 12.13% 12.33% 10.36% 49.82%
CONSUMER STAPLES 30 10.28% 13.80% 11.58% 7.11% 11.54% 46.11%
HEALTH CARE 35 24.19% 13.05% 13.05% 12.78% 6.66% 39.18%
INFO. TECH. 45 23.69% 9.73% 11.01% 12.19% 12.50% 29.85%
TELECOM. SERVI. 50 4.44% 4.07% 4.65% 5.39% 6.42% 76.08%
UTILITIES 55 10.29% 6.25% 7.52% 8.58% 7.49% 61.57%
Grand Total 11.22% 9.30% 9.49% 9.87% 9.67% 52.41%
2009
Sector GICS code
ENERGY 10 3.51% 8.63% 14.76% 11.79% 7.80% 54.74%
MATERIALS 15 6.01% 9.40% 11.57% 9.05% 13.05% 50.38%
INDUSTRIAL 20 17.00% 9.07% 13.64% 11.57% 10.90% 38.32%
CONSUMER DISCR. 25 8.56% 11.42% 15.87% 11.45% 13.16% 41.57%
CONSUMER STAPLES 30 5.67% 13.69% 13.46% 13.99% 11.29% 41.40%
HEALTH CARE 35 8.81% 8.94% 15.06% 10.49% 14.31% 45.76%
INFO. TECH. 45 12.57% 8.10% 19.41% 16.29% 15.91% 30.35%
TELECOM. SERVI. 50 5.23% 8.29% 9.10% 6.40% 9.58% 61.40%
UTILITIES 55 7.36% 6.82% 8.32% 8.30% 7.26% 61.87%
Grand Total 8.50% 9.58% 13.84% 11.39% 11.35% 46.38%
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Table B.1: Description of the variables - part 1
This table summaries the variables and provides details on the data used in the OLS regressions. Data and their description
are extracted from the ECB online database.
Code Description
GDS Securities other than shares, excluding ﬁnancial derivatives, All currencies combined,
(Gross) issues against cash (ﬂows)
NDS Securities other than shares, excluding ﬁnancial derivatives, All currencies combined, Unspeciﬁed
LOAN Total, Financial transactions (ﬂows), non-ﬁnancial corporations (S.11)
rl ECB, Benchmark bond, euro area 10-year government Benchmark bond yield, Yield
rs Reuters, Money Market, Euribor 6-month, Historical close, average of observations through period
ts ECB, Spread, Spread between Euribor 6-month and benchmark bonds of 10-year maturity, Spread
cbr Corporate bond rate; average yield on BBB-rated euro area non-ﬁnancial corporates
cbs Corporate credit spread, proxied by cbr-rl
HICP Euro area (changing composition) - HICP - Overall index, Annual rate of change, Eurostat,
Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted
pequity Bloomberg European 500 Index
MtoB Market to Book ratio
PER Price Earning Ratio
Divyield The sum of gross dividend per share amounts that have gone ex-dividend over the prior 12 months,
divided by the current stock price. Gross and Net Dividend amounts are assumed to be the same
when only one is reported. All Cash Dividend Types are included in this yield calculation.
REARN Retained earnings, proxied by pequity/PER-pequity*Divyield/100
GFCF Euro area 16 (ﬁxed composition), reporting institutional sector non-ﬁnancial corporations -
Gross ﬁxed capital formation - counterpart area World (all entities), counterpart institutional sector
Total economy including Rest of the World (all sectors) - Debit - Unspeciﬁed consolidation status,
Current prices - Euro, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted - ESA95 TP table Not applicable
CIAD Euro area 16 (ﬁxed composition), reporting institutional sector non-ﬁnancial corporations -
Changes in inventories and acquisition less disposals of valuables - counterpart area World (all entities),
counterpart institutional sector Total economy including Rest of the World (all sectors) - Debit -
Unspeciﬁed consolidation status, Current prices - Euro, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted -
ESA95 TP table Not applicable
CAPEX Capital expenditure, proxied by GFCF + CIAD
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Table B.3: Interest rates timing in the European debt capital market between 1999 and 2010
This table summarises the results obtained from the sensitivity analysis. The regressions below test for the interest rates
timing hypothesis in the euro area debt capital market between January 1999 and February 2010. The dependent variables
are the gross and net level of debt securities (GDS, NDS, LOAN) issued in the European debt capital market on a monthly
basis. The term spread (ts) is measured as the diﬀerence between the 10 year government bond benchmark yield to maturity
(rl) and the 6 month Euribor (rs). The credit spread is measured as the diﬀerence between corporate bond rate, proxied by
the average 10-year yield to maturity of BBB-rated bond issued by non-ﬁnancial corporates in the euro area, and the 10-year
government bond benchmark yield to maturity (rl). Measures of the current interest rate and credit spread levels compared
to their past levels are done through the diﬀerence between the current interest rate and credit spread over the past 12 to
18 months levels respectively (rateGapi ,creditspreadGapi ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread -0.577∗∗ -0.494∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.071 0.120 0.322∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.021) (0.010) (0.578) (0.386) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
credit spreadGap12 -0.267 -0.072 -0.101
(0.197) (0.624) (0.302)
rateGap12 -0.101 -0.064 0.204
∗∗∗
(0.429) (0.495) (0.003)
credit spreadGap15 -0.238 0.107 -0.183
∗∗
(0.261) (0.489) (0.041)
rateGap15 0.049 0.072 0.142
∗
(0.746) (0.466) (0.087)
credit spreadGap18 -0.205 0.255
∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.084) (0.007)
rateGap18 0.121 0.214
∗ 0.033
(0.546) (0.086) (0.742)
Observations 121 118 115 121 118 115 121 118 115
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.117 0.133 -0.020 -0.019 0.025 0.482 0.485 0.477
AIC 2671.1 2602.6 2533.8 2460.9 2400.2 2335.6 2662.2 2597.8 2535.5
BIC 2682.3 2613.7 2544.8 2472.1 2411.3 2346.6 2673.4 2608.9 2546.4
F 7.080 6.168 6.852 0.249 0.354 2.498 43.58 43.53 42.25
p 0.000205 0.000637 0.000281 0.862 0.787 0.0634 5.53e-19 8.01e-19 2.73e-18
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.4: Interest rates timing in the European Debt Capital market between 1999 and 2010 - Robustness
test
The regressions below robustly test for the interest rates timing hypothesis in the euro area debt capital market between
January 1999 and February 2010. Variables are identical to those as in Table B.3 but also include (CAPEX), (REARN) and
(MTOB)to proxy corporate's investment, ﬁnancing needs and growth opportunities respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread -0.063 -0.093 -0.118 -0.264 -0.104 0.132 -0.375∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.726) (0.578) (0.499) (0.116) (0.545) (0.397) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000)
credit spreadGap12 -0.242 -0.219 0.025
(0.145) (0.168) (0.796)
rateGap12 -0.294
∗∗ -0.095 0.106
(0.023) (0.389) (0.153)
credit spreadGap15 -0.319
∗∗ 0.011 -0.019
(0.042) (0.950) (0.839)
rateGap15 -0.226
∗ 0.104 0.093
(0.058) (0.428) (0.279)
credit spreadGap18 -0.355
∗∗∗ 0.230 -0.094
(0.008) (0.141) (0.273)
rateGap18 -0.177 0.296
∗∗ -0.078
(0.139) (0.039) (0.395)
MtoB 0.325∗ 0.437∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.216 0.003 -0.108 0.075 0.026 0.195
(0.097) (0.030) (0.004) (0.185) (0.988) (0.567) (0.538) (0.843) (0.130)
CAPEX 0.835∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 0.108 -0.094 -0.262 0.101 0.074 0.266∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.525) (0.647) (0.197) (0.403) (0.577) (0.050)
REARN -0.139 -0.287∗ -0.420∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗ -0.184 -0.021 0.290∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.172∗
(0.355) (0.082) (0.005) (0.026) (0.279) (0.911) (0.002) (0.001) (0.096)
Observations 121 118 115 121 118 115 121 118 115
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.304 0.331 0.001 -0.016 0.027 0.542 0.541 0.548
AIC 2644.1 2577.4 2506.9 2461.2 2402.8 2338.2 2650.2 2587.0 2521.7
BIC 2663.7 2596.8 2526.2 2480.8 2422.2 2357.4 2669.7 2606.4 2540.9
F 10.48 9.525 10.39 1.153 0.803 1.935 27.07 26.63 27.89
p 3.05e-09 1.96e-08 4.50e-09 0.337 0.569 0.0816 7.16e-20 1.85e-19 6.56e-20
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.5: Interest rates timing in the European debt capital market between 1999 and 2007
This table summarises the results obtained from the sensitivity analysis. The regressions below test for the interest rates
timing hypothesis in the euro area debt capital market between January 1999 and February 2007. The dependent variables
are the gross and net level of debt securities (GDS, NDS, LOAN) issued in the European debt capital market on a monthly
basis. The term spread (ts) is measured as the diﬀerence between the 10 year government bond benchmark yield to maturity
(rl) and the 6 month Euribor (rs). The credit spread is measured as the diﬀerence between corporate bond rate, proxied by
the average 10-year yield to maturity of BBB-rated bond issued by non-ﬁnancial corporates in the euro area, and the 10-year
government bond benchmark yield to maturity (rl). Measures of the current interest rate and credit spread levels compared
to their past levels are done through the diﬀerence between the current interest rate and credit spread over the past 12 to
18 months levels respectively (rateGapi ,creditspreadGapi ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread -0.561∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗ -0.205 -0.042 -0.551∗∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗ -0.659∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.010) (0.002) (0.036) (0.237) (0.832) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
credit spreadGap12 -0.443
∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.090
(0.009) (0.792) (0.402)
rateGap12 -0.093 -0.066 0.226
∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.530) (0.006)
credit spreadGap15 -0.513
∗∗∗ 0.046 -0.130
(0.010) (0.744) (0.239)
rateGap15 0.004 0.016 0.164
(0.977) (0.886) (0.137)
credit spreadGap18 -0.533
∗∗∗ 0.156 -0.159
(0.001) (0.345) (0.196)
rateGap18 0.047 0.131 0.052
(0.812) (0.392) (0.717)
Observations 95 92 89 95 92 89 95 92 89
Adjusted R2 0.165 0.161 0.177 0.032 0.029 0.040 0.345 0.340 0.324
AIC 2104.9 2035.4 1967.1 1927.3 1867.1 1806.6 2094.6 2031.6 1969.3
BIC 2115.1 2045.5 1977.0 1937.5 1877.2 1816.5 2104.8 2041.7 1979.2
F 7.187 6.809 7.321 2.029 2.156 2.329 20.87 20.35 19.08
p 0.000220 0.000352 0.000201 0.115 0.0989 0.0802 2.25e-10 4.18e-10 1.50e-09
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.6: Interest rates timing in the European debt capital market between 1999 and 2007 - Robustness
test
The regressions below test for the interest rates timing hypothesis in the euro area debt capital market between January
1999 and December 2007. The variables are identical to those as in table B.3. The data sample is restricted to data up to
December 2007 as to reﬂect the pre-credit crunch period.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDS GDS GDS NDS NDS NDS LOAN LOAN LOAN
term spread 0.010 -0.035 -0.090 -0.574∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗ -0.183 -0.159 -0.087
(0.959) (0.879) (0.758) (0.001) (0.007) (0.035) (0.192) (0.341) (0.616)
credit spreadGap12 -0.262
∗∗ -0.176 0.025
(0.037) (0.155) (0.801)
rateGap12 -0.246
∗ -0.136 0.162∗
(0.079) (0.260) (0.066)
credit spreadGap15 -0.313
∗∗ -0.152 0.072
(0.026) (0.294) (0.489)
rateGap15 -0.148 -0.051 0.200
∗
(0.286) (0.709) (0.056)
credit spreadGap18 -0.357
∗∗ -0.131 0.113
(0.022) (0.433) (0.291)
rateGap18 -0.108 0.008 0.075
(0.513) (0.959) (0.531)
MtoB 0.118 0.169 0.249∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.200 0.245 -0.027 -0.152 -0.066
(0.414) (0.279) (0.089) (0.030) (0.174) (0.117) (0.821) (0.214) (0.656)
CAPEX 0.783∗∗ 0.779∗∗ 0.789∗∗ -0.039 -0.094 -0.078 0.277∗ 0.214 0.336∗∗
(0.017) (0.025) (0.017) (0.847) (0.670) (0.700) (0.059) (0.163) (0.028)
REARN -0.097 -0.161 -0.259 -0.403∗∗ -0.393∗ -0.449∗∗ 0.215 0.299∗∗ 0.250
(0.665) (0.516) (0.283) (0.029) (0.054) (0.034) (0.109) (0.033) (0.127)
Observations 95 92 89 95 92 89 95 92 89
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.333 0.331 0.145 0.123 0.130 0.434 0.450 0.440
AIC 2080.2 2017.0 1951.5 1918.3 1860.5 1800.6 2083.6 2017.7 1955.4
BIC 2098.1 2034.7 1968.9 1936.2 1878.2 1818.0 2101.4 2035.3 1972.8
F 10.39 8.576 8.251 3.248 3.012 3.056 14.46 19.01 16.38
p 1.10e-08 0.000000272 0.000000538 0.00625 0.0102 0.00951 2.07e-11 6.49e-14 2.63e-12
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Correlation matrix based on data from 1999 to 2010
DGovtout
GDP ×
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
TotalDebtout_D
Govt
LT−out/D
Govt
out TotalDebtnet_D
Govt
LT−gross/D
Govt
gross
DGovtout
GDP ×
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
1
TotalDebtout_D
Govt
LT−out/D
Govt
out 0.0525 1
TotalDebtnet_D
Govt
LT−gross/D
Govt
gross 0.1162 0.07 1
rs -0.9043 0.1967 -0.1067
termspread 0.9078 -0.2097 0.1052
Table C.5: Proposition 4 testing based on data from 1999 to 2007, 12 months bond excess returns
This table summarises the results obtained based on data ranging from 1999 to 2007. The dependent variable is the 12 months
ahead bond excess return. The independent variables are the ratios of long term to total government bond, corporate
bond and loan outstanding respectively (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out , Bond
Corp
LT−out/Bond
Corp
out , Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) and the ratios of
long term to total government bond, corporate bond and loan new issues (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross, Bond
Corp
LT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross,
LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12 Rlt+12 −Rst+12
BondCorpLT−out
BondCorpout
0.061 0.061
(0.586) (0.601)
BondCorpLT−gross
BondCorpgross
0.001
(0.992)
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
-0.016 0.005
(0.885) (0.963)
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
-0.094
(0.414)
LoanCorpLT−out
LoanCorpout
0.074 0.069
(0.510) (0.541)
LoanCorpLT−net
LoanCorpnet
0.064
(0.571)
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82
Adjusted R2 -0.009 -0.021 -0.012 -0.016 -0.007 -0.016
AIC -251.8 -249.8 -251.5 -250.2 -252.0 -250.3
BIC -247.0 -242.6 -246.7 -243.0 -247.2 -243.1
F 0.299 0.148 0.0210 0.347 0.438 0.379
p 0.586 0.863 0.885 0.708 0.510 0.686
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.6: Proposition 4 testing based on data from 1999 to 2007, 24 months bond excess returns
This table summarises the results obtained based on data ranging from 1999 to 20.70. The dependent variable is the 24 months
ahead bond excess return. The independent variables are the ratios of long term to total government bond, corporate
bond and loan outstanding respectively (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out , Bond
Corp
LT−out/Bond
Corp
out , Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) and the ratios of
long term to total government bond, corporate bond and loan new issues (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross, Bond
Corp
LT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross,
LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24 Rlt+24 −Rst+24
BondCorpLT−out
BondCorpout
-0.419∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
BondCorpLT−gross
BondCorpgross
0.090
(0.345)
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
-0.039 -0.041
(0.692) (0.674)
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
0.035
(0.724)
LoanCorpLT−out
LoanCorpout
-0.466∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
LoanCorpLT−net
LoanCorpnet
0.187∗∗
(0.030)
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.167 -0.008 -0.016 0.209 0.237
AIC -333.6 -332.5 -313.1 -311.2 -339.1 -342.0
BIC -328.3 -324.5 -307.7 -303.2 -333.7 -333.9
F 22.41 11.65 0.158 0.141 29.09 17.50
p 0.00000691 0.0000273 0.692 0.869 0.000000429 0.000000281
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Proposition 4 testing based on data from 1999 to 2007, 36 months bond excess returns
This table summarises the results obtained based on data ranging from 1999 to 2007. The dependent variable is the 36 months
ahead bond excess return. The independent variables are the ratios of long term to total government bond, corporate
bond and loan outstanding respectively (DGovtLT−out/D
Govt
out , Bond
Corp
LT−out/Bond
Corp
out , Loan
Corp
LT−out/Loan
Corp
out ) and the ratios of
long term to total government bond, corporate bond and loan new issues (DGovtLT−gross/D
Govt
gross, Bond
Corp
LT−gross/Bond
Corp
gross,
LoanCorpLT−net/Loan
Corp
net ).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36 Rlt+36 −Rst+36
BondCorpLT−out
BondCorpout
-0.430∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
BondCorpLT−gross
BondCorpgross
s 0.084
(0.402)
DGovtLT−out
DGovtout
0.328∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
DGovtLT−gross
DGovtgross
0.035
(0.729)
LoanCorpLT−out
LoanCorpout
-0.609∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
LoanCorpLT−net
LoanCorpnet
0.032
(0.702)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 95
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.173 0.098 0.089 0.364 0.358
AIC -249.3 -248.0 -240.7 -238.8 -273.8 -272.0
BIC -244.2 -240.3 -235.6 -231.1 -268.7 -264.3
F 21.08 10.86 11.20 5.606 54.72 27.19
p 0.0000138 0.0000583 0.00118 0.00504 6.02e-11 5.29e-10
Standardized beta coeﬃcients; p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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